Abstract
This chapter discusses Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, particularly the twofold structure of human beings as subject and object simultaneously. When this basic structure collapses, we cease to be human beings. This chapter further focuses on the gap between body-schema and body-image, exploring the phenomenology of belonging and not-belonging to this world.
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Notes
- 1.
We must be careful not to read this sentence from a dualistic perspective but rather as the product of the limitations of language, a recurring problem in the writing of this book.
- 2.
Merleau-Ponty introduced the concept of flesh late in his writing.
- 3.
As opposed to knowing-that (Ryle, 1949).
- 4.
Yet it would be a fundamental mistake to ignore the important role which body-image plays in the structure of perception . For example, in the case of anorexia, body-image can shape, at least to some extent, the structure of the perceptual field . Furthermore, Fanon’s (1968) phenomenological investigation of the “other” (the black man in his case) shows that we must explore much more precisely the link between body-image and body-schema. Thus, if we accept O’Shaughnessy’s (2000) differentiation between short-term body-image and long-term body-image, we can plausibly suggest that long-term dispositions (perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes) toward the body can prenoetically shape the structure of the perceptual field . In such cases, long-term body-image remains hidden while perceiving the world—as does body-schema.
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Ataria, Y. (2018). The Twofold Structure of Human Beings. In: Body Disownership in Complex Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95366-0_2
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