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A Peasant Movement, Kleptocratic Elites and the Global Supply Chains

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Strategies of Authoritarian Survival and Dissensus in Southeast Asia

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Abstract

This chapter presents the resistance of a Cambodian peasant community against an exploitative kleptocrat. It depicts the relative failure of peasant and NGO movements targeting an industrial agro-sugar company, and the government institutions. It provides the historical events of the protests of the peasants from 2006 to 2016, and traces the dynamics and tactics of their protest alongside the responses of government institutions and foreign companies that jointly invested with a senior politician known as a ‘sugar baron’ in Cambodia. Considered as one of the best examples of how communities persistently resist foreign investments, the case involved tactical escalation from non-violent domestic movements to international networking: global supply chain movements. Thus, the documentation ranges from initial information-seeking protests, to the seeking of support of NGOs and political elites, to pursuing the supply chains of the sugar product exported from Cambodia to Thailand, from Thailand to the UK and then to the EU. It is clear that, although the movement’s approaches were solid and sophisticated, they did not achieve most of the demands because the government institutions perceived them as having harmed the rent extraction of the sugar baron, a close friend of the regime’s patron.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The companies have been given pseudonyms and the total areas of concessions have not been stated exactly due to the constraints of research ethics compliance.

  2. 2.

    He owns and is involved in other sugarcane plantations and factories in Kampong Speu and Oddar Meanchey provinces. Apparently, he is a sugar baron.

  3. 3.

    I found the impact assessment report provided by the provincial office of Koh Kong to be insufficient. The report contains only 5 pages of land demarcation and a concluding paragraph that states that the proposed ELCs would cause no adverse impacts.

  4. 4.

    The movements drew the attention of a number of news agencies: Radio Free Asia, Voice of America, Cambodian Television Network, BBC Asia, Reuters News, The New York Times, The Guardian, The Nation, Bangkok Post, Cambodia Daily, Phnom Penh Post, The Financial Times and others (Cock, 2011).

  5. 5.

    Interview with deputy provincial governor, 15 December 2013.

  6. 6.

    Interview with deputy commune chief, 04 November 2013.

  7. 7.

    Interview with village activist I, 01 November 2013; interview with village activist II, 02 November 2013; interview with village activist III, 01 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village A), 02 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village B), 02 November 2013. The land price keeps increasing in the commune. It was estimated to be about US$6000–US$10,000 per hectare.

  8. 8.

    Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village A), 02 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village B), 02 November 2013; Interview with village activist I, 01 November 2013; interview with village activist II, 02 November 2013; interview with village activist III, 01 November 2013.

  9. 9.

    Including CLEC (Community Legal Education Centre), ADHOC (Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association), LICADO (Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights) and others.

  10. 10.

    Interview with deputy head of provincial department of land, 02 January 2014.

  11. 11.

    The land size provided in the Sugar company report (2012) is either irrational or exaggerated.

  12. 12.

    Interview with village activist III, 01 November 2013; interview with lawyer, 20 December 2013.

  13. 13.

    Interview with village activist III; interview with lawyer, 20 December 2013; interview with legal advisor, 02 December 2013.

  14. 14.

    Please refer to https://www.boycottbloodsugar.net (accessed 28 February 2015).

  15. 15.

    https://www.facebook.com/pages/Boycott-Blood-Sugar/331317963619025 (accessed 28 February 2015).

  16. 16.

    Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village A), 02 November 2013; Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village B), 02 November 2013.

  17. 17.

    I did not investigate how the Peasants and NGOs lobbied the consumers.

  18. 18.

    EU’s EBA emerged in 2001 to give Least Developing Countries (LDC) full duty-free and quota-free access to the EU for all their exports with the exception of arms and armaments. Cambodia is one of the 49 countries (EU, 2014). The objectives of EBA trade preferences include ‘the promotion of sustainable development and good governance in the developing countries’ according to EU regulations (Miller, 2011).

  19. 19.

    An independent non-for-profit organisation based in Bangkok of Thailand, whose work protects and promotes human rights in the country and the region.

  20. 20.

    The complaint process was assisted by Jones Day (JD), a pro bono lawyer in the UK, and a Cambodian lawyer (see also Peter & Naren, 2013).

  21. 21.

    This is an association in the UK that provides certificates to member companies to prove that their sugar has been bought with no link to human rights abuses or adverse impacts.

  22. 22.

    interview with lawyer, 20 December 2013.

  23. 23.

    Some ELCs were still granted on the condition that they were on the pipeline.

  24. 24.

    The ‘tiger skin policy’ attempts to demarcate disputed land and carve land plots from overlapping concession areas for villagers who legally claim ownership.

  25. 25.

    Interview with NGO executive director, 06 December 2013; interview with lawyer, 20 December 2013; interview with standing member of parliament/ruling party, 18 December 2013.

