Abstract
Karen Lewis (Philos Stud, 158:313–342, 2012) argues that recognizing the importance of plans helps settle a debate regarding the semantics and pragmatics of indefinites. More specifically, Lewis argues against the dynamic approach (e.g., Kamp (In Groenendijk et al., Formal Methods in the Study of Language, pp. 277–322, Mathematics Center, Amsterdam, 1981), Heim (The semantics of definite and indefinite noun phrases, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1982), Groenendijk and Stokhof (Linguist Philos, 14:39–100, 1991), Kamp and Reyle (From Discourse to Logic, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993), and Asher and Lascarides (Logics of Conversation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003)), according to which indefinite expressions are subject to a semantic Novelty condition. Drawing on data of the so-called summary uses, she claims that Novelty is best analyzed as a pragmatic, cancelable implicature. This chapter throws significant doubt on Lewis’ analysis. Not only is her objection in large part a misreading of dynamic semantics, but the proposed pragmatic account offers no real explanation of even the alleged counterexamples. Once we consider a wider range of linguistic phenomena involving indefinites, the verdict is on the side of the dynamic approach.
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Notes
- 1.
The following examples are from Lewis (2012) examples (6)–(9) on p. 318.
- 2.
Gundel et al. (1993, p. 296), example (49).
- 3.
The “antecedent” of the indefinites may be an indefinite (as in (3) and (7)), a proper name (as in (13)), a demonstrative (as in (5)), or a definite (as in (6)).
- 4.
“[A] complete plan for a typical conversation is not decided upon beforehand, but the sort of plans we will be concerned with are speakers’ short-term plans, which we can call local plans” (Lewis 2012, p. 323).
- 5.
The quotes are from Heim (1983, pp. 166, 168), respectively.
- 6.
Heim (1983, p. 165).
- 7.
Lewis (2012, p. 316).
- 8.
Here is another way to block Lewis’ argument. Consider a scenario where whenever a student needed Sue’s help, he did not go to her but asked one of his classmates instead. In this case, the second occurrence of “a student” is still a summary use in the relevant sense, yet it no longer denotes “one and the same student” as the first occurrence of the indefinite noun phrase, i.e., the student that walked into Sue’s office. Of course, such possibility is disastrous for Lewis’ account, but provides further evidence that favors the dynamic analysis. I am grateful to Josh Dever for drawing my attention to this possibility.
- 9.
Earlier dynamic theories, e.g., Kamp (1981); Heim (1982); and Kamp and Reyle (1993), only predict the ambiguity of (10) and strictly speaking do not fully explain (11). But more recent DRT-based theories, such as Asher and Lascarides’ Segmented Discourse Representation Theory (SDRT), do account for the semantic contributions of discourse particles. Very roughly, discourse particles signal the rhetorical structures, e.g., elaboration, consequence, contrast, explanation, etc., so that the discourse relations place more constraints on the accessibility conditions in the DRT-style model theory. Since the primary aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that Lewis’ objections to the dynamic approach are misguided, I will not discuss the full details of a complete explanation of (11) along the lines of SDRT.
- 10.
The recognition of local plans allows “the participants to track the discourse, i.e., know what to expect will likely be a topic of conversation, an object under discussion, or a question being addressed” (Lewis 2012, p. 329).
- 11.
It seems to me that if (16) is to make sense at all, the discourse as a whole means something quite different from (14). The speaker must assume her addressee to have a much stronger degree of familiarity with the said individual.
- 12.
Lewis (2012, p. 318).
- 13.
An interesting twist of the data is the appositional phrases:
(1) a. A student1 walked into Sue’s office and asked her about his exam.
b. Finally, a student2, one3 who walked into Sue’s office and asked her about his exam, needed her help!
Two things to note about the use of appositives. First, suppose the second occurrence of “a student”—a student2—does trigger a general, category-like discourse referent, the appositional phrase—a student3—seems to be about something more specific, i.e., it is about a particular instance of a certain kind. One idea is that in its summary use, an indefinite is to be read into an appositive structure such that the general, purely existential meaning and the identity meaning are both captured.
One may wonder if, without the presence of the discourse particle “finally,” the appositional phrase alone suffices the indefinite be read in the “summary” sense. That is,
(2) a. A student1 walked into Sue’s office and asked her about his exam.
b. A student2, one3 who walked into Sue’s office and asked her about his exam, needed her help!
I think the answer is negative. It seems to me that somehow the general meaning of “a student” just is not available in discourse (2).
On the other hand, swapping the two noun phrases in the second sentence results in significant change of meaning:
(3) a. A student1 walked into Sue’s office and asked her about his exam.
b. Finally, one3 who walked into Sue’s office and asked her about his exam, a student2, needed her help!
Discourse (3) sounds much worse, if intelligible at all, and a purely existential, general meaning of a student2 is missing.
While these phenomena raise an interesting question of the ways “finally” interacts with noun phrases (as they are placed in different parts of the speech) that affect the availability of “summary reading,” it goes far beyond the scope of this chapter to present a full theory of all the relevant details.
- 14.
The intended reading here is not one where “a woman” receives a wide-scope, de re interpretation.
- 15.
- 16.
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Acknowledgments
The chapter benefits greatly from discussions with Josh Dever, Ray Buchanan, and Hans Kamp. I am also thankful for the very helpful comments from Kiki Linton Wang, as well as feedback from the audience at the IEAS conference on Language and Action. The usual disclaimer applies.
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Chen, HY. (2014). Indefinites in Action. In: Hung, TW. (eds) Communicative Action. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-4585-84-2_2
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