Abstract
In this chapter, I settle several of the remaining claims listed in the previous chapter, as elaborations of the Principle of Personal Worth. Recalling the original list, the claims in question are as follows: Non-persons are less valuable than persons. In referring to non-persons, I have in mind here “supra-personal” entities such as nations, religions, ethnicities (or ethnic groups), cultures, corporations, clubs, cults, castes, clans, traditions, roles, gangs, tribes, the family, the budgetary deficit, the economy, … some of which are more abstract than others; Persons are not more valuable than simple groups of, or networks of relationships among, persons, where these are understood as collections which are no greater than the sums of their parts (i.e. individual persons); Neither the strong individualism of the neo-liberal (“Western”) stereotype, nor the collectivism of the neo-socialist (“Eastern”) stereotype finds any support in the PPW.
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Notes
- 1.
Examples of more abstract supra-persons are the family, the budget deficit and the economy. Where actual families, like nations and religions, are directly constituted by persons, the relationship between the former and actual persons is less direct, albeit still present.
- 2.
The groups classified under (ii) are not fixed or rigidly determined. Some that used to be regarded as (ethically) significant – race, gender and sexuality come readily to mind here – become more or less irrelevant, while others – nationality, ethnicity and religion, for example – seem to become more prominent.
- 3.
- 4.
As I hope to establish, the reference to identity in such contexts is neither necessary nor helpful (a point not made by either Appiah or Berreby).
- 5.
The idea that quite specific experiences can generate feelings which, in turn, lead to beliefs (usually negative) about an entire group has a familiar name: “stereotyping”. Stereotypes are a type of supra-person which have little validity and often lead to moral conclusions which violate the PPW.
- 6.
Sen (2006, pp. 20ff).
- 7.
Granted, in the courtroom an expert on guns may also be called to identify the gun as being of a particular type or kind, akin to the botanist identifying the plant as (a member of) a particular species.
- 8.
In view of these comments, how should we understand the concept of identity theft, referring to the Internet-enabled process of (illegally) posing as a particular person in order to take financial advantage of her? A Wikipedia entry on this topic neatly points out that since it is not possible literally to steal someone’s identity, it might be more accurate to speak of identity fraud or impersonation. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_theft).
- 9.
In the lead-up to the 2014 Football World Cup (when writing these words), some media organizations were asking what it means to be Brazilian – which, as I see it, is more or less the same as asking what it means to be (the nation) Brazil. I see only two types of answer here: either a Brazilian is someone born in Brazil or a child of someone born in Brazil or a naturalized citizen of Brazil; or being Brazilian means more or less whatever anyone who is Brazilian (and perhaps, more worryingly, anyone else as well) wants it to mean. We could shift the spotlight onto Brazilian culture, but cultures, I suggest, are dubious entities on which to pin identifying qualities. They change continually, according to the actual behavior of those who identify as Brazilian! In short, I am not convinced that in our times, being of a particular nationality really means much at all, despite the pressure that is occasionally exerted on citizens to conform to a particular vision or stereotype. Conversely, the idea that a particular activity or attitude is “Un-Australian” (referring to my own national origin) lacks coherence unless it means simply “Not very nice”. I say more about the conceptual implications of citizenship below.
- 10.
- 11.
Also known as covering. See Yoshino (2006).
- 12.
See Codell (1999).
- 13.
Such a misguided need or goal is one symptom of an unhealthy narcissism which is evident in our time.
- 14.
Subjugation and oppression apply not only to those who are not members of one’s own collective or group. Those who belong are also harmed precisely because they are not treated as genuine individuals, each in its own right. From the perspective of the tribe, gang, or collectivist nation state, the traits that distinguish individuals are suppressed in favour of the sameness that the group itself projects. Examples throughout history – and, sadly, in our own day – are sufficiently well known as not to need elaboration here.
- 15.
Comment by Tony Abbott, Australian Prime Minister, quoted in “Abbott backflip on race laws”, The Age Newspaper, August 6, 2014, p. 5. The first four statements here, while familiar, are hypothetical in the sense that they are not attributed to anyone in particular.
- 16.
