War or Peace Across the Taiwan Strait

  • Steve Tsang
Part of the St Antony’s Series book series


The most difficult and dangerous issue that may lead to war between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States (US) is a confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. This is not changed by the fact that none of those directly involved, Taiwan, the PRC and the US wishes to see a military conflict. War or peace across the Taiwan Strait remains a serious issue as the PRC is determined to secure sovereignty over Taiwan while the latter is equally adamant that its own future must be decided not by the PRC or any other power but by the people who live in Taiwan, and the US is committed to help Taiwan defend itself and its democratic way of life. The assertion of its right, inherent in a democracy, to self-determination by Taiwan raises the prospect that its people may choose never to become part of the PRC or even of a China to be constituted by a union of the PRC and Taiwan. From Beijing’s point of view, such a development would be tantamount to Taiwan opting for independence and would be a trigger for war.


Chinese Communist Party Chinese Mainland Ming Dynasty Democratic Progressive Party Peace Treaty 
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© Steve Tsang 2004

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  • Steve Tsang

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