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The National Affairs Conference

  • C. L. Chiou

Abstract

Although the DPP performed credibly in the 6 December 1986 elections, the KMT did not treat them as a loyal opposition and accept them as a constitutional equal who could legitimately replace them as a new government. In the following three years, the thirteen-member DPP minority in the Legislative Yuan, although outnumbered by about twenty to one by the KMT, took quite a militant, sometimes violent, approach to disrupt the nation’s legislative processes. Particularly, young Chu Kao-cheng, dubbed “Taiwan’s warship”, effectively and skilfully used his “body language”, often forcing the house into an uncontrollable, violent but farcical chaos.1 Showmanship was involved in the DPP performance, compelling the KMT to respond in a very awkward manner. Although not attaining much success in the public policy area because of their small numbers, or preventing the ruling party from pushing through non-democratic, even anti-democratic, policies and laws, such as the hasty passing of the National Security Law to replace martial law in June 1987, the DPP still managed to break many political taboos, such as its open advocacy of Taiwanese independence and calls for investigation of the 28 February incident. And they did force the KMT to make some political concessions, such as liberalizing press control and releasing political prisoners.

Keywords

Presidential Election Constitutional Reform Political Prisoner National Affair Legislative Yuan 
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Notes

  1. 10.
    For the 1990 elections, see China Times, 22–23 December 1990. For the 1992 elections, see Chinese Times, 20–21 December 1992; Linda Gail Arrigo, “A Brief Report on Taiwan’s National Legislative Yuan Elections, 19 December 1992”, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 25:1 (January–March 1993) pp. 34–41;Google Scholar
  2. Julian Baum, “The Hollow Centre: Poll Result Undermines President’s Power”, Far Eastern Economic Review (7 January 1993) pp. 14–15;Google Scholar
  3. Nicholas D. Kristof, “Taiwan Election Helps Opposition: Governing Party’s Majority Sharply Pared in Vote — A ‘New Era’ Is Seen”, New York Times (20 December 1992 ).Google Scholar
  4. 11.
    For the 1993 elections, see China Times (28–29 November 1993); Julian Baum, “Democracy Banquet: President Lee Leads Ruling Party to Victory”, Far Eastern Economic Review (9 December 1994) p. 21.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© C. L. Chiou 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • C. L. Chiou
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.University of QueenslandAustralia
  2. 2.National Science CouncilTaiwan

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