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The Nature of Nuclear Hedging

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Living on the Edge

Abstract

Nuclear hedging is an established concept in the literature on proliferation behaviour, yet it has received little scholarly attention to date. This chapter begins by situating hedging in relation to other relevant concepts in the field, such as ‘latency’, ‘ambiguity’ and ‘opacity’, before going on to probe the nature and characteristics of nuclear hedging. In particular, the chapter considers how this subtle form of proliferation behaviour might be identified, setting out three original ‘hedging indicators’—technical nuclear development issues, the national nuclear narrative and nuclear diplomacy on the part of the suspect state—which, taken together, form an analytical lens through which countries suspected of hedging can be viewed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    In a 2011 report to its board of governors, the IAEA outlined the concerns with the past military dimensions of its nuclear programme. See Director General, ‘Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran’, Report to the IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2011/65, 8 November 2011, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65.pdf

  2. 2.

    Jacques E.C. Hymans and Matthew S. Gratias, ‘Iran and the Nuclear Threshold’, The Nonproliferation Review (2013), Vol. 20, No. 1, p. 13.

  3. 3.

    Ibid.

  4. 4.

    Ibid.

  5. 5.

    Ariel E. Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited’, International Security (2002), Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 59–69.

  6. 6.

    ‘Visible proliferation’, discussed in greater detail later in the chapter, is the term used to describe the first wave of nuclear weapons proliferation where the pursuit of such weapons was highly visible, in relative terms, and proliferation was not yet viewed in terms of deviant behaviour. This would change with the establishment of the NPT and the emergence of a global non-proliferation regime.

  7. 7.

    Avner Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, Journal of Strategic Studies (1990), Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 15.

  8. 8.

    Daniel Dombey, ‘FT Interview: Mohammed El Baradei’, Financial Times, 19 February 2007.

  9. 9.

    Cited in Robert S. Litwak, ‘Living with Ambiguity: Nuclear Deals with Iran and North Korea’, Survival (2008), Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 114.

  10. 10.

    James R. Clapper, ‘Statement on the record on the worldwide threat assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’, 16 February 2011, p. 4, http://intelligence.senate.gov/110216/dni.pdf

  11. 11.

    ‘“This Week” transcript: Jake Tapper interviews CIA Director Leon Panetta’, ABC News, 27 June 2010.

  12. 12.

    Amos Harel, ‘IDF chief to Haaretz: I do not believe Iran will decide to develop nuclear weapons’, Haaretz, 25 April 2012.

  13. 13.

    Ibid.

  14. 14.

    Walter B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1956), Vol. 56, pp. 167–198.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., p.168.

  16. 16.

    Gallie sets out a schema of what a concept must include to be essentially contested. Among other criteria, the concept must be capable of being variously described in terms of style, method, tactics and strategy; the original exemplar must be capable of being sustained despite debate; and, ultimately, there is no way of testing empirically which definition is right or wrong.

  17. 17.

    Cited in Levite ‘Never Say Never Again’, p. 70.

  18. 18.

    George H. Quester, ‘Some conceptual problems in nuclear proliferation’, The American Political Science Review (1972), Vol. 66, No. 2, p. 493.

  19. 19.

    Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, p. 69.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., p. 71.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, ‘Thinking About the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option’, Naval War College Review (2009), Vol. 62, No. 3, pp. 63–64.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    Ibid.

  25. 25.

    Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mary Beth Nikitin, ‘Japan’s Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and US Interests’, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 19 February 2009, p. 2. See also: Yuri Kase, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968–70 Internal Report’, The Nonproliferation Review (2001), Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 55–68.

  26. 26.

    Llewelyn Hughes, ‘Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization Of Japan’, International Security (2007), Vol. 31, No. 4, p. 69.

  27. 27.

    Ibid., p. 91.

  28. 28.

    Ibid.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., pp. 91–92.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., p. 93.

