Skip to main content

Britain’s ‘Independent’ Nuclear Deterrent

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
  • 1596 Accesses

Abstract

One of the most important challenges to McNamara’s determination to control the course of any future war, and in particular the moment when there was any possibility of nuclear use, was the fact that when he came to office the United Kingdom already had its own nuclear force and France was on its way to developing one. Although the possibility of multiple nuclear forces had been spoken of as a theoretical possibility for some time this was the point at which it started to come into view.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   49.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See, for example, National Planning Association, The ‘Nth Country’ Problem and Arms Control (New York: NPA, 1959). A corrective to some of the pessimism on the subject is found in Fred Iklé, ‘Nth countries and disarmament’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XVI:10 (December 1960). A useful compilation of articles is R. N. Rosencrance (ed) The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons (New York, Columbia University Press, 1964).

  2. 2.

    Herman Kahn, ‘The arms race and some of its hazards’, in Brennan (ed.), Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, p. 119.

  3. 3.

    The Rationale of Catalytic War (Princeton University Center of International Studies, April 1959).

  4. 4.

    Albert Wohlstetter, ‘Nuclear sharing: NATO and the N + 1 country’, Foreign Affairs, XXXIX:3 (April 1961).

  5. 5.

    Thomas Schelling, ‘Nuclears, NATO and the “New Strategy”’, in Henry Kissinger (ed.), Problems of National Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 179. Schelling regretted (with hindsight) that McNamara’s new strategy was used as an ‘argument against independent nuclear deterrents. The new strategy was new enough, at least in public discussion, to need a sympathetic audience.’

  6. 6.

    Malcolm Hoag, ‘Nuclear strategic options and European force participation’ in R. N. Rosencrance (ed.), op. cit., p. 227.

  7. 7.

    Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, p. 116.

  8. 8.

    Enthoven and Smith, How Much is Enough? p. 131.

  9. 9.

    Cited in Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, pp. 116–7.

  10. 10.

    John Groom’s British Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London: Frances Pinter, 1974).

  11. 11.

    John Garnett, ‘British strategic thought’, in John Baylis (ed.), British Defence Policy in a Changing World (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 163.

  12. 12.

    Hedley Bull, ‘International theory: the case for a classical approach’, World Politics (April 1966).

  13. 13.

    D. G. Brennan, ‘Review of “Strategy and Conscience”’, op. cit., p. 28.

  14. 14.

    Richard Moore, ‘A JIGSAW puzzle for operational researchers: British global war studies, 1954–1962’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 20: 2, 1997, pp. 75–91.

  15. 15.

    Laurence Martin, ‘The market for strategic ideas in Britain’, American Political Science Review, LVI:1 (March 1962), pp. 40–1.

  16. 16.

    Emanuel J. de Kadt, British Defence Policy and Nuclear War (London: Frank Cass, 1964), p. 130.

  17. 17.

    Stephen King-Hall, Power Politics in the Nuclear Age: A Policy for Britain (London: Gollancz Ltd., 1962), p. 171 (emphasis in original).

  18. 18.

    Matthew Jones, ‘The Radford Bombshell: Anglo-Australian-US Relations, Nuclear Weapons and the Defence of South East Asia, 1954–57’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 27, no. 4, 2004, pp. 636–62.

  19. 19.

    Matthew Jones, ‘Up the Garden Path? Britain’s Nuclear History in the Far East, 1954–1962’, The International History Review, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 2003, p. 331.

  20. 20.

    Matthew Jones & John W. Young, ‘Polaris, East of Suez: British Plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 6, 2010, pp. 847–70.

  21. 21.

    For a discussion of the UK nuclear contribution to CENTO, especially the problem of de-conflicting targets with NATO, see: Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role: Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–70 (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 210–4.

  22. 22.

    Television interview of February 1958. Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939–1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 178.

  23. 23.

    Ibid.

  24. 24.

    See for example John Strachey, On the Prevention of War (London: Macmillan, 1962).

  25. 25.

    The McNamara Ascendancy, p. 377.

  26. 26.

    The problems of miscommunication in this affair are examined in Richard Neustadt, Alliance Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970). See also Lawrence Freedman and John Gearson, ‘Interdependence and Independence: Nassau and the British Nuclear Deterrent’, in Kathleen Burk and Melvyn Stokes, eds, The United States and European Alliance since 1945 (Oxford: Berg, 1999).

  27. 27.

    The text of the manifesto can be found online at: http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab64.htm.

  28. 28.

    See for instance, Matthew Jones, The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, Volume I: From the V-Bomber Era to the Arrival of Polaris, 1945–1964 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2017), pp. 525–9.

  29. 29.

    Statement on Defence 1964, Cmnd 2270 (London: HMSO, 1964), p. 6.

  30. 30.

    Kristan Stoddart, ‘Maintaining the “Moscow Criterion”: British Strategic Nuclear Targeting 1974–1979’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 6, 2008.

  31. 31.

    Michael Quinlan, ‘The British Experience’ in Sokoloski, Getting MAD, pp. 265–6.

  32. 32.

    See for instance, Matthew Jones, The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent, Volume II: The Labour Government and the Polaris Programme, 1964–1970 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2017), pp. 368–75.

  33. 33.

    John Baylis, ‘British Nuclear Doctrine: The “Moscow Criterion” and the Polaris Improvement Programme’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 19 No. 1, 2005, 58.

  34. 34.

    Stoddart, op. cit., 2008.

  35. 35.

    Quinlan, op. cit., p. 273.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Lawrence Freedman .

Copyright information

© 2019 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Freedman, L., Michaels, J. (2019). Britain’s ‘Independent’ Nuclear Deterrent. In: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57350-6_22

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics