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Living on the Edge pp 45–64Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Opaque Proliferation and Moves Towards Latency

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Abstract

This chapter considers some key aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme in technical terms and examines the implications of the particular approach that Iran has adopted. Themes addressed include the coherence of the civil rationale in light of particular technical developments, the extent and significance of nuclear opacity, and the relationship between the nuclear programme and the military sphere. The period of study for this chapter is 2002 to 2013 because it was over this timeframe that the international spotlight on Iran gained ever more intensity, and technical indicators continually emerged that raised questions over Tehran’s designs in the nuclear area. It is shown that, while these indicators did not provide ‘smoking gun’ evidence to support allegations that Iran’s civil programme disguised a nuclear weapons programme, it was evident that Tehran had moved far beyond what it strictly needed for its civil nuclear programme.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In March 2013, the USA and Iran held secret bilateral talks that paved the way for further engagement with the P5+1 (Permanent Five plus Germany). This development marked the beginning of the more conciliatory approach that was then given momentum by the election of President Rouhani.

  2. 2.

    Latency can also gauged by examining capabilities related to the non-fissile material aspects of weapons production such as relevant high explosives and other elements of a detonation system, the ability to machine uranium metal and so on, as well as a suitable means of delivery such as a ballistic missile.

  3. 3.

    Wyn Q. Bowen and Jonathan Brewer, ‘Iran’s nuclear challenge: nine years and counting’, International Affairs (2011), Vol. 87, No. 4, p. 926.

  4. 4.

    Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, ‘Meeting Iran’s nuclear fuel supply needs’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5 June 2014.

  5. 5.

    See Mark Fitzpatrick (ed.), Nuclear black markets: Pakistan, A. Q. Khan and the rise of proliferation networks. A net assessment (London: IISS, 2007).

  6. 6.

    See, for example, Graham T. Allison, ‘How Close Is Iran to Exploding Its First Nuclear Bomb?’, Scientific American, 30 May 2012.

  7. 7.

    Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Iran: the fragile promise of the fuel-swap plan’, Survival (2010), Vol. 52, No. 3, p. 78.

  8. 8.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2013/6, 21 February 2013, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2013-6.pdf, pp. 3–7.

  9. 9.

    Ibid.

  10. 10.

    According to Iran Watch, these figures ‘account for the fact that Iran has been converting some of its low-enriched uranium gas (about 3.5 per cent in the isotope U-235) to medium-enriched uranium gas (about 20 per cent U-235), and that Iran has converted about 40 per cent of the medium-enriched uranium gas into fuel assemblies for a research reactor’. See ‘Iran’s Nuclear Timetable’, Iran Watch, 23 February 2013, http://www.iranwatch.org/ourpubs/articles/iranucleartimetable.html

  11. 11.

    David Albright, Christina Walrond, Andrea Stricker, and Robert Avagyan, ‘ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report’, Institute for Science and International Security, 21 February 2013, http://www.isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/ISIS_Analysis_IAEA_safeguards_Report_21Feb2013.pdf

  12. 12.

    Hymans and Gratias, ‘Iran and the Nuclear Threshold’, p. 15. A significant quantity refers to the approximate amount of highly enriched uranium required for one nuclear weapon. IAEA guidance refers to an approximate amount of 25 kg (U-235 ≥ 20 %).

  13. 13.

    Fredrik Dahl, ‘Iran may be limiting sensitive nuclear stockpile: diplomats’, Reuters, 9 August 2013.

  14. 14.

    ‘Diplomats: Iran may be limiting nuclear stockpile, staying below “red line”’, Jerusalem Post, 19 August 2013.

  15. 15.

    ‘Joint Plan of Action, Geneva, 24 November 2013’, European Union External Action Service website, http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131124_03_en.pdf, p. 1.

  16. 16.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2014/10, 20 February 2014, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2014-10.pdf, p. 1.

  17. 17.

    For a discussion of centrifuge numbers and sophistication in the context of Iranian latency and breakout potential, see Ivanka Barzashka, ‘Using Enrichment Capacity to Estimate Iran’s Breakout Potential’, Federation of the American Scientists Issue Brief, 21 January 2011; and William C. Witt, Christina Walrond, David Albright, and Houston Wood, ‘Iran’s Evolving Breakout Potential’, Institute for Science and International Security Report, 8 October 2012.

  18. 18.

    For a relevant analysis here, see Patrick Disney, ‘Kicking the Hornet’s Nest’, The Nonproliferation Review (2012), Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 159–175.

  19. 19.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2014/10, 20 February 2014, p. 9.

  20. 20.

    David Albright and Christina Walrond, ‘Update on the Arak Reactor’, Institute for Science and International Security, 15 July 2013, p. 1.

  21. 21.

    ‘Peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran policy’, Memorandum from the Ambassador, The Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, London, to the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, 14 June 2003, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/405/405we18.htm

  22. 22.

    ‘Peaceful nuclear activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran policy’, Memorandum from the Ambassador.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    ‘Iran’, US Energy Information Administration, 28 March 2013, http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Iran/iran.pdf

  27. 27.

    Carole Nakhle, ‘Can Oil and Gas Markets Adjust to a Rising Persia?’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 October 2014.

  28. 28.

    ‘Iran announces uranium finds and power plant expansion’, BBC News, 23 February 2013.

  29. 29.

    Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, ‘Meeting Iran’s nuclear fuel supply needs’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 5 June 2014.

  30. 30.

    The NCRI’s remarks to the press on 14 August 2002 can be accessed at: ‘Remarks by Alireza Jafarzadeh on New Information on Top Secret Projects of the Iranian Regime’s Nuclear Program’, 14 August 2002, Iran Watch, http://www.iranwatch.org/library/ncri-new-information-top-secret-nuclear-projects-8-14-02

  31. 31.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2009/74, 16 November 2009, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-74.pdf, p. 2.

  32. 32.

    ‘Statements by President Obama, French President Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Brown on Iranian Nuclear Facility’, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 25 September 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Statements-By-President-Obama-French-President-Sarkozy-And-British-Prime-Minister-Brown-On-Iranian-Nuclear-Facility

  33. 33.

    ‘Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant’, Country Profiles—Iran, Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org/facilities/165/

  34. 34.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2009/74, 16 November 2009, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-74.pdf, p. 2.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., p. 4.

  36. 36.

    ‘Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant’, Country Profiles—Iran, Nuclear Threat Initiative, www.nti.org/facilities/165/

  37. 37.

    ‘Iran “plans new enrichment sites”’, BBC News, 29 November 2009.

  38. 38.

    ‘Iran authorizes 10 new uranium plants’, CNN, 30 November 2009.

  39. 39.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 27 November 2009, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2009-82.pdf, p. 1.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., p. 2.

  41. 41.

    Daniel Salisbury, ‘MITEC’s Procurement of Valves for Arak Heavy Water Reactor’, Project Alpha, King’s College London, 20 June 2013, http://acsss.info/component/k2/item/242-mitec-s-procurement-of-valves-for-arak-heavy-water-reactor

  42. 42.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2008/4, 22 February 2008, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2008-4.pdf, pp. 3–5

  43. 43.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2008-15.pdf, pp. 3–5.

  44. 44.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2010/10, 18 February 2010, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2010-10.pdf, pp. 8–9.

  45. 45.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2009/55, 28 August 2009, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2009-55.pdf, pp. 4–6.

  46. 46.

    Director General, ‘Final Assessment of Past and Present Outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2015/68, 2 December 2015, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_PMD_Assessment_2Dec2015.pdf

  47. 47.

    Ariane Tabatabai, ‘With Controversial Report, a step towards Iran deal implementation’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 3 December 2015, http://thebulletin.org/controversial-report-step-toward-iran-deal-implementation8929

  48. 48.

    Director General, IAEA, 2 December 2015, p. 14.

  49. 49.

    Director General, IAEA, 26 May 2008, pp. 3–5; Director General, IAEA, 22 February 2008, pp. 3–5.

  50. 50.

    Director General, IAEA, 22 February 2008, pp. 3–5.

  51. 51.

    Kelsey Davenport, ‘Iran’s outstanding nuclear issues at a glance’, Arms Control Association, October 2013; See also Director General, IAEA, 26 May 2008, pp. 3–5.

  52. 52.

    Davenport, ‘Iran’s outstanding nuclear issues at a glance’.

  53. 53.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2008-15.pdf, pp. 3–5.

  54. 54.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2008/38, 15 September 2008, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2008-38.pdf, pp. 3–5.

  55. 55.

    Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2009/55, 28 August 2009, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2009-55.pdf, pp. 4–6.

  56. 56.

    45 Director General, IAEA, 15 September 2008, pp. 3–5.

  57. 57.

    Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2011/29, 24 May 2011, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-29.pdf, p. 7.

  58. 58.

    Director General, IAEA, 26 May 2008, pp. 3–5.

  59. 59.

    Director General, IAEA, 15 September 2008, pp. 3–5.

  60. 60.

    Director General, IAEA, 26 May 2008, pp. 3–5.

  61. 61.

    ‘Communication dated 27 August 2007 from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency concerning the text of the “Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the modalities of resolution of the outstanding issues”’, INFCIRC/711, 27 August 2007, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/2007/infcirc711.pdf, p. 4.

  62. 62.

    Director General, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2011/7, 25 February 2011, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-7.pdf, pp. 7–8.

  63. 63.

    Director General, IAEA, 26 May 2008, pp. 3–5.

  64. 64.

    Director General, IAEA, 15 September 2008, pp. 3–5.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. King’s College London, London, UK

    Wyn Bowen, Dina Esfandiary & Matthew Moran

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  2. Dina Esfandiary
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  3. Matthew Moran
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Bowen, W., Esfandiary, D., Moran, M. (2016). Opaque Proliferation and Moves Towards Latency. In: Living on the Edge. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-27309-3_3

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