China’s Worldview and Its Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy

  • John F. Copper


As noted in Volume 1, Chapter 1, since 1950, the People’s Republic of China has given foreign assistance to a significant number of countries throughout the world. By most accounts China has been very generous—giving aid at considerable cost and sacrifice. More important to the analysis here, its foreign assistance has been, and is, a much more important instrument of China’s diplomacy than it is for most aid-giving countries. Explaining this is not easy; it requires assessing both China’s history and its leaders’ worldviews.


Foreign Policy Intermediate Zone Chinese Communist Party World Country Chinese Leader 
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