Abstract
The narrative of the Nepalese constitution begins from 1948, when the Ranas (Originally, the title of “Rana” was bestowed to Junga Bahadur Kunwar, the prime minister of Nepal by the kings of Nepal. Later, not only Junga Bahadur himself but also all his family members and descendants used the title like a family name. In fact, Junga Bahadur Rana had instituted the office of the prime minister as a position to be inherited only by his brothers and descendants.) promulgated a constitution in an attempt to deter the democratic aspirations and impending political movement of the Nepalese people. Comparatively, the constitutional history of Nepal is not long, but the vicissitudes it has passed through are numerous. In six decades, it has experienced six constitutions. Among these six constitutions, the 1959 Constitution , known as the democratic constitution , is one of the shortest-lived constitutions in Nepal, having had a life span of less than 1 year. The longest-lived constitution is the autocratic Panchayati (Historically, the term “panchayat” conveyed the system of community arbitration. Senior and respected members of the community were generally trusted to assume the position of arbitrators in solving disputes in the community. But King Mahendra used the term to denote a political system created by him. The term “panchayati” denotes to the system of panchayat, which was practiced in Nepal from 1962 to 1990. Today, the term “panchayati” is used to refer to an undemocratic totalitarian political system and practices.) Constitution of 1962, which survived for 28 years. The 1990 Constitution marks an important moment in the constitutional history of Nepal for three important reasons. First, although it had some conspicuous limitations, it was a democratic constitution. Second, for the first time, it brought the absolute monarchy within the constitutional purview. Third, it permitted the free and competitive participation of the people in the political affairs of the country. Unfortunately, faced with constant challenges, the 1990 Constitution did not survive any longer than 17 years. The Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, which was prepared to serve for a short period and is supposed to be replaced by a constitution promulgated by the people through their elected representatives, called the Constituent Assembly (CA ), continues to govern the country to this day.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
See ASCPC (2011). A Declaration of the Republic of Nepal by the Constituent Assembly of Nepal on May 28, 2008. From Conflict to Peace in Nepal. Kathmandu: Asian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Transformation.
- 2.
Originally, the title of “Rana” was bestowed to Junga Bahadur Kunwar, the prime minister of Nepal by the kings of Nepal. Later, not only Junga Bahadur himself but also all his family members and descendants used the title like a family name. In fact, Junga Bahadur Rana had instituted the office of the prime minister as a position to be inherited only by his brothers and descendants.
- 3.
Historically, the term “panchayat” conveyed the system of community arbitration. Senior and respected members of the community were generally trusted to assume the position of arbitrators in solving disputes in the community. But King Mahendra used the term to denote a political system created by him. The term “panchayati” denotes to the system of panchayat, which was practiced in Nepal from 1962 to 1990. Today, the term “panchayati” is used to refer to an undemocratic totalitarian political system and practices.
- 4.
Cited in Stengel, Richard (2006, June 26). Why History Matters. Time Magazine US. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1207787,00.html. Accessed 8 December 2012.
- 5.
See The National Trust UK (2006). Why History Matters: Pass It On. http://www.nationaltrust.org.uk/main/w-history-matters.pdf. Accessed 8 December 2012.
- 6.
Roscoe Pound, an American legal philosopher, meaningfully used the term “social engineering” to secure maximum interests as a whole with the least sacrifice for higher and more complete human development . See Pound, Roscoe (1943). A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harvard Law Review 57, 1–39. See also Pound, Roscoe (1922). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law. Yale University Press, Kindle Location 683. Pound writes, “For the purpose of understanding the law of today I am content with a picture of satisfying as much of the whole body of human wants as we may with the least sacrifice. I am content to think of law as a social institution to satisfy social wants—the claims and demands involved in the existence of civilized society—by giving effect to as much as we may with the least sacrifice, so far as such wants may be satisfied or such claims given effect by an ordering of human conduct through politically organized society. For present purposes I am content to see in legal history the record of a continually wider recognizing and satisfying of human wants or claims or desires through social control; a more embracing and more effective securing of social interests; a continually more complete and effective elimination of waste and precluding of friction in human enjoyment of the goods of existence—in short, a continually more efficacious social engineering.”
