How to prevent buying of votes in computer elections
We present a new voting scheme. Our scheme is the first one which satisfies both of the following properties: each voter can check that her voting strategy is counted correctly but she cannot prove the voting strategy to anybody except the full coalition of all interest groups involved in the voting. The latter property means that buying of votes is not possible, since the potential buyer does not know whether she gets what she is paying for!
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