Abstract
Following intense negotiations, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats agreed to equalize constituency boundaries and hold a referendum on the Alternative Vote (AV). The chapter examines the parliamentary debate on these reforms, showing that both sides employed different definitions of ‘fairness’ to foster ideological identification. This concept also dominated Cameron’s case against AV in a bitter referendum campaign, and the ensuing friction between the leaders was manifested in a dispute over House of Lords reform. The analysis reveals that this conflict stemmed from the parties’ different interpretations of the Coalition Agreement, which were shaped by their perceived interests. Consequently, Liberal Democrats could justify their decision to back the postponement of the boundary review, which angered the Conservatives but allowed the junior partner to reassert its distinctiveness.
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Notes
- 1.
Under the AV system, candidates are ranked in order of preference. Then, ‘if no candidate is the first preference of a majority of voters, the candidate with the fewest number of first-preference rankings is eliminated and that candidate’s votes are redistributed to the remaining candidates. This process is repeated until one candidate secures 50 per cent of the total vote’ (d’Ancona 2013: 21). It is important to note that AV is not a form of proportional representation.
- 2.
As Vernon Bogdanor (2011: 85, n. 10) points out, exceptions to the 5 per cent rule are the Isle of Wight, the Orkney and Shetland Islands and Comhairle na Eilean Siar (the Western Isles).
- 3.
Similarly, David Davis noted that the Jenkins Commission on electoral reform rejected AV on the ground that ‘in many cases it was actually less proportional—more disproportional—than our current system’ (HC Deb., 6 September 2010, vol. 515 col. 70).
- 4.
As Main put it, ‘AV has been slipped into the Bill as a result of horse-trading—I can put it no other way—to make the Coalition work’ (HC Deb., 6 September 2010, vol. 515 col. 81).
- 5.
Compare the objections of Walker , Jenkin and Main , which were discussed in the previous section.
- 6.
As d’Ancona points out, ‘it had been the Labour members of the “No” team who had insisted on using Clegg’s image in such leaflets. To energize the Labour vote, they argued, it had to be spelt out that the referendum was an opportunity to punish Clegg and the Lib Dems for letting the Tories in’ (2013: 82).
- 7.
- 8.
Likewise, on 29 May 2012, the Conservative Chancellor George Osborne claimed that: ‘Nick is just looking for excuses to torpedo boundary reform, because he is worried about losing MPs in 2015. This stuff about the House of Lords is just a smokescreen’ (quoted in Laws 2016: 150).
- 9.
Note that, in his opening statement on the PVSC Bill , Clegg said these factors would be taken into consideration once the numerical requirement had been met.
- 10.
For instance, Peter Bone MP argued that the deal was ‘a vote on AV in return for Liberal Democrat support on boundary reviews … The Conservative Party kept to that deal but the Liberal Democrats have gone back on their part of it. They are a disgrace and should be on the Opposition Benches’ (HC Deb., 29 January 2013, vol. 557 col. 839).
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Atkins, J. (2018). Constitutional Reform. In: Conflict, Co-operation and the Rhetoric of Coalition Government. Rhetoric, Politics and Society. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-31796-4_4
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