Abstract
The Nash bargaining scheme is extended to discrete and continuous time dynamic games. The bargaining takes place under future uncertainty and the contracting takes place at each stage on the basis of the available information. A two-level hierarchical method to handle such problems is presented. At the lower level a weighted sum of the decision makers' objectives is maximized. This corresponds to solving the cooperative problem with a given contract, which is expressed by the weights of the individual objectives. At the top level the contract is determined by solving an algebraic equation such that the rationality axioms of the Nash bargaining scheme are satisfied for the whole time interval of cooperation.
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
6. References
Ehtamo, H., J. Ruusunen, V. Kaitala and R. P. Hämäläinen (1986), „Solution for a dynamic bargaining problem with an application to resource management,” Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Vol. 59, to appear.
Ehtamo, H., J. Ruusunen, and R. P. Hämäläinen (1987), „On the computation of the Nash bargaining solution with an energy management example,” in Proc. 26th IEEE CDC, Los Angeles, CA, pp. 263–266.
Ruusunen, J., H. Ehtamo, and R. P. Hämäläinen (1988), „Bargaining with dynamic information,” in Proc. 3rd Bellman Continuum, Springer-Verlag, to appear.
Ehtamo, H., J. Ruusunen, and R. P. Hämäläinen (1989), „A hierarchical approach to bargaining in power pool management,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, to appear.
Roth, A. E. (1979), „Axiomatic Models of Bargaining,” Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1989 Springer-Verlag
About this paper
Cite this paper
Ehtamo, H., Ruusunen, J., Hämäläinen, R.P. (1989). Repeated bargaining under uncertainty. In: Başar, T.S., Bernhard, P. (eds) Differential Games and Applications. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol 119. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0004272
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0004272
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50758-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46079-4
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive