Abstract
The smart speaker provides users with useful functions such as music playback and online search with simple operation. However, since smart speakers always wait for the user’s voice, if they are exposed to security threats, serious problems can occur such as eavesdropping and privacy disclosure. Therefore, in order to provide improved security for of all smart speakers, it is necessary to identify potential security threats and systematically investigate vulnerabilities. In this paper, we perform security threat modeling for four products with high market share. STRIDE threat modeling was used to make a checklist for systematic vulnerability checks and the checklist was used to check vulnerabilities of commercial devices. Here, we propose a new method to improve the security of smart speaker through the analysis of the vulnerability check result and the vulnerability of each product.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by Institute of Information & communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government (MSIT) (No. 2017-0-00184, Self-Learning Cyber Immune Technology Development).
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Appendices
Appendices
1.1 Data Flow Diagram
1.2 Attack Library
No | Year | Type | Source/Author | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 2011 | Conference | Black Hat 2011/Joe Grand | Hardware Reverse Engineering: Access, Analyze,& Defeat |
2 | 2013 | Conference | DEFCON 21/Phorkus and Evilrob | Hacking Embedded Devices, Doing Bad Things to Good Hardware |
3 | 2013 | Conference | Black Hat 2013/J Zaddach | Embedded Devices Security and Firmware Reverse Engineering |
4 | 2014 | Conference | Australian Information Security Management Conference/Veelasha Moonsamy, Lynn Batten | Mitigating man-in-the-middle attacks on smartphones – a discussion of SSL pinning and DNSSec |
5 | 2015 | Conference | Zeronights/Alexander, Boris | Practical Firmware Reversing and Exploit Development for AVR-based Embedded Devices |
6 | 2015 | Conference | International Telemetering Conference/Wondimu Zegeye, Richard A Dean, Farzad Moazzami, Yacob Astatke | Exploiting Bluetooth Low Energy Pairing Vulnerability in Telemedicine |
7 | 2017 | Conference | Black Hat 2017/Ben Seri and Alon Livne | Exploiting BlueBorne in Linux-based IoT devices |
8 | 2017 | Conference | HITBSecConf/Slawomir Jasek | Blue picking – hacking Bluetooth Smart Locks |
9 | 2018 | Conference | DEFCON 26/Tencent Blade Team | Breaking Smart Speaker, We are Listening to you |
10 | 2017 | Conference | Black Hat 2017/Sen Nie, Ling Liu, Yuefeng Du | Free-Fall: Hacking Tesla from Wireless to CAN BUS |
11 | 2016 | Conference | Black Hat 2016/Chilik Tamir | Su-a-Cyder: Home-Brewing iOS Malware Like a B0$$ |
12 | 2011 | Conference | 28th Chaos Communication Congress/Dario Carluccio | Smart Hacking for Privacy |
13 | 2018 | Vulnerability | CVE | CVE-2018-9070 |
14 | 2016 | Web document | Cert Italia | Malware Android “CALLJAM” SCOPERTO SU GOOGLE PLAY |
15 | 2016 | Web document | Cert Italia | “DRESSCODE”: NUOVO MALWARE ANDROID SCOPERTO SU GOOGLE PLAY |
16 | 2014 | Web document | DistriNet | LINDDUN: Privacy Threat Modeling |
17 | 2017 | Paper | University of Notre Dame/Yuan Gong, Christian Poellabauer | Crafting Adversarial Examples for Computational Paralinguistic Applications |
18 | 2010 | Paper | IEEE Design & Test of Computers | Attacks and Defenses for JTAG |
19 | 2013 | Paper | NDSS 2013/Ang Cui, Michael Costello, Salvatore J. Stolfo | When Firmware Modifications Attack: A Case Study of Embedded Exploitation |
20 | 2014 | Paper | 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy/Lin Shung Huang, Alex Rice, Erling Ellingsen | Analyzing Forged SSL Certificates in the Wild |
21 | 2015 | Paper | IJRSCSE 2015/Vimalesh Kumar Dubey, Kumari Vaishali, Nishant Behar, Manish Shrivastava | A Review on Bluetooth Security Vulnerabilities and a Proposed Prototype Model for Enhancing Security against MITM Attack |
22 | 2016 | Paper | USENIX 2016/Nicholas Carlini, Pratyush Mishra, Tavish Vaidya, Yuankai Zhang, David Wagner | Hidden Voice Commands |
23 | 2017 | Paper | IEEE Computer Society/Hyunji Chung, Michaela loarga, Jeffrey Voas, Sangjin Lee | Alexa, Can I Trust You? |