  26. 26.

    Interview with NGO coordinator of land reform, 19 December 2013.

  27. 27.

    Interview with NGO executive director, 06 December 2013.

  28. 28.

    Interview with village head II, 04 November 2013.

  29. 29.

    focus group discussion (10 villagers in village A), 02 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village B), 02 November 2013.

  30. 30.

    Interview with village activist I, 01 November 2013.

  31. 31.

    Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village A), 02 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village B), 02 November 2013.

  32. 32.

    Interview with deputy provincial governor, 15 December 2013.

  33. 33.

    Interview with standing member of parliament/ruling party, 18 December 2013.

  34. 34.

    Interview with NGO executive director, 06 December 2013; interview with NGO provincial manager, 04 December 2013; interview with lawyer, 20 December 2013.

  35. 35.

    International supply chains movement approach.

  36. 36.

    Interview with standing member of parliament/ruling party, 18 December 2013.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    Interview with deputy provincial governor, 15 December 2013.

  39. 39.

    Interview with legal advisor, 02 December 2013; interview with programme officer of OHCHR, 13 December 2013.

  40. 40.

    Interview with NGO executive director, 06 December 2013.

  41. 41.

    Interview with village activist I, 01 November 2013; interview with village activist II, 02 November 2013; interview with village activist III, 01 November 2013.

  42. 42.

    See Chapter 1 for additional explanation about network.

  43. 43.

    Interview with standing member of parliament/ruling party, 18 December 2013. He explains that those corrupt officials or members of the ruling party have to earn from such investments to secure their office tenure or title (see Chapter 2).

  44. 44.

    Figure cited from a Term of Reference of the EU calling for a consultancy service to study the sugar industry in Cambodia in 2014.

  45. 45.

    Interview with ELC company general manager, 27 November 2013; Interview with legal advisor, 02 December 2013.

  46. 46.

    On 17 March 2016, the Sugar company requested for land concession via minister of MAFF and got the approval letter on 29 June 2006 from the CoM.

  47. 47.

    Interview with deputy provincial governor, 14 December 2013.

  48. 48.

    Interview with NGO deputy director, 20 December 2013; interview with Law Firm Senior Legal Advisor, 09 December 2013.

  49. 49.

    interview with Law Firm Senior Legal Advisor, 09 December 2013.

  50. 50.

    The licence is approved by the CoM in the form of a notification (sor chor nor in Khmer), which is usually exaggerated by Sugar company and local and provincial authorities as a ‘law’ or chhbab to intimidate the affected people or communities.

  51. 51.

    Please refer to previous footnote about insufficient impact studies.

  52. 52.

    Interview with lawyer, 20 December 2013, and based on the communities’ complaint filed with the UK court.

  53. 53.

    He is known as both a senior member of and significant financial contributor to the current ruling party. The party depends on this kind of tribute to influence the economic and political agenda (cf. Un, 2005).

  54. 54.

    Interview with village activist I, 01 November 2013.

  55. 55.

    Interview with NGO executive director, 06 December 2013; interview with lawyer, 20 December 2013.

  56. 56.

    Interview with economic land concession official of MAFF, 03 December 2013.

  57. 57.

    Interview with sugar company executive officer, 13 January 2014. He claimed that all problems that occurred were not the business of the Sugar company; it is more likely that the Sugar company felt no corporate responsibilities towards the local communities.

  58. 58.

    Focus group discussion (10 villagers in village A), 02 November 2013; focus group discussion (10 villagers in village B), 02 November 2013.

  59. 59.

    Article 41 states that CCs have a duty to promote and support good governance by managing and using existing resources in a sustainable manner to meet the basic needs of its commune.

  60. 60.

    Interview with deputy commune chief, 04 November 2013; interview with village head I, 03 November 2014; interview with village activist I, 01 November 2013. ‘Light weight’ in the Cambodian context refers to the inability to compete or fight with another because of a lack of influence.

  61. 61.

    Interview with economic land concession official-MAFF, 03 December 2013. The former governor was withdrawn and placed at MAFF.

  62. 62.

    Interviewwith NGO executive director, 06 December 2013. In 2016, the Minister of Ministry of Environment also defended the senator about the Koh Kong sugar issues, claiming that all conflict was solved.

  63. 63.

    Interview with NGO executive director, 06 December 2013; interview with lawyer, 20 December 2013.

  64. 64.

    A quote cited in Titthara (2014).

  65. 65.

    Interview with a member of parliament and former minister, 17 December 2013.

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Young, S. (2021). A Peasant Movement, Kleptocratic Elites and the Global Supply Chains. In: Strategies of Authoritarian Survival and Dissensus in Southeast Asia. Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6112-6_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6112-6_3

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