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North Korea in Crisis: Regime, Identity, and Strategy

  • Terence Roehrig

Abstract

When World War II came to a close, the United States and the Soviet Union made the decision to divide Korea following Japan’s surrender.1 This decision to separate the peninsula physically severed the common identity held by the Korean people for over 1,200 years. Since that time, the North and South have headed in different directions. While retaining some elements of a common historical and cultural identity, they have pursued radically different political and economic paths.

Keywords

Nuclear Weapon Agree Framework Korean People Benevolent Leader Nuclear Weapon Program 
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Notes

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Copyright information

© Shale Horowitz, Uk Heo, Alexander C. Tan 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  • Terence Roehrig

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