24 | 2017 | Paper | ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security(CCS)/Xiaoyu Ji | DolphinAttack: Inaudible Voice Commands |
25 | 2017 | Paper | MIT/William Haach, Michael Wallace | Security Analysis of the Amazon Echo |
26 | 2017 | Paper | Michigan State University/Xinyu Lei, Guan-Hua Tu, Alex X. Liu | The Insecurity of Home Digital Voice Assistants - Amazon Alexa as a Case Study |
27 | 2017 | Paper | ACM CCS 2017/Mathy Vanhoef | Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2 |
28 | 2017 | Paper | Personal and Ubiquitous Computing/Da-Zhi Sun, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo | Man-in-the-middle attacks on Secure Simple Pairing in Bluetooth standard V5.0 and its countermeasure |
29 | 2017 | Paper | Australian Information Security Management Conference/Brian Cusack, Bryce Antony, Gerard Ward | Assessment of security vulnerabilities in wearable devices |
30 | 2014 | Paper | 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security/Yeongjin Jang, Chengyu Song, Simon P. Chung, Tielei Wang, Wenke Lee | A11y Attacks: Exploiting Accessibility in Operating Systems |
31 | 2018 | Paper | Deep Learning and Security Workshop/Nicholas Carlini, David Wagner | Audio Adversarial Examples: Targeted Attacks on Speech-to-Text |
32 | 2018 | Paper | NIPS 2017 Machine Deception workshop/Moustafa Alzantot | Did you hear that? Adversarial Examples Against Automatic Speech Recognition |
33 | 2018 | Paper | Beijing Key Laboratory of IoT Information Security Technology/Nan Zhang, Xianghang Mi, Xuan Feng | Understanding and Mitigating the Security Risks of Voice-Controlled Third-Party Skills on Amazon Alexa and Google Home |
34 | 2018 | Paper | Rongjunchen Zhang, Xiao Chen, Jianchao Lu | Using AI to Hack IA: A New Stealthy Spyware Against Voice Assistance Functions in Smart Phones |
35 | 2018 | Paper | ACMSE 2018/Richmond, Kentucky | Testing vulnerabilities in Bluetooth Low Energy |
36 | 2017 | Paper | IEEE Access/Efthimios Alepis, Constantinos Patsakis | Monkey Says, Monkey Does: Security and Privacy on Voice Assistants |
37 | 2015 | Paper | IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility/Chaouki Kasmi, Jose Lopes Esteves | IEMI Threats for Information Security: Remote Command Injection on Modern Smartphones |
38 | 2015 | Paper | UseNIX 2015/Tavish Vaidya, Yuankai Zhang, Micah Sherr, Clay Shields | Cocaine Noodles: Exploiting the Gap between Human and Machine Speech Recognition |
39 | 2017 | Paper | CSAE 2017/Xiao Fu, Zhijian Wang, Yong Chen, Feng Ye | Research on Android Application Package Stealth Download Hijacking |
40 | 2018 | Paper | Ben Gurion University/Or Ami, Yuval Elovici, Danny Hendler | Ransomware Prevention using Application Authentication-Based File Access Control |
41 | 2017 | Paper | ICISS 2017/Anis Bkakria, Mariem Graa, Nora Cuppens-Boulahia | Experimenting Similarity-Based Hijacking Attacks Detection and Response in Android Systems |
42 | 2012 | Paper | SEC 2012/Alessandro Armando, Alessio Merlo, Mauro Migliardi, Luca Verderame | Would you mind Forking This Process? A Denial of Service attack on Android |
43 | 2014 | Paper | SPSM 2014/Steven Arzt, Stephan Huber, Siegfried Rasthofer, Eric Bodden | Denial-of-App Attack: Inhibiting the Installation of Android Apps on Stock Phones |
44 | 2017 | Paper | ASIA CCS 2017/Behnaz Hassanshahi, Roland H.C. Yap | Android Database Attacks Revisited |
45 | 2017 | Paper | IJCSMC 2017/Zainab S. Alwan, Manal F. Younis | Detection and Prevention of SQL Injection Attack: A Survey |
46 | 2017 | Paper | 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy/Nethanel Gelernter, Senia Kalma, Bar Magnezi, Hen Porcilan | The Password Reset MitM Attack |
47 | 2017 | Paper | ISC 2017/XingXing Wang | Improving Password Guessing using Byte Pair Encoding |
48 | 2015 | Paper | IJCSIT 2015/Aqib Malik | A Model to Restrict Online Password Guessing Attacks |
49 | 2018 | Paper | IEEE 2018/Roberto Merco | Replay Attack Detection in a Platoon of Connected Vehicles with Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control |
50 | 2017 | Paper | INTERSPEECH 2017/Parav Nagarsheth | Replay Attack Detecting using DNN for Channel Discrimination |
51 | 2017 | Paper | 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems/Mohammad Raashid Ansari | A low-cost masquerade and replay attack detection method for CAN in automobiles |
