Abstract
A noncooperative game is formulated on a transportation network with congestion. The players are associated with origin-destination pairs; each player supplies from an origin a destination, where demand is variable. A Nash-Cournot equilibrium is defined and conditions for existence and uniqueness are provided. The asymptotic behaviour of the equilibrium is shown to yield a total flow vector corresponding to a competitive equilibrium.
Research supported by NSERC Grant #A4952, SSHRC Grant #410-81-0722-R2, FCAC Grant #AS-26.
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© 1986 The Mathematical Programming Society, Inc.
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Haurie, A., Marcotte, P. (1986). A game-theoretic approach to network equilibrium. In: Gallo, G., Sandi, C. (eds) Netflow at Pisa. Mathematical Programming Studies, vol 26. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0121108
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0121108
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Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-00922-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-00923-5
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