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International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology

ASIACRYPT 1994: Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT'94 pp 164–170Cite as

How to prevent buying of votes in computer elections

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 917))

Abstract

We present a new voting scheme. Our scheme is the first one which satisfies both of the following properties: each voter can check that her voting strategy is counted correctly but she cannot prove the voting strategy to anybody except the full coalition of all interest groups involved in the voting. The latter property means that buying of votes is not possible, since the potential buyer does not know whether she gets what she is paying for!

Research supported by The Academy of Finland, grant 11281

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Vaasa, 65101, Vaasa, Finland

    Valtteri Niemi

  2. Department of Mathematics, University of Turku, 20500, Turku, Finland

    Ari Renvall

Authors
  1. Valtteri Niemi
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  2. Ari Renvall
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Editor information

Josef Pieprzyk Reihanah Safavi-Naini

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© 1995 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Niemi, V., Renvall, A. (1995). How to prevent buying of votes in computer elections. In: Pieprzyk, J., Safavi-Naini, R. (eds) Advances in Cryptology — ASIACRYPT'94. ASIACRYPT 1994. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 917. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0000432

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0000432

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-59339-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-49236-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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