In the kind of community I propose as ideal for personal development (Chap. 8), the degree of empathy can be strong enough to prompt even the mainstream members to insist that they, too, are oppressed or persecuted whenever any one member suffers.
- 17.
One media commentator, in response to the Australian Government’s 2014 Budget statement, remarked: “Ordinary people are lashed to the wheels of ‘the market’ and conscripted to serve an economy which should be serving them” (Carlton 2014).
- 18.
The change in question would have removed restrictions on the freedom of speech when applied specifically to matters of race, thereby bringing such speech into line with similar comments about gender, sexuality, etc. The still broader context was the Government’s attempts to persuade the electorate of the need for more stringent security measures in the face of growing terrorist threats.
- 19.
This comment is commonly attributed to George W. Bush in his response to the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001.
- 20.
Arendt’s description of Eichmann remains somewhat controversial. One critic has alleged that she missed that part of the trial in which his true moral character became evident (Cesarani 2006). And many fellow Jews reacted angrily to the slightest suggestion that the victims of the Nazi Holocaust were anything other than the innocent targets of pure evil.
- 21.
Male circumcision on cultural or religious grounds has become a contentious issue, partly because of health concerns (with each side attempting to counter the other), but also on moral grounds (circumcision is involuntary mutilation, etc.). While the particular tradition is unlikely to change among Jews (and Muslims), because it symbolizes the covenant made between Abraham (the first Jew) and God, it is not clear how contemporary religion would respond if a broad societal moral consensus against circumcision were to be reached. By contrast, female circumcision – still widely practiced, even in some Western countries, depending on cultural and tribal factors – is more universally condemned as misogynistic and brutal by Western standards. Yet questions remain about the different moral and social responses to the two acts; are they based on physiological impact, cultural factors, or both?
- 22.
According to Jewish tradition, the proscription against what is now known as homosexual conduct between males dates back to the pre-Jewish era of Noah – hence the idea that it carries a stronger sense of universality as compared with laws of kashrut (keeping kosher), for example. The so-called “Golden Rule” of Christianity (“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”) restates the earlier Jewish version (“What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor”). Interestingly, while most established religious traditions use the negative formulation, the two world religions which, in historical terms, have always been more aggressively missionary in nature – Christianity and Islam – use the positive formulation. The latter, but not the former, calls for followers to go out and act in certain ways, which can presumably be interpreted as a call to change the world in line with their own particular prescriptions. However, matters are not quite so straightforward: as my friend Rabbi Danny Schiff recently reminded me, the commandment to “love thy neighbor as thyself” – a positive prescription if ever there were one! – is distinctively Jewish in origin.
- 23.
- 24.
It is claimed by some religious authorities that the imperative to empathize with others, and to act, not just out of self-interest, but in the interest of the larger group, owes much to the influence of religion throughout human history, not just in moral, but also in biological or evolutionary terms. See “The Moral Animal” by Jonathan Sacks (2012). Sacks cites approvingly Robert Putnam (of Bowling Alone fame) who “showed that there was one place where social capital could still be found: religious communities.” “Religion,” claims Sacks, “is the best antidote to the individualism of the consumer age.” It might have been wiser to conclude more generally that communities are the antidote here, leaving open the question of which (kinds of) communities. History reveals most religions as supra-persons whose moral authority is often compromised in one way or another.
- 25.
- 26.
The search engine: Education Research Complete reports that in the period 2001–2010, the number of journal articles with titles containing “citizenship” was 1194, up from 234 a decade earlier. The corresponding figures for the term “civic” were 813 and 166. The search engine ERIC reports somewhat more modest figures, but also shows a sharp increase.
- 27.
The combination of strong patriotic and individualistic sentiments inevitably leads to the conviction that one’s own (individual) nation is, in some senses, superior to others.
- 28.
The key verbs in (2), viz. “believe” and “think” generate semantically opaque referential contexts because their apparent objects – including phlogiston, in this case – are not their actual objects. I can imagine eating a chocolate cake which weighs 100 kg, but I cannot actually eat it because I cannot eat things that do not exist.
- 29.
