China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy in Northeast and Central Asia

  • John F. Copper


China extended foreign assistance to two Northeast Asian countries—North Korea and Mongolia—during the early period of its aid giving. In the case of North Korea, China provided massive help in the form of both economic and military aid (including soldiers) during the Korean War and subsequently funds for postwar reconstruction. Since then China has provided very large amounts of aid and investments to North Korea. North Korea was, and arguably still is, the largest recipient of China’s financial assistance anywhere.


Nuclear Weapon Chinese Leader Foreign Assistance Central Asian Country Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
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