- 7.
The 1948 Constitution was named the “Government of Nepal Act, 1948 .”
- 8.
Maharaja Pudma Shumsher , with a view to diffuse internal political pressures and political awakening in the country, had formed a “reformed committee” composed of twelve members and one advisor. All members of the committee were from the Rana ruling class and its close associates. The list is given in Annex I.
- 9.
Preamble of the Constitution of Nepal, 1948. The preamble states, “Whereas by virtue of the supreme authority vested through the instruments of their sacred Panjapatras by Shree Panch Maharajadhirajas of Nepal, dating from the Sambat year 1903 onwards, delegating all powers of the State upon the contemporaneous Shree 3 Maharajas. And whereas, I, Maharaja Pudma Shumsher Junga Bahadur Rana, and now carrying on the administration of the country by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid Panjapatra. … I, Maharaja Pudma Shumsher Junga Bahadur Rana, do hereby ordain this Constitutional Act.”
- 10.
Panjapatra is a formal document granted by Shah kings to Junga Bahadur Rana permitting to exercise all state power and authority by Rana prime ministers.
- 11.
India was liberated from British rule, and democracy was subsequently established in India. Both the Nepali Congress (1947) and Nepal Communist Party (1949) were formed in India, and they had closely watched political changes in India and had started activities for a democratic polity in Nepal. Other political parties such as the Gorkha League (1921), Prachanda Gurkha Samiti (1931), Praja Parishad (1935), and all Gurkha Congress (1946) were already formed in the country and working against the autocratic Rana rules.
- 12.
See Chaturvedi, S. K. (1992). Nepal Internal Politics and its Constitutions. New Delhi: Inter-India Publication, p. 35. Nehru had sent three persons to assist in the preparation of the constitution. They were Mr. Sri Prakash, Mr. Raghu Nath Singh, and Mr. R. U. Singh.
- 13.
Gorkha League (1921), Prachanda Gurkha Samati (1931), Praja Parishad (1935), Vishow Vatritwo Sangh (1943), All Gurkha Congress (1946), Nepali National Congress (1947).
- 14.
For example, Praja Parishad wanted to end the autocracy of Ranas by means of the leadership of His Majesty King. The Gorkha League (All India Gorkha League) that was established in Dehradun, India, was led by one of the sons of a deposed Rana. He was followed by Thakur Chandan Singh who, in collusion with the Ranas, brought about the collapse of the Gorkha League. In 1942, a branch of the All India Gorkha League was revived in Darjeeling by Rup Narain Singh, a barrister. This branch was taken over by Dambar Singh Gurung, a member of the Legislative Assembly in the province of Bengal, on the ticket of the Indian National Congress. In 1946, Gurung visited Kathmandu and returned to India as an upholder of the Rana regime. With this development, the Gorkha League disappeared from the scene of Nepalese politics. See Sanwal, B. D. (1993). Social and Political History of Nepal (New Delhi: Manohar, pp. 154–156). Vishow Vatritow Sangh was guided by the ideology of communism and had a belief in terrorism as a means of achieving communism. See K. C., Surendra (1999). Nepalma Communist Andolan (Communist Movement in Nepal). Kathmandu: Student Book Store, p. 43.
- 15.
See Bista , Dor Bahadur (1991). Fatalism and Development: Nepal’s Struggle for Modernization. India : Orient Longman Limited, p. 1.
- 16.
On March 19, 1948, G. A. Falconer wrote to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin on the 1948 Constitution of Nepal that “… It is hardly surprising that the majority of the people have had little or no education whatever and no training to fit themselves for the responsibility of even local self-government. To introduce democracy into Nepal it is therefore necessary to begin at the bottom. To begin at the top or even halfway as the few anti-Rana agitators in India would have it will merely produce chaos and the condition of the people will be worse than before. …” Cited in Shaha , Rishikesh (1990). Modern Nepal: A Political History. New Delhi: Manohar Vol. II, p. 187.
- 17.
See GoN (August 20, 1951). Nepal Gazette. I(3). It provides that the Interim Government Act, 1951, of Nepal was promulgated by King Tribhuvan on Chaitra 17, 2007 B. S. (March 30, 1951).