As part of her dissertation defence, a recent doctoral candidate presented data indicating that students’ knowledge of, and interest in, their nation and its history had declined over the last decade. The candidate concluded that boosting national education in schools is a “must”. But such a strongly normative conclusion requires an additional (normative) premise, to the effect that a knowledge of and interest in one’s nation and its history are essential. Nowhere in the research presented was this claim articulated, let alone defended.
- 30.
This commitment is somewhat blurred in the context of the growth of private and home schooling. Such non-public institutions often impose or reflect moral viewpoints that are at odds with those advocated by the state. See also Footnote 63 below, and Chap. 8.
- 31.
McLaughlin (1992) sees (1), (2) and (3) in terms of a continuum, ranging from “minimal” to “maximal” conceptions of citizenship. He criticizes British Government policy of the day – and, one can infer, of much contemporary government policy today as well – for working with and promoting a muddled conception of citizenship, one whose educational implications in terms of such components as morality and critical thinking are quite unclear.
- 32.
Not all values “act as justifications for activity”. Aesthetic values (not acknowledged by Halstead), as noted in the previous chapter, are not directly linked to any specific actions. Beauty and integrity, for example, are values in so far as they are the outcomes of aesthetic judgments. Moreover, rationality, highlighted by Halstead, is not an exclusively moral value; but it is not a civic value either. It is a core intellectual or cognitive value attaching to the concept of person.
- 33.
Many philosophers have been critical of both classical dualism and empiricism. See, for example, Wittgenstein’s argument against the idea of a “private language” (Wittgenstein 1968, §§243ff). My thinking here follows P. F. Strawson, in his celebrated account of the concept person as primitive with respect to, and preempting, any conceptual gap between, mind and body (Strawson 1959, Ch. 3). For Strawson’s final statement on this issue, see Magdalen College (2008, pp. 83ff). My views on the subject/predicate distinction, and on the relational nature of person, are also strongly influenced by Strawson, although I am not sure that he would agree with the former.
- 34.
McLaughlin, while endorsing the “private/public” distinction with respect to morality, points out some of the difficulties in maintaining that autonomy and other values should be classified as public – hence, uniformly accepted – in the absence of a broad-ranging and comprehensive public debate. See also Chap. 8.
- 35.
Martha Nussbaum begins her 2012 paper with a tale of how the US “Pledge of Allegiance” came into being in 1892, namely, as an attempt to challenge the “unfettered greed and egoism” that would be on display at the coming World’s Fair in Chicago. The idea was to shift the spotlight from rampant individualism to something more inclusive and caring. But as she points out, patriotic inclusion entails exclusion, both of those within the country who, for whatever reason, cannot identify with the Pledge (some religious groups regard it as a form of idolatry), and of those who happen to reside elsewhere. In her words, “Patriotism is Janus-faced” (Nussbaum 2012).
- 36.
See Thornton (2014).
- 37.
See Dewey (1910).
- 38.
Elsewhere Hall expresses a preference for the concept of identification over identity, suggesting that identification is an ongoing “construction, a process never completed”. I prefer to characterize this project in terms of a shifting or evolving set of identifications and differences but – for reasons which I have tried to make clear – my literal and continuing identity is not in question. Hall again:
In common sense language, identification is constructed on the back of a recognition of some common origin or shared characteristics with another person or group, or with an ideal, and with the natural closure of solidarity and allegiance established on this foundation. (Hall 1996, p. 2)
Once again, however, in so far as identification is a relation of alignment rather than distinction – we identify with something or someone – it is qualitative rather than quantitative, and cannot capture the full conditions of identity that apply to individual objects, including ourselves, based on the kind of object – say, living organism – that I – the person – am.
- 39.
Strawson’s “purely logical” truth is really one of a pair, the second of which may be stated thus: No (non-trivial) concept can be truly applied to all objects; in other words, for a given concept C, if we can truly predicate “C” of some object x, then there must be – conceivably if not actually – a distinct object y of which C can be meaningfully but falsely predicated.
- 40.
