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Fault tolerant anonymous channel

  • Session 15: Protocols
  • Conference paper
  • First Online:
Information and Communications Security (ICICS 1997)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 1334))

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Abstract

Previous anonymous channels, called MIX nets, do not work if one center stops. This paper shows new anonymous channels which allow less than a half of faulty centers. A fault tolerant multivalued election scheme is obtained automatically. A very efficient ZKIP for the centers is also presented.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Himeji Institute of Technology, Japan

    Wakaha Ogata & Kazunori Takatani

  2. Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan

    Kaoru Kurosawa

  3. NEC Corporation, Japan

    Kazue Sako

Authors
  1. Wakaha Ogata
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  2. Kaoru Kurosawa
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  3. Kazue Sako
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  4. Kazunori Takatani
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Editor information

Yongfei Han Tatsuaki Okamoto Sihan Qing

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© 1997 Springer-Verlag

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Ogata, W., Kurosawa, K., Sako, K., Takatani, K. (1997). Fault tolerant anonymous channel. In: Han, Y., Okamoto, T., Qing, S. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 1997. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 1334. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0028500

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0028500

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-63696-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-69628-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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