Abstract
A sense of complexity is not absent from the study of patronage in Philippine politics, but discussions are limited in some respects. Patronage is widely regarded as an unremittingly negative feature and one that remains deeply embedded; and academic literature on high-level political appointments is thin. An obvious concern must be that the paucity of empirical material makes it difficult to contradict existing models, and easy to interpret such material as is available in the light of those models. It is for this reason that this study draws heavily on actors’ accounts of events. The broad lines of political appointments sketched with these accounts are not complicated; but the detail revealed by actors in the following chapters is intricate. Indeed, the case of high-level political appointments in the Philippines suggests that patronage does not invade, nor is it supplanted by, formal organizations and processes (as if these normally comprise qualitatively different technical rules and impersonal interactions). Rather, formal organizations and processes comprise competitive relationships of which patronage is an important aspect. In order to accommodate and explain these features, a model is set out in Sect. 3.3.
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- 1.
See, for example, Cruz (2008).
- 2.
Of the very few academic studies which pay more than just passing attention to high-level political appointments, see Rose-Ackerman et al. (2011).
- 3.
- 4.
A president is elected to only 1 term of 6 years.
- 5.
It is often the case that money is not available for all these posts and so, in practice, some will be left unfilled.
- 6.
Favorito, B., Department of Public Works and Highways, Manila, September 30 2010. Interview with Hodder, J.
- 7.
Presidential Management Staff, Malacanang, Manila, September 7, 2010. Interview with the author. Source requests anonymity.
- 8.
Sales, E., Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Manila, September 3, 2010.
- 9.
Lilia Guillermo, L. Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue, Manila, September 3, 2010. Interview with the author.
- 10.
Presidential Management Staff, Malacanang, Manila, September 7, 2010. Interview with author. Source requests anonymity.
- 11.
Search Committee Member, Arroyo Administration, September 2, 2010. Interview with author. Source requests anonymity.
- 12.
Sto. Tomas, P., former member of Search Committee, Arroyo administration, and former Secretary and Undersecretary, Department of Labor and Employment. Interview, Manila, September 2, 2010. Interview with the author.
- 13.
Ibid.
- 14.
Aspiras, G., Atty, Chief of Staff, Senator M. Villar, Manila, August 17, 2010. Interview with the author.
- 15.
Cayetano, A.P., Senator, Manila, November 30, 2010. Interview with the author.
- 16.
Aspiras, G., op.cit.
- 17.
Tiu, A., Secretary, Commission On Appointments, Manila, November 30, 2010. Interview with the author.
- 18.
Ibid.
- 19.
Aspiras, G., Atty, op.cit.
- 20.
Tiu, A., op.cit.
- 21.
Panadero, Undersecretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Manila, December 6, 2010. Interview with the author.
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Hodder, R. (2014). Patronage and Appointments in the Philippines. In: High-level Political Appointments in the Philippines. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-4560-05-4_3
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