In a footnote, Appiah credits this use of the term “identity” to Erikson, noting that Erikson himself moved between psychological (private, inner) and social understandings of identity. For a detailed account of Erikson’s contribution to the “identity” debate in postmodernism, see Schachter (2005). Schachter maintains that Erikson’s view of the harmonious interplay of the individual and society seems somewhat quaint in the context of more recent postmodernist narratives which focus on fragmentation and dissolution. I am less interested in the details of this debate than in pointing out that here, as elsewhere, the logic of identity as a formal relation first and foremost does not rate a mention.
- 41.
One point on which I completely agree with Nussbaum: whatever else may be said on behalf of a “purified patriotism”, it requires a “vigorous critical culture” which schools need to foster. By this indicator alone, most examples of patriotism past and present would not count as purified. I take up the question of what schools need to do for persons in the next chapter.
- 42.
Jürgen Habermas adopts a somewhat different stance in this regard, preferring to preserve the value of citizenship but sever it from its usual nationalistic associations. Habermas points out that freedom in the name of national independence is quite different from the freedom enjoyed (or not) by citizens within a nation: “Citizenship was never conceptually tied to national identity” (Habermas 1994, p. 23).
- 43.
- 44.
I am not, however, convinced by Hansen’s insistence that “cosmopolitan education … does not project a wholesale revision of curriculum and pedagogy” (Hansen 2010, p. 13). Elsewhere he states, more specifically, that “a cosmopolitan education does not necessitate a radical curricular overhaul of what is taught in elementary, secondary, or university settings…[and] does not depend on or require a formal program such as those featuring what is called civic education, global education, or moral education” (Hansen 2008, p. 296). I share Hansen’s view that such special programs ought not be necessary, but contend that something like a “radical curricular overhaul of what is taught…” may well be. I take up this point in the following chapter.
- 45.
Taking a cosmopolitan perspective requires meeting the practical challenge of reaching out to others who are not in our immediate circle of contacts and relationships, including those who are quite different in various respects (living in distant locations, having unfamiliar customs and lifestyles, etc.). Citing the work of fellow feminist writer Sandra Harding, Barbara Thayer-Bacon supports the strategy of bridging the gap between what is culturally distant from our own perspectives and the everyday context of our daily experience, by both ensuring that the voices of those “on the margins” are incorporated into our own discourse, and acknowledging that many aspects of our own lives are “problematic” (Thayer-Bacon 1997, pp. 254–255).
- 46.
For an interesting analysis of the concept of culture in the context of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, see Rizvi (2005). My own reading of Rizvi indicates that he has not sufficiently problematized the concepts of culture and (especially) identity. Regarding the latter, like Hall and others (as discussed above), Rizvi fails to distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity; he also shifts unannounced between the identity of the group and that of the individuals who belong to it.
- 47.
One more example of how identity theory, so-called, misconstrues the concept of personal identity is drawn from the rise and fall of the work ethic which may be traced to the rapid industrial growth in Europe during the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. Citing the work of Zygmunt Bauman (1998), Margarita Pavlova (2009) explains how work was viewed as “the main factor determining social placement and identity for the majority of males…a phenomenon that planned and ordered all aspects of life…a search for daily meaning… central to an individual’s sense of identity and well-being” (p. 90). However, led by an American transformation which saw work (merely) as “the means to become richer”, notions of personal autonomy gradually became defined in economic terms. The individual as worker (“producer”) was replaced by the individual as “consumer” (p. 91). I do not deny that such a transformation occurred; my target is the presumption that such institutions or roles as worker and consumer have any conceptual part to play in personal development. Whatever it is (if anything) that defines or essentially characterizes me as an individual person, neither “worker” nor “consumer” even comes close.
- 48.
I say more about the identity and existence conditions of groups below. See “Supra-persons: Do we need them?”
- 49.
“The word in language is half someone else’s” (Bakhtin 1981, p. 293).
- 50.
- 51.
Witness the proliferation, in the West – and, increasingly, elsewhere – of “feel good” therapies, such as urging young children to sing songs with lyrics like “I am wonderful, I am special…”
- 52.
In Rousseau we find the idea that authenticity can be viewed as a process – or, better, a project – of self-construction/creation which depends, crucially, on egalitarian relationships of inter-subjectivity (see Ferrara 1993). This idea, as Appiah (2005, p. 15) points out, is also in J. S. Mill. See Splitter (2009).
