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Small and Least-Developed Countries

  • Tony Heron
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Handbooks in IPE book series (PHIPE)

Abstract

This chapter focusses on the status and role of small and least-developed countries (SLDC) in the International Political Economy against the backdrop of the structural changes associated with the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India, China (‘BRICs’) and other emerging economies. Although the dominant narrative of the changing global order is one of rapid change and transformation, I argue that the defining theme for SLDCs remains that of enduring vulnerability. In this context, I explore and critically assess different approaches to understanding SLDC agency. I illustrate two key strategies—‘internal’ and ‘external’ agency—which SLDCs have adopted, with varying degrees of success, to manage the vulnerabilities associated with global restructuring. I conclude by considering the overall position of SLDCs in the emergent global economic order.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Tony Heron
    • 1
  1. 1.University of YorkYorkUK

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