52 | 2018 | Paper | Georgetown University Law Center/David A. Hyman | Implementing Privacy Policy: Who should Do What? |
53 | 2015 | Paper | Journal of Computer and Security/Nader Sohrabi Safa | Information security policy compliance model in organizations |
54 | 2017 | Paper | 23rd ACM SIGKDD/Lu Zhang | Achieving Non-Discrimination in Data Release |
55 | 2015 | Paper | Privacy Enhancing Technologies/Reza Shokri | Privacy Games: Optimal User-Centric Data Obfuscation |
56 | 2017 | Paper | Cryptography and Security/Samuel Yeom | Privacy Risk in Machine Learning: Analyzing the Connection to Overfitting |
57 | 2017 | Paper | International Conference on Advances in Electrical, Electronics, Information, Communication and Bio-Informatics/Ashalatha R | Data storage security algorithms for multi cloud environment |
58 | 2015 | Paper | International Conference on Next Generation Computing Technologies/Preeti Sirohi | Cloud computing data storage security framework relating to data integrity, privacy and trust |
59 | 2014 | Paper | Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing/Jen Ho Yang | An ID-Based User Authentication Scheme for Cloud Computing |
60 | 2016 | Paper | IEEE Signal Processing Magazine/Vishal M. Patel | Continuous User Authentication on Mobile Devices: Recent progress and remaining challenges |
61 | 2012 | Technical Report | SANS/Neil Jones | Exploiting Embedded Devices |
62 | 2012 | Technical Report | Inverse Path/Andrea Barisani, Daniele Bianco | Practical Exploitation of Embedded Systems |
63 | 2015 | Technical Report | Samsclass/Sam Bowne | Making an SSL Auditing Proxy with a Mac and Burp |
64 | 2016 | Technical Report | Vanderpot/Ike Clinton, Lance Cook, Dr. Shankar Banik | A Survey of Various Methods for Analyzing the Amazon Echo |
65 | 2016 | Technical Report | Oxford University | Security Vulnerabilities in Speech Recognition Systems |
66 | 2016 | Technical Report | Vanderpot | Amazon Echo Rooting: Part 1 |
67 | 2016 | Technical Report | Vanderpot | Amazon Echo Rooting: Part 2 |
68 | 2017 | Technical Report | MWR labs/Mark Barnes | Alexa, are you listening? |
69 | 2017 | Technical Report | medium.com/micaksica | Exploring the Amazon Echo Dot, Part 1: Intercepting firmware updates |
70 | 2017 | Technical Report | medium.com/micaksica | Exploring the Amazon Echo Dot, Part 2: Into MediaTek utility hell |
71 | 2017 | Technical Report | NowSecure/Rono Dasgupta | Certificate pinning for Android and iOS: Mobile man-in-the-middle attack prevention |
72 | 2017 | Technical Report | Securing/Slawomir Jasek | Gattacking Bluetooth Smart Devices |
73 | 2018 | Technical Report | CanSecWest/HyperChem | Practical JTAG: From 0 to 1 |
74 | 2015 | Technical Report | Charlie Miller, Chris Valasek | Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered Passenger Vehicle |
75 | 2018 | Technical Report | IEEE Security & Privacy/Lee Garber | Security, Privacy, Policy, and Dependability Roundup |
1.3 STRIDE
Type | No | Name | Threat description | Attack library | Threat No | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Entity | E1 | User | S | The attacker masquerades as a User | 18, 24, 25, 27 | T1 |
R | The attacker denies the control of the speaker | 18, 24, 25, 27 | T2 | |||
Entity | E2 | Provider | S | The attacker masquerades as a Provider | 36, 45 | T3 |
R | The attacker denies the provided of the speaker | 36, 45 | T4 | |||
Process | P1 | Register Speaker | T | Threats to manipulate authentication values in transit | 4, 10, 13, 16, 31, 57 | T5 |
I | Threats that expose User’s ID, Password | 4, 13, 16, 22, 31, 43 | T6 | |||
D | Threats that prevent you from performing User authentication by passing invalid argument values | 4, 10, 31, 43, 57 | T7 | |||
Process | P2 | Authentication | T | Threats to manipulate authentication values in transit | 4, 13, 20, 31, 43, 57 | T8 |
I | Threats that expose User’s ID, Password | 4, 13, 20, 22, 31, 43 | T9 | |||
D | Threats that disable data transmission of authentication values | 4, 20, 31, 43 | T10 | |||
E | Threats to gain the privileges of a router through a specific attack | 20, 29, 30 | T11 | |||
Process | P3 | Routing | S | After an attacker obtains an administrator account using a random assignment attack, Attacker masquerades as a administrator | 29, 30 | T12 |
