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Nash-cournot equilibria in the buropean gas market: A case where open-loop and feedback solutions coincide

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Differential Games and Applications

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences ((LNCIS,volume 119))

Abstract

We consider an oligopolistic industry extracting a non-renewable resource sold in a competitive market. We show, first, that if all players, but one, have infinite private reserves and production capacities (or alternatively the expansion of the production capacities is exogeneous) then Nash open-loop and feedback equilibria coincide. Second, we show that these conditions correspond to a fairly good approximation of the European gas market and hence the practical importance of our result.

The second author has been supported by CRSNG — Canada

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Economics, University of Bergen, Norway

    Sjur Didrik Flåm

  2. GERAD, Ecole des H.E.C., Montreal, Canada

    Georges Zaccour

  3. INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France

    Georges Zaccour

Authors
  1. Sjur Didrik Flåm
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  2. Georges Zaccour
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Editor information

Tamer S. Başar Pierre Bernhard

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© 1989 Springer-Verlag

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Flåm, S.D., Zaccour, G. (1989). Nash-cournot equilibria in the buropean gas market: A case where open-loop and feedback solutions coincide. In: Başar, T.S., Bernhard, P. (eds) Differential Games and Applications. Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, vol 119. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0004269

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0004269

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-50758-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-46079-4

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