  31. 31.

    Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, p. 73.

  32. 32.

    Ibid.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    Cohen and Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, p. 16.

  35. 35.

    Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, p. 72.

  36. 36.

    Cohen and Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, p. 14.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., p. 23.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., p. 17.

  39. 39.

    Ibid., p. 15.

  40. 40.

    Ibid., pp. 17–18.

  41. 41.

    Ibid., p. 21.

  42. 42.

    Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), p. ix.

  43. 43.

    Avner Cohen, ‘And Then There Was One’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (1998), Vol. 54, No. 5, p.51.

  44. 44.

    For a detailed study of the Vanunu Affair, see Yoel Cohen, The Whistleblower of Dimona: Israel, Dimona and the Bomb (New York: Holmes and Meier, 2003); and Peter Hounam, The Woman from Mossad: The Torment of Mordechai Vanunu (London: Vision, 1998).

  45. 45.

    Cohen and Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, p. 23.

  46. 46.

    For a detailed study of South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme, see J.W. de Villiers, Roger Jardine and Mitchell Reiss, ‘Why South Africa gave up the bomb’, Foreign Affairs (1993), Vol. 72, No. 5, pp. 98–109; and Frank V. Pabian, ‘South Africa’s nuclear weapon programme: Lessons for U.S. nonproliferation policy’, The Nonproliferation Review (1995), Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 1–19.

  47. 47.

    A suspected Israeli–South African low-yield atomic test over the South Atlantic in September 1979 was never conclusively proven.

  48. 48.

    De Villiers, Jardine and Reiss, ‘Why South Africa gave up the bomb’, p. 98.

  49. 49.

    Ibid., pp. 100–101.

  50. 50.

    Avner Cohen, The Worst Kept Secret: Israel’s Bargain with the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 266.

  51. 51.

    Cohen and Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, p. 26. For a more revealing account, see Leonard S. Spector, ‘Silent Spread’, Foreign Policy (1985), No. 58, pp. 53–78. By the end of the 1960s, the USA accepted that Israel was in possession of nuclear weapons. Having failed to prevent this occurring, the US approach then switched to preventing Israel from declaring its capability and undermining both US non-proliferation policy and regional stability. Opacity was the ideal solution in that it provided a means of recognising the reality of a nuclear-armed Israel without formally challenging non-proliferation policy.

  52. 52.

    Cohen and Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, p. 19. Taking the domestic context in Israel as an example, Evron demonstrates how a posture of ambiguity allows the Israeli population to reconcile the belief that Israel has nuclear weapons with a cultural and moralistic unease regarding the destructive potential of nuclear weapons. See Yair Evron, ‘Opaque proliferation: The Israeli Case’, Journal of Strategic Studies (1990), Vol. 13, No. 3, p. 48.

  53. 53.

    Samina Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices’, International Security (1999), Vol. 23, No. 4, p. 186.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    Ibid., p. 194.

  56. 56.

    Cohen and Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, p. 19.

  57. 57.

    Aaron Karp argues that the ballistic missile programme played a key role in fuelling suspicions regarding Argentina’s nuclear weapons aspirations: ‘[I]f the nuclear weapons program was an illusion, it is impossible to understand why the Argentine Air Force clung so determinedly to the Condor-2 in the face of President Menem’s efforts to kill it.’ See Aaron Karp and Julio Carasales, ‘Argentina and the Bomb’, The Nonproliferation review (2000), Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 189–190.

  58. 58.

    Frank Barnaby, How Nuclear Weapons Spread Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 87.

  59. 59.

    Argentina ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1993 and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1995.

  60. 60.

    Julio C. Carasales, ‘The so‐called proliferator that wasn’t: The story of Argentina’s nuclear policy’, The Nonproliferation Review (1999), Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 54.

  61. 61.

    Ibid., p. 54.

  62. 62.

    Cohen and Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, p. 19.

  63. 63.