T | Threats to tamper with existing file system files | 29, 30, 45 | T13 | |||
R | Threats denying actions such as accessing, running, or tampering with the file system | 29, 30, 43, 45 | T14 | |||
I | Threats that expose users’ data flowing through the router | 4, 13, 20, 22, 31, 43 | T15 | |||
Process | P4 | Request Smart Speaker Command | S | Disguised as user through long distance voice command | 16, 18 | T16 |
S | Disguised as a user using voice commands over a communication medium | 16, 18 | T17 | |||
S | Beyond the wall, disguised as a user through voice commands | 16, 18 | T18 | |||
S | Disguised as user through high frequency voice attack | 15, 17, 18, 24, 25, 39, 46 | T19 | |||
R | Threat of denying high frequency voice attacks | 15, 17, 18, 24, 25, 39, 46 | T20 | |||
I | Threats that expose your information through malicious voice | 6, 18, 23, 24, 26, 39, 46 | T21 | |||
D | Threats that cannot use speakers through malicious voice | 6, 18, 23, 24, 39, 46 | T22 | |||
Process | P5 | Detect Wake Word | S | An attacker masquerades as a user and instructs the speaker | 6, 16, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 39, 46 | T23 |
R | Threat of denying of attacker’s voice | 6, 16, 18, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 39, 46 | T24 | |||
Process | P6 | Execute Voice Data | S | Using IP spoofing to trick speakers into disguise as a server | 4, 13, 23, 31 | T25 |
T | Threats to send manipulated voice files to speakers | 4, 13, 23 | T26 | |||
R | Threats that an attacker denies camouflage and tampering | 4, 13, 23 | T27 | |||
D | Threats that do not use speakers through manipulated voice files | 6, 23, 24 | T28 | |||
Process | P7 | Periodic Firmware Check | T | Threats to modify firmware information | 4, 5, 12, 38, 43, 49 | T29 |
I | Threats that expose firmware information | 4, 5, 12, 38, 43, 49 | T30 | |||
D | Threats that make the update impossible by modifying version information | 12, 43, 49 | T31 | |||
Process | P8 | Publish Firmware Updates | S | Malicious firmware disguised as normal firmware | 1, 5, 12, 38, 49 | T32 |
T | Threats to modify firmware to update | 1, 3, 12, 38, 43, 49 | T33 | |||
R | Threat to denial of tampered firmware installation | 1, 12, 38, 43, 49 | T34 | |||
I | Threats that expose the system information contained in the firmware | 5, 12, 38, 41, 49 | T35 | |||
I | Threats to fetch firmware files | 1, 5, 12, 38, 41, 43, 49 | T36 | |||
D | Threats to disable firmware updates | 12, 43, 49 | T37 | |||
Process | P9 | Install Firmware | T | Threats to modify firmware | 1, 3, 5, 10, 11, 32, 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 45, 49 | T38 |
R | Threat to deny firmware tampering and installation | 1, 3, 10, 32, 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 45, 49 | T39 | |||
D | threat that disables system operation by installing corrupted firmware | 1, 3, 5, 10, 11, 32, 34, 35, 40, 42, 45, 49 | T40 | |||
E | Threat that an attacker installs a malicious file | 1, 3, 5, 10, 11, 32, 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 45, 49 | T41 | |||
E | Threat that user’s voice eavesdropping through modulated firmware | 5, 12, 38, 49 | T42 | |||
Process | P10 | Publish Applications | S | Disguising a malicious application as a normal application | 12, 36, 50, 51, 52, 54 | T43 |
T | Threats to tamper with installed applications | 36, 50, 52, 54 | T44 | |||
R | Threat to denial of application installation history | 36, 50, 54 | T45 | |||
I | Threats that expose information in the application | 36, 50, 54 | T46 | |||
E | Threats that control smartphone functionality through malicious applications | 36, 47, 48, 51 | T47 | |||
Process | P11 | Publish Application Updates | S | Malicious application disguised as normal application | 12, 36, 50, 51, 52, 54 | T48 |
T | Threats to tamper with updated applications | 12, 50, 52, 54 | T49 | |||
R | Threat to denial of application tampering | 12, 50, 52, 54 | T50 | |||
I | Threats that expose information in application | 36, 50, 54 | T51 | |||
D | Threats that disable application updates | 12, 50, 54 | T52 | |||
Process | P12 | Install, Uninstall Application | T | Threats to install moderated files | 36, 38, 50, 51 | T53 |
