Abstract
The Nash bargaining solution in a sequential cooperative game with dynamic information is studied. The bargaining scheme is applied at each stage, where the gains from the cooperation are measured by considering the past, the current and the future gains. It is shown that at each stage the cooperative policy can be selected as if the current contract would remain in effect over the remainder of the time horizon of cooperation.
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References
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© 1989 Springer-Verlag
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Ruusunen, J., Ehtamo, H., Hämäläinen, R.P. (1989). Bargaining with dynamic information. In: Blaquiére, A. (eds) Modeling and Control of Systems. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol 121. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0041203
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0041203
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Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50790-1
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