Abstract
In this paper we improve Davies' attack [2] on DES to become capable of breaking the full 16-round DES faster than the exhaustive search. Our attack requires 250 complexity of the data collection and 250 the complexity of analysis. An alternative approach finds 24 key bits of DES with 252 known plaintexts and the data analysis requires only several minutes on a SPARC. Therefore, this is the third successful attack on DES, faster than brute force, after differential cryptanalysis [1] and linear cryptanalysis [5]. We also suggest criteria which make the S-boxes immune to this attack.
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References
Eli Biham, Adi Shamir, Differential Cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard, Springer-Verlag,1993.
D.W. Davies, Investigation of a Potential Weakness in the DES Algorithm, private communications, 1987.
D. Davies, S. Murphy, Pairs and Triplets of DES S-boxes, to appear in the Journal of Cryptology.
Kwang-jo Kim, Sang-jin Lee, Sang-jun Park, How to Strengthen DES against Differential Attack, private communications, 1994.
Mitsuru Matsui, Linear Cryptanalysis Method for DES Cipher, Abstracts of EUROCRYPT'93, pp. W112–W123, May 1993.
National Bureau of Standards, Data Encryption Standard, Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 46, January 1977.
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© 1995 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Biham, E., Biryukov, A. (1995). An improvement of Davies' attack on DES. In: De Santis, A. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — EUROCRYPT'94. EUROCRYPT 1994. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 950. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0053464
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0053464
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