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The Indigenous People and the Strange Westerner

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Part of the Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies book series (PSAPS)

Abstract

This chapter traces the events and tactics employed by Cambodia’s indigenous community movement targeting government institutions and a European investor to address social, economic and environmental concerns. To this end, the indigenous community, with relatively weak support from local NGOs, launched two phases of influencing strategies, involving an escalation from institutional to non-institutional tactics. Initially, they held several peaceful protests, networking with local NGOs, and circulating petitions (institutional tactics), but received no satisfactory responses from either the government or the company. The indigenous community then staged violent protests, such as vandalising the company’s property, to put pressure on the government institutions to intervene to regulate the company and address the community demands. In a relative sense, the indigenous community succeeded in achieving most of its demands. However, this chapter argues that, while an analysis of influencing strategies, such as a tactical escalation from non-violence to violence, is necessary for explaining the dynamics of the indigenous community, the decisive factors for explaining the responses of the government institutions that duly shaped the outcomes lie elsewhere. The government institutions chose, at the expense of the European company, to concede to rather than repress the movement, due to the weak political ties between the local partner of the company and the central patron of the regime. This gave the government institutions, especially the provincial office, strong autonomy in decision-making and exerting pressure on the company to comply with related regulations and thereby address the demands of the indigenous community and NGOs.

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Fig. 4.1

(Source Author, 2019)

Fig. 4.2

(Source Author, 2019)

Notes

  1. 1.

    Data obtained from the office of planning and statistics from MAFF.

  2. 2.

    All names are pseudonyms, to comply with research ethics and consent between the researcher and participants from the company.

  3. 3.

    Interview with rubber company’s general manager, 23 December 2013.

  4. 4.

    For requirements to become an Oknha, please refer to definition in Chapter 2.

  5. 5.

    The PM has at least 100 official advisors and unknown private advisors (cf. Chansy, 2013).

  6. 6.

    Officially launched in 2000 by the UN, the Global Compact is a voluntary corporate responsibility initiative with, currently, over 8700 corporate participants and other stakeholders from over 130 countries.

  7. 7.

    Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village C), 17 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village D), 17 November 2013.

  8. 8.

    The Bunong (Phnong) are one of several indigenous communities in Cambodia who worship forests and cemeteries. They believe the spiritual forest protects them from sickness, disaster or any tragedy, and the encroachment of evil.

  9. 9.

    The provincial office is under the Ministry of Interior (MoI). MLMUPC is also targeted because they are mentioned along with MoE in the sub-decree on indigenous communal land registration to assist the indigenous communities.

  10. 10.

    Interview with village activist III, 17 November 2013.

  11. 11.

    Established in 2009, this high-level committee has been criticised for not functioning very well (see ADHOC, 2013).

  12. 12.

    Interview with village activist I, 18 November 2013.

  13. 13.

    Community Legal Education Centre, ADHOC, Caritas, My Village and Indigenous Communities Support Organisation, among others. The statement can be retrieved at: http://www.chrac.org/eng/CHRAC%20Statement%20in%202010/01_22_2010_Joint%20statement%20of%20Busra%20case.pdf (accessed 13 November 2014).

  14. 14.

    Interview with NGO provincial manager, 08 January 2014; interview with NGO deputy provincial manager, 08 January 2014.

  15. 15.

    Interview with village activist I, 18 November 2013; interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013.

  16. 16.

    Interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013.

  17. 17.

    Interview with village head V, 18 November 2013.

  18. 18.

    Interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013.

  19. 19.

    Ibid.

  20. 20.

    Ibid.

  21. 21.

    Ibid.

  22. 22.

    Interview with deputy provincial governor (Mondulkiri), 10 January 2013; Interview with deputy head of provincial department of environment, 10 January 2014.

  23. 23.

    Interview with deputy provincial governor (Mondulkiri), 10 January 2013.

  24. 24.

    Agriculture and forestry, land management and environment departments.

  25. 25.

    Interview with former commune chief (Mondulkiri), 19 November 2013; interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013; interview with deputy provincial governor (Mondulkiri), 10 January 2013.

  26. 26.

    Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village C), 17 November 2013; Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village D), 17 November 2013. Some villagers called this ‘selling land to the rubber company’.

  27. 27.

    Interview with village activist I, 18 November 2013.

  28. 28.

    Interview with rubber company’s general manager, 23 December 2013; Interview with deputy provincial governor (Mondulkiri), 10 January 2013.

  29. 29.

    Ibid.

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    Interview with rubber company’s general manager, 23 December 2013.

  32. 32.

    Interview with village activist I, 18 November 2013; interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013; interview with village activist III, 17 November 2013; Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village C), 17 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village D), 17 November 2013.

  33. 33.

    Ibid.

  34. 34.

    Informal interview with a villager who was allocated the joint rubber plantation.

  35. 35.

    Interview with village activist I, 18 November 2013; interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013; interview with village activist III, 17 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village C), 17 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village D), 17 November 2013.

  36. 36.

    According to ELC sub-decree 2005, an SEIA shall be done before an ELC is approved. To ease investment in agricultural land, the government (Secretariat of ELCs [MAFF] and CoM) accepted the initial SEIA. On receiving ELC licences, which are usually issued as a notification from the CoM (sometimes signed by the PM), a full SEIA has to be done. But the concessionaires tend to clear the land prior to the completion of a full SEIA, claiming that they have an official licence from the government. This applies to this rubber plantation as the local partner, who was granted ELCs, started clearing the land to attract a foreign investor (James) before the completion of a full SEIA. Hence, the impacts were more likely induced by the local investors, rather than by the foreign investors.

