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Learning more about the FATF: Knowing the tree by its fruits

  • Petrus C. van DuyneEmail author
  • Jackie H. Harvey
  • Liliya Y. Gelemerova
Chapter

Abstract

The FATF prides itself on being the authority that sets global standards for combating money laundering, the financing of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is an inter-governmental organisation and in that capacity a “policy making body”. It does not present itself as a public organisation falling under some other super-ordinate public organisation or authority. It is funded with public money: all members contribute to its operations, roughly in proportion to the size of their economy (GDP). This also applies to the ‘FATF style regional bodies’: the FSRBs. As the whole undertaking is funded from the public purse these bodies should be publicly accountable. Given the inter-governmental status of the FATF, this accountability is assumed to work through the G-20 Heads of State and/or the “FATF-ministers”: the real principals of the FATF who decide on determining and prolonging its mandate. Naturally, the ministers and Heads of State are politically responsible in their own countries. Analogue to this, the FSRBs are responsible to their participating governments: ministers or other designated authorities. Does this imply democratic accountability? The answer is uncertain and depends on the extent of political appreciation. We find no mention of participating countries having different ‘degrees of democracy’, which they do have, ranging from full democracies to one-party states or thinly veiled autocracies. Apparently, this does not hamper the FATF in its functioning (see 3.5.).

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Petrus C. van Duyne
    • 1
    Email author
  • Jackie H. Harvey
    • 2
  • Liliya Y. Gelemerova
    • 3
  1. 1.Department of Penal LawTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Newcastle Business SchoolNorthumbria UniversityNewcastle upon TyneUK
  3. 3.University of ManchesterManchesterUK

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