    Itty Abraham, ‘Contra-proliferation: Interpreting the Meanings of India’s Nuclear Tests in 1974 and 1998’, in Scott Sagan (ed.), Inside Nuclear South Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), p.117.

  64. 64.

    Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1984), p. 1.

  65. 65.

    Ibid.

  66. 66.

    Quoted in Scott D. Sagan, ‘Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation’, in William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (eds.), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory, Volume 1 (Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 85.

  67. 67.

    Sagan, ‘Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation’, pp. 89–90.

  68. 68.

    Ibid.

  69. 69.

    Ibid.

  70. 70.

    Avner Cohen and Joseph F. Pilat, ‘Assessing Virtual Nuclear Arsenals’, Survival (1998), Vol. 40, No. 1, p. 129.

  71. 71.

    Cohen and Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, p. 20

  72. 72.

    Lally Weymouth, ‘Q&A: ElBaradei, Feeling the Nuclear Heat’, Washington Post, 30 January 2005.

  73. 73.

    Cohen and Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, p. 20

  74. 74.

    Quester, ‘Some conceptual problems in nuclear proliferation’, p. 491.

  75. 75.

    Michael Howard, ‘Grand Strategy in the Twentieth Century’, Defence Studies (2001), Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 2.

  76. 76.

    Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Third edition (Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. xviii.

  77. 77.

    Cohen and Frankel, ‘Opaque nuclear proliferation’, p. 35.

  78. 78.

    See, for example, Fredrik Dahl, ‘Experts argue over Iran nuclear bomb timeline’, Reuters, 7 December 2011; Greg Jones, ‘Earliest Date Possible for Iran’s First Bomb, February 2012’, Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre, 6 December 2011; and David Albright and Jacqueline Shire, ‘Iran’s Growing Weapons Capability and Its Impact on Negotiations’, Arms Control Today, December 2009.

  79. 79.

    Sagan, ‘Nuclear Latency and Nuclear Proliferation’, p. 98

  80. 80.

    Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, p. 72.

  81. 81.

    Quester, ‘Some conceptual problems in nuclear proliferation’, p. 493.

  82. 82.

    Ibid.

  83. 83.

    Ibid., p. 497.

  84. 84.

    Levite highlights this tension in his article. See Levite Levite, ‘Never Say Never Again’, pp. 72–75.

  85. 85.

    Mark Fitzpatrick (ed.), North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, 2011), p. 93.

  86. 86.

    Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 252.

  87. 87.

    Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the bomb: American nuclear intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: Norton, 2006), p. 347.

  88. 88.

    Wade L. Huntley, ‘Rebels without a Cause: North Korea, Iran and the NPT’, International Affairs (2006), Vol. 82, No. 4, p. 723. See also Fitzpatrick, North Korean Security Challenges, chapters 4–5; Paul Bracken, ‘Nuclear weapons and state survival in North Korea’, Survival (1993), Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 137–153; and Sang Hoon Park, ‘North Korea and the challenge to the US-South Korean Alliance’, Survival (1994), Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 78–91.

  89. 89.

    Fitzpatrick, North Korean Security Challenges, pp. 68–69.

  90. 90.

    Kai He and Huiyun Feng, ‘Deceptive Bargaining and Nuclear Ambitions: Prospect Theory and North Korea’s decision to Go Nuclear’, in Stephen G. Walker, Akan Malici and Mark Schafer, Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioural International Relations (Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2011), p. 103.

  91. 91.

    James M. Acton, ‘The Problem with Nuclear Mind Reading’, Survival (2009), Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 120–124.

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  1. King’s College London, London, UK

    Wyn Bowen, Dina Esfandiary & Matthew Moran

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  1. Wyn Bowen
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  2. Dina Esfandiary
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Bowen, W., Esfandiary, D., Moran, M. (2016). The Nature of Nuclear Hedging. In: Living on the Edge. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-27309-3_2

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