Complex Systems, International Political Economy and the Behavioral/Contracts Theory of the Firm

  • Michael I. C. Nwogugu


There are some sociological, behavioral and legal issues that influence the creation and evolution of corporate entities and sometimes results in financial distress. These factors are applicable to the modeling of the rates of business formation, regional economic growth, corporate financial distress, industry structure and economic growth.


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  • Michael I. C. Nwogugu
    • 1
  1. 1.EnuguNigeria

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