D | Threats that disrupt system operation by installing corrupted files | 36, 51, 54 | T54 | |||
E | Threats that unauthorized users install files | 36, 51, 54 | T55 | |||
Process | P13 | Periodic Application Check | T | Threats to tamper with application information | 4, 13, 43 | T56 |
I | Threats that expose application information | 4, 13, 22, 31, 43, 54 | T57 | |||
D | Threats that make the update impossible by modifying version information | 4, 13, 31, 43, 54 | T58 | |||
Process | P14 | Application Login | S | masquerades as a user through password guessing attack | 59, 60 | T59 |
S | Disguised as user through replay attack | 61, 62, 63 | T60 | |||
I | Threats that exposed authentication values are exposed | 4, 13, 31, 53, 54 | T61 | |||
I | Threats that expose other information needed for additional authentication | 4, 13, 22, 31, 53, 54 | T62 | |||
D | Threats that make login page inaccessible | 4, 13, 31, 53 | T63 | |||
D | Threats that exceed the number of login attempts and make normal access impossible | 4, 53 | T64 | |||
E | Threats accessible to user accounts using exposed authentication values | 4, 13, 54 | T65 | |||
Process | P15 | Bluetooth Pairing | S | Disguised as user through replay attack | 61, 62, 63 | T66 |
T | Threat of modifying transmission information of Bluetooth | 7, 9, 14, 21 | T67 | |||
I | Threats that Bluetooth transmission information is exposed | 7, 9, 14, 21, 28 | T68 | |||
D | Threat that Bluetooth pairing impossible | 9, 14, 21 | T69 | |||
E | Threats to gain the rights of a device through a particular attack | 8, 44 | T70 | |||
Data Store | D1 | Smart Speaker | T | Speaker system files, threats to tamper with memory | 1, 3, 5, 10, 11, 32, 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 45, 49 | T71 |
R | The threat that an attacker controls the device and denies this behavior | 6, 16, 18, 19, 24, 25, 33, 39, 46 | T72 | |||
I | Threats that expose sensitive information (voice, schedule, etc.) | 6, 16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 25, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 46 | T73 | |||
D | threat that prevents a device from being used for a certain amount of time | 6, 10, 16, 23, 24, 25, 32, 34, 35, 39, 40, 42, 53 | T74 | |||
Data Store | D2 | User Smart phone | T | a threat that modifies memory on smartphone | 1, 2, 29, 30 | T75 |
R | Threats denying access to system files memory on smart phones | 1, 2, 29, 30 | T76 | |||
I | Threats that expose system files, memory contents on smart phones | 1, 2, 3, 29, 30 | T77 | |||
D | Threats that do not provide service due to memory corruption | 29, 30, 53, 54 | T78 | |||
D | Threats that fail to provide services due to network paralysis | 29, 30, 53, 54 | T79 | |||
Data Store | D3 | Firmware Data Store | T | Threats to manipulate transmitted firmware | 12, 43, 49, 58 | T80 |
I | Threats that expose firmware data | 10, 12, 16, 18, 41, 43, 49, 58 | T81 | |||
D | Threats not uploading firmware | 12, 43, 58 | T82 | |||
Data Store | D4 | Database | T | Threats to transmit modulated data | 4, 10, 31, 43 | T83 |
R | Threat denying modulated data transmission | 4, 31, 43 | T84 | |||
I | Threats that expose your sensitive information | 4, 10, 19, 22, 31, 43 | T85 | |||
D | Threats that fail to provide services through arbitrary queries | 10, 55, 56 | T86 | |||
Data Store | D5 | App Store | T | Threat to upload moderated apps to the App Store server | 47, 48 | T87 |
R | Threats denying access to the App Store server | 47, 48 | T88 | |||
I | Threats to exposure of application data | 19, 22 | T89 | |||
Data Store | D6 | Smart Speaker Voice Server | T | The threat that an attacker sends a malformed voice file to the server | 18, 24, 25 | T90 |
R | A threat that denies attackers from sending malformed voice files to the server | 18, 24, 25 | T91 |
1.4 Attack Tree
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Lee, J., Kang, S., Kim, S. (2020). Study on the Smart Speaker Security Evaluations and Countermeasures. In: Park, J., Yang, L., Jeong, YS., Hao, F. (eds) Advanced Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering. MUE FutureTech 2019 2019. Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, vol 590. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9244-4_7
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