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A default logic based on epistemic states

Extended abstract
  • J. -J. Ch. Meyer
  • W. van der Hoek
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 747)

Abstract

We indicate how default logic can be based on epistemic logic, and particularly how we may employ Halpern & Moses' minimal epistemic states for this purpose. In the context of default reasoning Halpern & Moses' entailment based on honest formulas is used to infer what is considered epistemically possible. These epistemic possibilities can be used in defaults in a way that is similar to the representation in AEL, but in which the nonmonotonicity appears at a different place: at the inference of ignorance rather than at the jumping to conclusions. In this way we obtain a simple and natural non-monotonic logic for default reasoning that is cumulative, almost by design. We give a model-theoretical characterization of the non-monotonic entailment associated with this logic in terms of S5-like models.

Keywords

Epistemic State Epistemic Logic Default Theory Epistemic Possibility Default Logic 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1993

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. -J. Ch. Meyer
    • 1
  • W. van der Hoek
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUtrecht UniversityTB UtrechtThe Netherlands

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