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Closed-loop stackelberg solution and threats in dynamic games

  • B. Tołwiński
Differential Games
Part of the Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences book series (LNCIS, volume 22)

Abstract

A solution of the deterministic two-person closed-loop Stackelberg game with linear dynamics and quadratic cost functions has been discussed, with the emphasis made on interpretation of the proposed Stackelberg strategies. The basic result has been formulated for the game with the leader perfectly dominating the follower, and then various extensions of this result for more general games have been outlined. It should be noted, that although a considerable progress in the study of closed-loop Stackelberg games has recently been achieved, many aspects of the theory, especially those concerned with continuous-time and multiperson problems, require further investigation.

Keywords

Decision Rule Optimal Control Problem Dynamic Game Stackelberg Game General Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • B. Tołwiński
    • 1
  1. 1.Polish Academy of SciencesSystems Research InstituteWarszawaPoland

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