  37. 37.

    Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village C), 17 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village D), 17 November 2013.

  38. 38.

    Interview with rubber company’s general manager, 23 December 2013.

  39. 39.

    Interview with village head V, 18 November 2019; interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013.

  40. 40.

    Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village D), 17 November 2013.

  41. 41.

    According to sub-decree No. 54 (2913), 55 (2013) and 231(2013), the total area of 561 hectares was excised from the EC. Of this amount, 300 hectares were within the plantation areas of EC while the rest was located along the cannels.

  42. 42.

    A rightful claim is assessed in terms of having proof of land with crop plantation and other cultivation.

  43. 43.

    Interview with rubber company’s general manager, 23 December 2013.

  44. 44.

    Directive No. 01BB appears to be enforced with ELCs which have weak connection with the political elites. Grandish Timber in Kampong Speu province, and Korean Company in Kratie provinces are a few examples of such phenomena.

  45. 45.

    Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village C), 17 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village D), 17 November 2013.

  46. 46.

    Interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013.

  47. 47.

    Interview with Law Firm Senior Legal Advisor, 09 December 2013, commented in her capability as a business lawyer that, having seen many loopholes in the ELCs and related regulation enforcement, none of her clients got access to ELCs. It is risky to get access to ELCs without a local facilitator or connection with powerful investors in Cambodia.

  48. 48.

    Interview with rubber company’s general manager, 23 December 2013.

  49. 49.

    Ibid.

  50. 50.

    Interview with ELC company general manager, 27 November 2013. As illustrated in this chapter, even foreign companies also donate a certain amount to the Red Cross, which is chaired by the PM’s wife. This is a good example of how donations to the regime are managed (Milne, Pak & Sullivan, 2015).

  51. 51.

    Interview with ELC company CEO, 18 December 2013; interview with ELC company general manager, 27 November 2013.

  52. 52.

    Interview with former commune chief (Mondulkiri), 19 November 2013; interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013; interview with deputy provincial governor (Mondulkiri), 10 January 2014; Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village C), 17 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village D), 17 November 2013.

  53. 53.

    Licences (or notifications from the CoM signed by the PM) have been manipulated and claimed as law or legal rights granted by the government. These have been used as a powerful means of threatening the local and provincial governments and even the affected villagers.

  54. 54.

    Interview with member of parliament and former minister, 17 December 2013; interview with chief of office of the environmental impact assessment (of Ministry of Environment), 05 January 2014; Interview with former commune chief (Mondulkiri), 19 November 2013.

  55. 55.

    Interview with rubber company’s general manager, 23 December 2013.

  56. 56.

    As in a previous footnote, some CCs and village heads call them ‘laws’, ‘licences’, (Chhbab in Khmer). Chhbab was used by the company to threaten those villagers or lower officials.

  57. 57.

    Interview with former commune chief (Mondulkiri), 19 November 2013.

  58. 58.

    Interview with former commune chief (Mondulkiri), 19 November 2013; interview with village head IV, 19 November 2013.

  59. 59.

    As in Chapter 1, to be nominated as a commune chief candidate in the ruling party, a person has to pay a substantial amount of financial contribution in return for this lucrative position.

  60. 60.

    Interview with former commune chief (Mondulkiri), 19 November 2013; interview with village head IV, 19 November 2013.

  61. 61.

    Interview with former commune chief (Mondulkiri), 19 November 2013; interview with village activist I, 18 November 2013.

  62. 62.

    Interview with deputy provincial governor (Mondulkiri), 10 January 2014.

  63. 63.

    Interview with deputy provincial governor (Mondulkiri), 10 January 2014.

  64. 64.

    Interview with deputy head of provincial department of land, 23 December 2013; interview with chief of office of the environmental impact assessment (of Ministry of Environment), 05 January 2014.

  65. 65.

    Interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013.

  66. 66.

    Interview with deputy provincial governor (Mondulkiri), 10 January 2014.

  67. 67.

    Interview with village activist II, 18 November 2013.

  68. 68.

    Interview with NGO deputy provincial manager (Mondulkiri), 08 January 2014.

  69. 69.

    Interview with member of parliament and former minister, 17 December 2013.

  70. 70.

    Shareholders companies of the EC in France and Belgium have long been established and incorporated corporate social and environmental responsibilities. This is unlike those companies, including the sugarcane case, which have just established in Cambodia. Hence, seeking intervention from these long experience and standard companies is more effective.

  71. 71.

    It has ten principles that cover human rights, labour, the environment and anti-corruption. In principle no. 1, ‘businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights’. Businesses should make sure they are not complicit in human rights abuses through acts or omissions, explicitly referring to direct, beneficial or silent complicity (UN Global Compact, 2014).

  72. 72.

    Interview with the rubber company’s general manager, 23 December 2013.

  73. 73.

    Ibid.

  74. 74.

    Ibid.

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Young, S. (2021). The Indigenous People and the Strange Westerner. In: Strategies of Authoritarian Survival and Dissensus in Southeast Asia. Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6112-6_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6112-6_4

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