China’s Foreign Aid and Investment Diplomacy to African Nations—II

  • John F. Copper


In the late 1970s, China dramatically reduced its foreign assistance to nations on the African continent and did not restart its giving in a meaningful way until the 1990s and after. The cutback in aid to African nations was much starker than other regions mainly because Africa was more distant and hence China’s security and other interests there were less vital. In addition, China’s support for wars of national liberation, which had earlier motivated China’s aid giving in Africa more than other areas, was ended. Finally, China no longer wished to help socialist regimes of which there were many in Africa.


African Country Chinese Leader African Nation Debt Relief Foreign Assistance 
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© John F. Copper 2016

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