- 53.
Compare Appiah’s position with that of Sen: “Being born in a particular culture is obviously not an exercise in cultural liberty, and the preservation of something with which the person is stamped, simply because of birth, can hardly be, in itself, an exercise of freedom” (Sen 2006, pp. 116–117).
- 54.
According to one commentator (Hauerwas 2007), After Virtue is a cornerstone of MacIntyre’s work, but by no means the only stone. Nevertheless, Hauerwas argues that the central themes of After Virtue are continuous with those of both his earlier and later works, including Marxism: An Interpretation (1953), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988) and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990); also a third edition of After Virtue (2007). In this brief analysis, I do not attempt to go beyond that cornerstone text, which is already sufficiently challenging on account of the depth of MacIntyre’s knowledge and expertise, both philosophical and historical.
- 55.
MacIntyre might have included in his historical account the views of Confucius – still evident in much of contemporary Chinese and East Asian society – in which the paradigm nature of specific social roles – king and minister, father and son – provided the basic rules for how to live well. I shall say more about this below.
- 56.
Collectivist sentiments such as pride, shame, honor and loyalty are inevitably tinged with moral connotations. I am not dismissing the notion that the wayward behavior of individuals can bring a sense of dishonor or shame, not only to themselves, but to the wider collective or community which seeks to enforce certain traditions or customs. But in moral terms, the causal direction should move from individual to group, whereas in the case of honor killings (as one extreme example), the direction is reversed: the wrongness of the individual’s behavior is based simply on its falling outside the boundaries of what the group can accept. Notions of national or tribal pride and loyalty become problematic in terms of the PPW when priority is given to the well-being of the collective over that of individual persons.
- 57.
In the following chapter, I reiterate the distinction between supra-persons and groups which are “no greater than the sums of their parts” (recall Claim #7 at the start of this chapter), and confirm that the classroom community of inquiry can only be a collective of the second kind (it is not a supra-person). The basic idea that each person is constituted and sees herself as one among others is the appropriate basis for the slogan “No I without We”.
- 58.
Ample evidence of this “new darkness” may be found by observing the state of the world today, characterised inter alia by a dominant market ideology based on the very neo-liberal individualism which MacIntyre finds rationally incoherent (and, I would add, amoral at best), and a host of trouble spots around the world due, in large part, to a rejection of this same liberal tradition and a stubborn refusal on the part of governments to allow – let alone encourage – their citizens to think for themselves beyond the shackles of the various supra-persons (in the form of roles, traditions, ethnicities, religions, tribal and national loyalties, etc.) which continue to wield unwarranted moral and existential power.
- 59.
We may discern some common threads between MacIntyre’s account and the idea of grounded cosmopolitanism, as expounded by Hansen (above). One of these, which I endorse, is that the possibility of extrapolation to an unknown future, or to an entire cosmos, etc., depends on having a base which is strongly contextualized and situated in space and time.
- 60.
Taylor attributes the idea of narrative in this context to writers such as MacIntyre, Ricouer and Bruner.
- 61.
For a comparison, consider the phylogenetic conception of species (discussed in Chap. 4), in particular its inadequacy as a viable definition precisely because it does not generate identity criteria which govern the identity of species through such crucial events as speciation.
- 62.
A recent media headline citing a comment by the principal of an Islamic school serves as a reminder of the distorting power of Emphasis Type="Italic">supra-persons</Emphasis>. This principal told his students that Islamic extremism (which is currently evident in troubled areas around the world) must be caused by non-Muslims because Islam is a peaceful and peace-loving religion.
- 63.
It would be interesting to recreate the less personal interactions among the teenagers, to see if the sense of inter-connectedness established in the personal context might raise the level of the dialogue. Dialogue is a deeply inter- and intra- personal endeavour which is actually part of the process of personal development – a point I shall take up in the following chapter.
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Splitter, L.J. (2015). Religions, Nations, Cultures, Traditions, Roles and Other Supra-Persons: The Principle of Personal Worth II. In: Identity and Personhood. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-481-8_7
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