Probabilistic default logic based on irrelevance and relevance assumptions

  • Gerhard Schurz
Accepted Papers
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 1244)


This paper embeds default logic into an extension of Adams' probability logic, called the system P + DP. Default reasoning is furnished with two mechanisms: one generates (ir)relevance assumptions, and the other propagates lower probability bounds. Together both mechanisms make default reasoning probabilistically reliable. There is an exact correspondence between Poole-extensions and P + DP-extensions. The procedure for P + DP-entailment is comparable in complexity with Poole's procedure.


Probabilistic Default Default Logic Default Reasoning Open Formula Inference Step 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1997

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerhard Schurz
    • 1
  1. 1.Inst. f. Philosophie, Abtlg. Logik und WissenschaftstheorieUniversität SalzburgDeutschland

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