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Dutch—Chinese Bilateral Relations: Constant Elements of a Bilateral Relationship in a Changing World System

  • Henk Houweling

Abstract

In this study of Dutch—Chinese bilateral relations, I will first introduce my theoretical approach to the topic. My approach to the study of foreign policy interactions and its rationale is given in section 2. Section 3 summarises early contacts between Dutchmen and Chinese in East Asian waters. A description of early interaction between Chinese and Dutchmen gives, in my view, insights into behavioural continuities in Dutch—Chinese encounters. Section 4 focuses on diplomatic relations since World War II, encompassing the early recognition by the Dutch government of the communist regime in mainland China and the controversies about weapon deliveries to Taiwan in the 1980s. Section 5 gives an overview of economic relations between the Netherlands and the worlds of the Chinese at present times.

Keywords

Foreign Policy Security Council Dutch Government East Asian Region Diplomatic Relation 
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Notes

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© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2000

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  • Henk Houweling

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