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Political Socialisation

  • Yongjin Zhang
Part of the St Antony’s Series book series

Abstract

China’s emerging new conceptions of war and peace, revolution and development, as well as dependence and inter-dependence in the present-day international system are not only significant in themselves. More importantly, these changing ‘images of the world’ are, to adapt Weber slightly, what have since determined the track on which the dynamism of China’s national interests keep Chinese foreign policy performing. The changing perceptions on the part of China of the existing international system and major institutions associated with that system are therefore more satisfactory explanations of China’s changing behaviour in international society in the 1980s and the 1990s. This argument does not simply derive from the fact that those changing perceptions have clear expressions in China’s operational foreign policies. Rather, it is because of the explanatory power/potential of perceptual changes in unriddling China’s often puzzling and erratic international behaviour.

Keywords

Security Council Security Council Resolution Political Socialisation Chinese Foreign Policy Draft Resolution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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    There is a particular account in Lewis’s article about this. The sale of DF-3 missiles to Saudi Arabia was negotiated by Poly Technologies, an affiliate of the General Staff Department and the COSTIND, but objected to by the Foreign Ministry on political grounds. When the dispute was referred to Deng Xiaoping, he only asked, ‘How much money did you make?’ When he was told it would be ‘two billion dollars’, he replied ‘bushao’ (quite a large sum). That remark closed the matter. The Foreign Ministry lost its argument. Ibid., p. 96.Google Scholar
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  140. authorised, registered and approved by the government. Their business activities must remain strictly within the scope of operation approved. Contracts for transfer of military equipment and technologies require approval before gaining effect. Major transfer items and contracts must be examined by the SACMPT and approved by the State Council and the Central Military Commission. Stern legal sanction shall be taken against any company or individual who transfers military equipment and technologies without proper governmental examination and approval. See Information Office of the State Council, ‘China: Arms Control and Disarmament’, Beijing Review, 38, 48 (1995) 19.Google Scholar
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  148. At the conclusion of a meeting held in Washington DC on 28 and 19 May (1992) the five permanent members of the Security Council adopted interim guidelines related to weapons of mass destruction, by which they undertook not to assist any non-nuclear weapon state in developing or acquiring nuclear weapons; to notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of the export to a non-nuclear-weapon state of any nuclear materials and to place them under IAEA safeguards; to exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive nuclear facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, equipment or facilities; not to assist any recipient whatsoever in developing or acquiring chemical weapons; and to observe similar restrictions concerning biological weapons. In addition, they agreed on other restrictions regarding the export of items that might be used in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction.Google Scholar
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    Those are actually subtitles for sections of the White Paper. There are ten sections in the White Paper altogether. The others are: I, The Right to Subsistence — the Foremost Human Right the Chinese People Long Fight for; VIII, Family Planning and Protection of Human Rights; IX, Guarantee of Human Rights for the Disabled; and X, Active Participation in International Human Rights Activities.Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© Yongjin Zhang 1998

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yongjin Zhang
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Political StudiesUniversity of AucklandNew Zealand
  2. 2.St Antony’s CollegeOxfordUK

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