Abstract
We consider cryptographic protocols for elections over computer networks. In addition to the requirements imposed upon customary secret balloting systems, we discuss possibilities of recasting one's vote, as well as verifying that it has been properly counted. All this should happen without compromising secrecy or relying on trusted persons and groups.
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References
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© 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Salomaa, A. (1991). Verifying and recasting secret ballots in computer networks. In: Maurer, H. (eds) New Results and New Trends in Computer Science. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 555. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0038196
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0038196
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