China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy in South Asia

  • John F. Copper


When the People’s Republic of China came into being in 1949, China’s national interests in South Asia were clearly secondary to its interests in both Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. Still, China’s leaders saw good reasons to seek cordial relations with and/or improve ties with countries in South Asia. With time China’s interests there increased markedly.


Nuclear Weapon Chinese Leader South Asian Country Foreign Assistance Missile Technology Control Regime 
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