U.S. Strategy in the Korean Conflict
It is not surprising that the ideological makeup of the Bush administration produced an approach to the Korean conflict that differed from the Clinton years. The shock of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, however, lent a new focus and urgency to the Bush administration’s foreign policy. Stopping nuclear proliferation became an overriding priority, leading to a sharper departure from the Clinton administration’s engagement approach.
KeywordsNuclear Weapon Agree Framework Ballistic Missile Nuclear Program Congressional Research
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