- 18.
Art. 1 (2) of the Interim Government of Nepal Act 1951 , provides, “It shall come into force from Chaitra 29, 2007 (April 11, 1951).”
- 19.
See King Tribhuvan ’s address to the nation on February 18, 1951, 3 days after his return from India . He declared, “… the government of our people be carried on henceforth according to a republican constitution prepared by a constituent assembly elected on the basis of direct universal suffrage,” cited in Singh, Top Bahadur (1985). Constitution of Nepal and Constitutional Law. Kathmandu: Law Book Publication Committee, p. 660. See also Regmi , Mukunda (2004). Constitutional Development: Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal. Kathmandu: Mrs. Sitadevi Regmi, p. 74.
- 20.
Rana Prime Minister Pudma Shumsher first introduced the concept of Constituent Assembly when he made a consultation with his brothers and senior members of the Rana ruling family in February 1947. He had proposed a body consisting of 12 elected members and 12 nominated members to initiate constitutional change or reform in the country. See Pande, Sardar Bhim Bahadur (1982). The Then Nepal. referred in Regmi, Mukunda, supra note, pp. 4–5.
- 21.
See Prasai, Dirgha Raj (May 29, 2011). The Nepalese Political Scenario 1950–2011. http://www.international.to/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1079&catid=54:dirgha-raj-prasai&Itemid=84. Accessed 10 August 2013. However, B. P. Koirala had frequently pointed out to the need of a Constituent Assembly elected by adult franchise. See Giri, Pradeep (Ed.) (2009). Political Documents of Mr. Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala. Kathmandu: Student Book Store, pp. 23–26.
- 22.
See in Annex III.
- 23.
See Dahal, Ram Kumar (2001). Constitutional and Political Developments in Nepal. Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar, p. 32. See also Thakur, Mihir Kumar (1995). Nepalese Constitution and Politics. Rajbiraj: M. R. Publication, p. 65.
- 24.
See Article 55 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1959. Art. 55 (1) provides, “If His Majesty in His discretion is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security or economic life of Nepal, or any part thereof, is threatened by war or external aggression, or by internal disturbance, He may by Proclamation in His discretion: declare that His functions shall to such extent as may be specified in the Proclamation, be exercised by Him in His discretion; (a) assume to Himself all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by Parliament or any other governmental body or authority ; and any such Proclamation may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as may appear to Him to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provision of this Constitution.”
- 25.
See the address made by King Mahendra in the name of country-persons on 22 Poush 2017 (January 6, 1960) and GoN (January 6, 1960). Nepal Gazette. 1(2) Supplementary 20. Art. 56 (1) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1959, provides, “If His Majesty in His discretion is satisfied, after consulting the Council of State, that the system of Parliamentary government contemplated by this Constitution has broken down and that the powers conferred by Article 17 are in the circumstances inadequate, He may by Proclamation in His discretion suspend any provision of Part III, IV and V of this Constitution and make such temporary provision for the governance of the Kingdom of Nepal as in His discretion …”
- 26.
See Annex III.
- 27.
See Dahal, Ram Kumar, supra note, p. 48.
- 28.
See Article 20(2) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1962, which reads, “The sovereignty of Nepal is vested in His Majesty and all powers-executive, legislative and judicial emanate from Him. These powers are exercised by His Majesty through the organs established by or under this Constitution and other laws for the time being in force keeping in view the interest and wishes of His Majesty’s subjects according to the highest traditions of the Shah dynasty.”
- 29.
See Burghart, Richard (1993). The Political Culture of Panchayati Democracy. In Michael Hutt ed., Nepal in the Nineties: Versions of the Past, Visions of the Future. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–13. cited in Malagodi, Mara (2013). Constitutional Nationalism and Legal Exclusion. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p. 88.
- 30.
See GoN (May, 1990). Communiqué of the Chief Secretariat of His Majesty the King. 40(Supp. 11).
- 31.
