Abstract
A solution of the deterministic two-person closed-loop Stackelberg game with linear dynamics and quadratic cost functions has been discussed, with the emphasis made on interpretation of the proposed Stackelberg strategies. The basic result has been formulated for the game with the leader perfectly dominating the follower, and then various extensions of this result for more general games have been outlined. It should be noted, that although a considerable progress in the study of closed-loop Stackelberg games has recently been achieved, many aspects of the theory, especially those concerned with continuous-time and multiperson problems, require further investigation.
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© 1980 Springer-Verlag
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Tołwiński, B. (1980). Closed-loop stackelberg solution and threats in dynamic games. In: Iracki, K., Malanowski, K., Walukiewicz, S. (eds) Optimization Techniques. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol 22. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0036401
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0036401
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