Abstract
This chapter examines the role of provincial governments in the urban housing sector of China. Evidence from Shandong and Shanxi provinces is used to analyze the influence of the provincial institutions of leadership , legislation , land use, and living culture in the allocation, construction, and distribution of commercial and affordable urban houses. The evidence shows that provincial governments , as the intermediary, play an increasingly important role in coordinating policy initiation and implementation by the central and municipal governments , respectively. The central government provides the broad guidelines with institutional space for municipal and county governments to adapt and implement policies according to local socioeconomics conditions. The provincial governments intermediate the coordination in the formulation and implementation of policies by the central, municipal, and county governments, respectively.
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Notes
- 1.
The Affordable Housing Program was introduced by the government of China to provide subsidized houses to the urban middle- and low-income households. It comprises four sub-programs, namely Economical Comfortable Housing, Low Rent Housing, Public Rental Housing, and Price-Capped Housing.
- 2.
Telephone interview was conducted on August 12, 2013. His view was similar to that of Liu Shengkui, an employee on of the Municipal Housing Security Centre of Qingdao (Interview conducted on February 5, 2013).
- 3.
Sub-provincial units refer to governing body in municipal and county level (Cheung et al. 1998, p. 13).
- 4.
Telephone interview with Ms. Gao Guofang on January, 2014.
- 5.
Telephone Interview on August 13, 2013.
- 6.
Sub-provincial cities, or vice-provincial cities in the People’s Republic of China, are prefecture-level cities that are ruled by provincial governments, but administered independently (State Commission Office for Public Sector Reform, 1995).
- 7.
This is reflected by government efforts to reserve large portions of fiscal income from land transfer to develop rural infrastructure since 2005 following the launching of “New Rural Construction” scheme by central government.
- 8.
Land Use Right Lease Fees refers to a fee, which is paid in a lump sum to the land authority until the lease period ends, while LUT is a tax that must be paid by land users annually to tax authorities. All land users (apart foreign entities, government and non-profit agencies, and agricultural industries) are required to pay LUT.
- 9.
Counties, towns, and industrial and mining areas are exempted, which is partly due to the low productivity of mining compared to other activities, such as residential and commercial lands.
- 10.
Culture is defined as shared norms, values, and assumptions (Schein 1996).
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Zhang, M., Rasiah, R. (2015). Intermediary Role of Provincial Governments. In: Institutionalization of State Policy. Dynamics of Asian Development. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-570-9_5
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