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Using Aid and Investment Diplomacy to Isolate Taiwan

  • John F. Copper

Abstract

The People’s Republic of China has allocated a substantial amount of its foreign aid and investments to deal with the “Taiwan issue.” Specifically, China has given economic help to a host of developing countries in order to reduce Taipei’s formal diplomatic ties, diminish its status as a nation-state, isolate Taiwan from the international community, and compel Taiwan’s government to negotiate with China for the island’s reunification.

Keywords

Democratic Progressive Party Chinese Leader United Nations Security Council Diplomatic Relation Taiwan Issue 
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Notes

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