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Part of the book series: T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services ((TLABS))

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Abstract

This chapter examines directions for future work that we believe to be realistic. First, we discuss two main directions that we see for the photonic side channel. Then, we sketch ideas for future work regarding higher-order fault attacks on pairing computations.

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Correspondence to Juliane Krämer .

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© 2015 Springer Science+Business Media Singapore

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Krämer, J. (2015). Future Work. In: Why Cryptography Should Not Rely on Physical Attack Complexity. T-Labs Series in Telecommunication Services. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-787-1_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-787-1_6

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore

  • Print ISBN: 978-981-287-786-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-981-287-787-1

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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