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Abstract

Chinese investment cycles result from a collective action problem facing the Party and its members. On the one hand, overinvestment is undesirable for the Party as a whole because it is economically destabilizing. Individual decision makers, on the other hand, do not take the macroeconomic effects of their actions into account. For local officials, the optimal level of investment may be practically unlimited, particularly when the objective is to advance their own careers or to provide a vehicle for corruption.

Keywords

Political Reform Collective Action Problem Soft Budget Constraint Animal Spirit Individual Decision Maker 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    The Charter 08 quotations given here are from the translation in: Liu Xiaobo, No Enemies, No Hatred (London: Belknap Press, 2012).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), 3.Google Scholar
  3. 4.
    Bloomberg News, “China’s Billionaire People’s Congress Makes Capitol Hill Look Like Paupers.” Bloomberg.com, February 27, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-26/china-s-billionaire-lawmakers-make-u-s-peers-look-like-paupers.html.Google Scholar
  4. 5.
    Pei Minxin, “China’s Politics of the Economically Possible.” Project Syndicate, March 16, 2012, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/chinas-politics-of-the-economically-possibleGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Mark A. DeWeaver 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark A. De Weaver

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