Abstract
This concluding chapter presents the synthesis and draws implications for theory, methodology, and policy from a profound assessment of the impact of economic reforms on China’s urban housing sector. The synthesis shows how the roles of the different organizations of the state, i.e., the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the provincial and municipal governments, have evolved since economic reforms were launched to strengthen the production and delivery of urban houses in China. Rather than taking a simplistic view of a state-market dichotomy to explain the changes, the evidence shows the influence of a broader range of institutions that includes regional variations in the influence of Confucian culture and leaders. While the account supports the powerful arguments advanced by structuralist Marxists, the evidence also shows that state theory should absorb the influence of institutional and evolutionary theories to better capture the role of developmental states in economic development. A key extension essential from our findings is that the state of China is not a single complex superstructure, and that countries are complex enough so that different regions end up evolving differently.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Amsden, A. H. (1989). Asia’s next giant: South Korea and late industrialization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ball, M. (1998). Institutions in British property research: A review. Urban Studies, 35(9), 1501–1517. doi:10.1080/0042098984259.
Boettke, P. J., Coyne, C. J., Davis, J., Guala, F., Marciano, A., Runde, J., et al. (2006). Where economics and philosophy meet: Review of the elgar companion to economics and philosophy with responses from the authors*. The Economic Journal, 116(512), F306–F325. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2006.01101.x.
Buchanan, J. M. (1986). Liberty, market and state: Political economy in the 1980s. Linden: Wheatsheaf Books.
Chakravarty, S. (1993). Development planning: The Indian experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press India.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm. Economica, 4(16), 386–405. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x.
Coase, R. H. (1992). The institutional structure of production. The American Economic Review, 82(4), 713–719. doi:10.2307/2117340.
Evans, P. B. (1995). Embedded autonomy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., & Skocpol, T. (1985a). Bringing the state back in. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Evans, P. B., Rueschemeyer, D., & Stephens, E. H. (1985b). States versus markets in the world-system. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
Gordon, W. (1984). Developmental states and socialist industrialization in the third world. Journal of Development Studies, 21(1), 97–120.
Healey, P. (1992). An institutional model of the development process. Journal of Property Research, 9(1), 33–44. doi:10.1080/09599919208724049.
Healey, P., & Barrett, S. M. (1990). Structure and agency in land and property development processes: Some ideas for research. Urban Studies, 27(1), 89–103. doi:10.1080/00420989020080051.
Helmke, G., & Levitsky, S. (2004). Informal institutions and comparative politics: A research agenda. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Huff, W. G. (1995). The developmental state, government, and Singapore’s economic development since 1960. World Development, 23(8), 1421–1438. doi:10.1016/0305-750x(95)00043-c.
Jessop, B. (1990). State theory: Putting the capitalist state in its place. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Johnson, C. (1982). MITI and the Japanese miracle: The growth of industrial policy (pp. 1925–1975). Redwood City: Stanford University Press.
Johnson, C. (1999). The developmental state. New York: Cornell University Press.
Kiser, L. L., & Ostrom, E. (2000). The three worlds of action: A metatheoretical synthesis of institutional approaches. In M. D. McGinnis (Ed.), Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the workshop in political theory and policy analysis (pp. 56–88). Chicago: University of Michigan Press.
Li, J., Chiang, Y.-H., & Choy, L. (2011). Central–local conflict and property cycle: A Chinese style. Habitat International, 35(1), 126–132. doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2010.06.002.
Meng, A. (2014). More Shanxi officials detained on suspicion of corruption, South China morning post. Access on December 29, 2014 http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1580245/more-shanxi-officials-detained-suspicion-corruption
Miliband, R. (1969). The state in capitalist society. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Murdoch, J., & Abram, S. (1998). Defining the limits of community governance. Journal of Rural Studies, 14(1), 41–50. doi:10.1016/s0743-0167(97)00046-6.
Nee, V. (1989). A theory of market transition—from redistribution to markets in state socialism. American Sociological Review, 54(5), 663–681. doi:10.2307/2117747.
Nee, V. (2000). The role of the state in making a market economy. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 156(1), 64–88.
Nee, V., & Matthews, R. (1996). Market transition and societal transformation in reforming state socialism. Annual Review of Sociology, 22, 401–435. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.22.1.401.
Nelson, R. (2008a). Economic development from the perspective of evolutionary economic theory. Oxford Development Studies, 36(1), 9–22.
Nelson, R. (2008b). What enables rapid economic progress: What are the needed institutions? Research Policy, 37(1), 1–11. doi:10.1016/j.respol.2007.10.008.
Nelson, R., & Winter, S. G. (1982). An evolutionary theory of economic change. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Nolan, P. (1995). China’s rise, Russia’s fall: Politics. Economics and Planning in the Transition from Stalinism: Macmillan.
North, D. C. (1991). Institutions. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1), 97–112.
Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time. New York: Rinehart Press.
Poulantzas, N. A. (1973). Political power and social classes. New York: Sheed and Ward.
Poulantzas, N. A. (1978). Classes in contemporary capitalism. New York: Verso Press.
Ramo, J. C. (2004). The Beijing consensus. London: Foreign Policy Centre.
Rasiah, R. (2007). The systemic quad: Technological capabilities and economic performance of computer and component firms in Penang and Johor, Malaysia. International Journal of Technological Learning and Development, 1(2), 79–105.
Rasiah, R. (2011). The role of institutions and linkages in learning and innovation. International Journal of Institutions and Economies, 3(2), 165–172.
Schumpeter, J. A. (2013). Capitalism, socialism and democracy. Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis.
Sweezy, P. M. (1942). The theory of capitalist development: Principles of marxian political economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Szamosszegi, A., & Kyle, C. (2011). An analysis of state-owned enterprises and state capitalism in China. Capital Trade, Incorporated for US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.
Thorstein, V. (1915). The theory of the leisure class: An economic study of institutions. New York: Macmillan.
Veblen, T. (1915). The theory of the leisure class: An economic study of institutions. New York: Macmillan.
Wade, R. (2003). Governing the market: Economic theory and the role of government in East Asian industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2015 Springer Science+Business Media Singapore
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Zhang, M., Rasiah, R. (2015). Conclusions. In: Institutionalization of State Policy. Dynamics of Asian Development. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-570-9_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-570-9_7
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-287-569-3
Online ISBN: 978-981-287-570-9
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)