Abstract
We briefly consider certificate revocation lists (CRLs), and ask whether they could, and should, be eliminated, in favor of other mechanisms. In most cases, the answer seems to be “yes.” We suggest some possible replacement mechanisms.
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© 1998 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Rivest, R.L. (1998). Can we eliminate certificate revocation lists?. In: Hirchfeld, R. (eds) Financial Cryptography. FC 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1465. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0055482
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0055482
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