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Conclusions

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Institutionalization of State Policy

Part of the book series: Dynamics of Asian Development ((DAD))

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Abstract

This concluding chapter presents the synthesis and draws implications for theory, methodology, and policy from a profound assessment of the impact of economic reforms on China’s urban housing sector. The synthesis shows how the roles of the different organizations of the state, i.e., the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and the provincial and municipal governments, have evolved since economic reforms were launched to strengthen the production and delivery of urban houses in China. Rather than taking a simplistic view of a state-market dichotomy to explain the changes, the evidence shows the influence of a broader range of institutions that includes regional variations in the influence of Confucian culture and leaders. While the account supports the powerful arguments advanced by structuralist Marxists, the evidence also shows that state theory should absorb the influence of institutional and evolutionary theories to better capture the role of developmental states in economic development. A key extension essential from our findings is that the state of China is not a single complex superstructure, and that countries are complex enough so that different regions end up evolving differently.

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Correspondence to Miao Zhang .

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Zhang, M., Rasiah, R. (2015). Conclusions. In: Institutionalization of State Policy. Dynamics of Asian Development. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-570-9_7

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