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Disarmament to Arms Control

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The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy

Abstract

The prescriptive implications of the strategy of stable conflict were radical when it came to how to approach a potential enemy. Measures to stabilise the nuclear relationship made much more sense than attempts to eliminate nuclear weapons from international affairs. This proposition challenged those who had followed the traditional internationalist approach of seeking to contain conflict and mitigate its worst effects.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Kuznick, Prophets of Doom.

  2. 2.

    On the British campaign see Christopher Driver, The Disarmers (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1964).

  3. 3.

    Philip Noel-Baker, The Arms Race (London: John Calder, 1958).

  4. 4.

    Philip Noel-Baker, ‘Peace and the Arms Race,’ Nobel Lecture, December 11, 1959.

  5. 5.

    Hedley Bull, “Disarmament and the International System,” Australian Journal of Politics & History, vol. 5, no. 1 (May 1959), pp. 41–50.

  6. 6.

    http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/never-despair.

  7. 7.

    Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 15.

  8. 8.

    Morgenstern, The Question of National Defense, pp. 9–10.

  9. 9.

    Report by the Panel of Consultants of the Department of State to the Secretary of State, January 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Vol. II, Part 2, Doc. 67. Can be accessed at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v02p2/d67.

  10. 10.

    Progress Report Prepared by the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen), FRUS, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Vol. XX, Doc. 33. Available at: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v20/d33.

  11. 11.

    Bernard Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1961). Tal, The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, pp. 78–91.

  12. 12.

    Leo Szilard, ‘Disarmament and the Problem of Peace’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XI:8 (October 1955), p. 298.

  13. 13.

    One notable attempt to integrate the insights of the formal strategists with those of the nuclear pacifists was J. David Singer, Deterrence, Arms Control and Disarmament, op. cit.

  14. 14.

    Leo Szilard, ‘How to Live with the Bomb and Survive’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XVI:2 (February 1960), p. 59. See also, his proposal for ‘mined cities’ in ‘The Mined Cities’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 17: 10, 1961, pp. 407–12.

  15. 15.

    Schelling, Strategy and Conflict, p. 236. See also Arthur Lee Burns, op. cit.

  16. 16.

    Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), pp. 1–2.

  17. 17.

    Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, p. 232.

  18. 18.

    Schelling and Halperin, op. cit., p. 5.

  19. 19.

    Jennifer E. Sims, Icarus Restrained: An Intellectual History of American Arms Control, 1945–1960 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990).

  20. 20.

    Don Brennan, Ed., Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security (New York: Braziller, 1961).

  21. 21.

    Paul Kecskemeti, ‘Review: Disarmament, Arms Control, and Strategic Analysis’, Science, 134: 3495 (22 December 1961), pp. 2031–3.

  22. 22.

    There is some link with the earlier usage in Hedley Bull’s definition of arms control as ‘restraint internationally exercised upon armaments policy’. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race, p. 1.

  23. 23.

    Schelling and Halperin, op. cit, p. 2.

  24. 24.

    Alva Myrdal, The Game of Disarmament: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1977), p. xiv.

  25. 25.

    Robert Osgood, ‘Stabilizing the military environment’, American Political Science Review, LV:1 (March 1961).

  26. 26.

    Malcolm Hoag, ‘On Stability in Deterrent Races’, World Politics, XIII:4 (July 1961), p. 522.

  27. 27.

    The term is taken from Thomas Murray, Nuclear Policy for War and Peace (Ohio: World Publishing Co., 1960), p. 28. Murray, a catholic member of the Atomic Energy Commission, attempted more than most others connected with the nuclear programme to inject a moral element into the debate. A discussion of a variety of ethical problems is found in Green, Deadly Logic, chap. 6. Green also provides a useful bibliography. Green’s ideas are discussed, unsympathetically, in Morton A. Kaplan (ed.), Strategic Thinking and Its Moral Implications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973). See also Sydney Bailey, Prohibitions and Restraints in Warfare (London, Oxford University Press, 1972).

  28. 28.

    Kahn made this reference during his talk on ‘National Defense and Arms Control’ to the Commonwealth Club of California, February 10, 1961.

  29. 29.

    Lieutenant-General Sir John Cowley, ‘Future trends in warfare’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute (February 1960), p. 13.

  30. 30.

    The 1961 review in Scientific American is collected with other small pieces by Newman in The Rule of Folly (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1962). Bertrand Russell’s book was entitled Commonsense and Nuclear Warfare (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959).

  31. 31.

    C. P. Snow, ‘The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science’, American Association for the Advancement of Science (1960).

  32. 32.

    Accidental War: Some Dangers in the 1960s, Mershon National Security Program Research Paper (June 1960).

  33. 33.

    Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

  34. 34.

    Aaron Wildavsky, ‘Practical consequences of the theoretical study of defence policy’, Public Administration Review, XXV (March 1965). Re-printed in The Revolt Against the Masses (New York: Basic Books, 1971).

  35. 35.

    Robert Jervis, ‘Hypotheses on misperception’, World Politics, XX (April 1968), p. 455.

  36. 36.

    Green, op. cit., p. xii.

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Freedman, L., Michaels, J. (2019). Disarmament to Arms Control. In: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-57350-6_16

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