Advertisement

How Stable Is China’s Economy?

  • Paul Armstrong-Taylor
Chapter
Part of the Politics and Development of Contemporary China book series (PDCC)

Abstract

Paul Armstrong-Taylor focuses on the risk of rising debt in China. He explains that China’s economic growth has been based on investment and exports. To support growth the government has distorted financial markets by keeping interest rates low. This has caused rapid growth in debt, particularly in the shadow banking sector. The risks are manageable, provided that China actually moves to a more sustainable, if slower, growth path.

Keywords

Interest Rate Financial Crisis Federal Reserve Deposit Insurance Real Estate Price 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Bibliography

  1. Ahuja, A., Cheung, L., Han, G., Porter, N., & Zhang, W. (2010). Are house prices rising too fast in China? (IMF working paper). Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.Google Scholar
  2. Armstrong-Taylor, P. (2014). Trade and financial links during financial crises. Frontiers of Economics in China, 9(4), 556–572.Google Scholar
  3. Bank of America – Merrill Lynch. (2014). The coming trust defaults. Hong Kong: Bank of America – Merrill Lynch.Google Scholar
  4. Barclays. (2014). Financing China – In (orderly) default we trust. Hong Kong: Barclays.Google Scholar
  5. Credit Suisse. (2013). China: Shadow banking – Road to heightened risks. Credit Suisse: Credit Suisse.Google Scholar
  6. Economist Intelligence Unit. (2011). Building Rome in a day. Economist Intelligence Unit London for EIU; New York for JP Morgan.Google Scholar
  7. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. (2013). Shadow banking in China. San Francisco: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.Google Scholar
  8. JP Morgan. (2014). How scary are China’s shadow banks? JP Morgan London for EIU; New York for JP Morgan.Google Scholar
  9. Kim, S.-Y. (2014, February 9). In defense of shadow banking. Retrieved April 24, 2014, from The Indian Economist: http://theindianeconomist.com/in-defense-of-shadow-banking/
  10. Lu, Y., & Sun, T. (2013). Local government financing platforms in China: A fortune or misfortune (IMF working paper, WP/13/243). Washington: International Monetary Fund.Google Scholar
  11. Minsky, H. P. (1994). Failed and successful capitalisms: Lessons from the twentieth century. Retrieved from Hyman P. Minsky Archive: http://digitalcommons.bard.edu/hm_archive/47/
  12. Nomura. (2014). China’s property sector overinvestment. Hong Kong: Nomura.Google Scholar
  13. Pettis, M. (2014, June 18). The four stages of Chinese growth. Retrieved from China Financial Markets: http://blog.mpettis.com/2014/06/the-four-stages-of-chinese-growth/
  14. Qi, L. (2014, February 14). Swelling debt spreads among China’s local governments. Wall Street Journal – China Real Time http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/02/14/swelling-debt-spreads-among-chinas-local-governments/Google Scholar
  15. Rabinovitch, S. (2014, January 2). China gives local governments go-ahead to roll over debt. Financial Times.Google Scholar
  16. Wu, J., Gyourko, J., & Deng, Y. (2012). Evaluating conditions in major Chinese housing markets. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 42, 531–544.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Yu, H. (2011). Size and characteristic of housing bubbles in China’s major cities: 1999–2010. China & World Economy, 19(6), 56–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Zhang, S., & Zhang, C. (2013). Macroeconomic analysis of Q3: Resolving excess capacity and promoting restructuring. Asia Research Center, Copenhagen Business School & Unirule, Institute of Economics, Beijing.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Armstrong-Taylor
    • 1
  1. 1.Hopkins-Nanjing CenterJohns Hopkins-SAISNanjingChina

Personalised recommendations