See CRC (1990) . Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal: Draft, Exploratory Note & Report. Kathmandu, p. 5. During the preparation of the draft, the CRC carried public consultations and collected 8,707 suggestions from different parts of the country between 17 Jesth 2047 (May 31, 1990) and 20 Ashad 2047 (July 4, 1990). Out of the total suggestions, 80 % of the suggestions were from Kathmandu Valley. Within 10 days, the CRC had tabulated, classified, and analyzed the suggestions. The rest of the time it devoted itself to preparing the draft. The consultation and preparation of the draft was completed in a short period of time because there was an overwhelming feeling to outdo the efforts of antidemocratic forces, especially during the gestation period.
- 32.
See Id., at 2 & 3. When the CRC accomplished its historic assignment on time, it expressed that “as per the direction given by His Majesty the King to prepare a Draft Constitution based on the principles of Constitutional Monarchy and Multiparty Democracy … we have prepared a balanced Draft Constitution based on these principles.” Further, the CRC mentioned that “as the Constitutions of any other countries, primarily, the proposed Constitution has also defined the authority of the government and rights of the people and outlined the interrelationship between different organs of the state.”
- 33.
The committee was composed of Mr. Nilambar Acharya , Minister of Law and Justice; Mr. Yog Prasad Upadhyaya , Minister for Home; and Dr. Keshar Jung Rayamajhi . Mr. Acharya used to represent the left front, Mr. Upadhyaya used to represent the Nepali Congress , and Dr. Rayamajhi, former General Secretary of Nepal Communist Party, used to be known as close to the Palace and afterward became Chairman of Raj Parishad (King’s Council).
- 34.
See Sharma, Ramesh (1990, October 22). A Different Constitutional Text Produced by Palace: Substantial Differences in Major Issues. Gorkhapatra. The text is reproduced in Upreti, Bharat Raj, and others (Ed.) (1997). Constitutional Law of Nepal. Kathmandu: FREEDEL, p. 715. See also Pathak, Narendra Prasad, & Pyakurel, Brajesh (2004). Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal and Constitutional Manuscripts. Kathmandu: Pairabi Publication, pp. 203–252.
- 35.
See GoN (9 November 1990). Nepal Gazette. 40(Supp. 37).
- 36.
The preamble of the 1990 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990, provides, “… Now, therefore, keeping in view the desire of the people that the state authority and sovereign powers shall, after the commencement of this Constitution, be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, I, King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva, by virtue of the state authority as exercised by us, do hereby promulgate and enforce this Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal on the recommendation and advice, and with the consent of the Council of Ministers.”
- 37.
See CRC , supra note, p. 5.
- 38.
See Regmi, Mukunda, supra note, p. 64. Mr. Regmi argues, “… attention is to be given to what type of constitution should be prepared rather than who has to prepare a constitution. The Constitution is to be prepared by that political force, which has already contributed in the formation of state and has obtained public confidence in the society … the Kingdom of Nepal has been formed by the Great King Prithvi Narayan Shah … Kings of this Kingdom have always wished for the greater interests and affluence of the people. … In a country where there is a monarchy, a constitution is made by an agreement between the King and the people. There is no record around the world that people have alone made a constitution in a monarchical country.”
- 39.
The devastating tragedy took place on the evening of June 1, 2001. In that incident, nine royal family members were killed, including the king, queen, prince, and princess. There are three popular narratives of the incident. First, the Royal Commission composed of Chief Justice Mr. Keshav Prasad Upadhyaya and Speaker of the House of Representatives Mr. Tara Nath Ranabhat reported that an automatic gun had went off killing the royalties. Second, Crown Prince Dipendra killed his father, mother, sister, brother, and other members of the royal families before he shot himself but kindly saved the family members of Prince Gyanendra, who became king after the incident. When Crown Prince Dipendra was in coma at military hospital, he was declared the 13th King of Nepal. However, it is still not known that whether he was alive or already dead when he was declared the king. The popular anecdote in Nepal is that the 13th Kingship would be ominous. Thus, Prince Gyanendra, the younger brother of the deceased King Birendra , wanted to avoid the 13th Kingship by declaring Dipendra as the 13th King. Third, there is a widespread suspicion that the massacre was a conspiracy planned by Prince Gyanendra, who was outside Kathmandu on the night of the royal massacre. Prince Gyanendra became King after declaring possibly the dead Crown Prince the 13th King. The Royal Enigma. Megnum Publishing. See also Willesse, Amy, & Whittaker, Mark (2004). Love & Death in Kathmandu: A Strange Tale of Royal Murder. St. Martin’s Press; Gregson, Jonathan (2002). Massacre at Palace. Miramax; Raj, Prakash A. (2001). Kay Gardeko? The Royal Massacre in Nepal. Rupa & Co.
- 40.
See GoN (October 4, 2002). Royal Proclamation by His Majesty King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva. Nepal Gazette. 52(Supp. 49). The proclamation states that “As it is our responsibility to preserve nationalism, national unity and sovereignty , as well as, to maintain peace and order in the country and also to ensure that the condition of the nation does not deteriorate for any reason, a situation has arisen wherein, by virtue of the Royal Prerogatives as exercised by us and in the spirit of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990, as well as, taking into consideration Article 27 (3) of the Constitution, Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba should be relieved of his office, owing to his incompetence to conduct the general elections on the stipulated date in accordance with the Constitution, and the Council of Ministers dissolved. Similarly, the general elections dated for November 13 also needs to be postponed. We, therefore, issue the following orders in accordance with Article 127 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990.”
- 41.
See Adhikari, Aditya (May 4, 2010). The Lure of Power . http://www.ekantipur.com/2010/05/04/oped/the-lure-of-power/313609/. Accessed 1 July 2012. Adhikari states that Madhav Nepal ’s desire for power was immense; yet that the communist leader rejected the principles and went to stand in line outside the palace, application in hand, in the company of such monarchical loyalists such as Pashupati Shamsher Rana, Kirtinidhi Bista, and Badrinath Mandal.
- 42.
See International Crisis Group (June 15, 2005), Towards A Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues: Asia Report. 99. The report states, “Due to the controversial manner of their appointment, Deuba and his cabinet lacked credibility. Other political actors, including the Maoists, viewed the coalition as the King’s ‘puppet.’ Governing under the pervasive threat of Article 127, fear of dismissal deprived the Deuba government of the freedom to make independent policy choices. All decisions had to be approved by the Palace.”
- 43.
The major political parties defined Deuba’s appointment merely as the continuation of the October 4, 2002, regression in a different form, and in no way did they take it as a correction of regression. See The Kathmandu Post (June 3, 2004). http://www.ekantipur.com/2004/06/03/top-story/five-party-alliance-leaders-react-differently/12538.html. Accessed 1 July 2012.
- 44.
See Adhikari, Aditya, supra note.
- 45.
See Kantipur Daily (July 7, 2005, i.e., 2062, Ashad 23 B. S.).
- 46.
See GoN (November 22, 2005). The 12-Point Agreement entered between the Seven Political Parties and the Maoist on November 22, 2005. http://www.peace.gov.np/uploads/Publication/cover%20and%20con.pdf. Accessed 1 July 2012. Article 1 of the agreement reads as “The democracy , peace, prosperity, social advancement and an independent, sovereign Nepal is the principal wish of all Nepali people in the country today. We are fully agreed that the autocratic monarchy is the main hurdle for this. We have a clear opinion that the peace, progress and prosperity in the country are not possible until a full democracy is established by bringing the absolute monarchy to an end …” It is reproduced in Annex VIII of this book.
- 47.
See the Proclamation to the Nation by King Gyanendra of April 24, 2006. The King recognized that “Convinced that the source of State power of the Kingdom of Nepal is Nepali people having and sovereignty and state power of Nepal is inherent in the people of Nepal and cognizant of the spirit of the ongoing people’s movement …” The text of the proclamation is reproduced in Annex X of this book.
- 48.
The ICDC was composed of Justice Laxman Prasad Aryal, coordinator, and members Mr. Harihar Dhal, Mr. Sindhunath Pyakural, Mr. Sambhu Thapa , Mr. Mahadev Yadav, and Mr. Khimlal Devkota, all lawyers. The agreement is reproduced in Annex VI of this book.
- 49.
See International Crisis Group (February 26, 2007). Nepal’s Constitutional Process. Asia Report, 128.
- 50.
See Annex VI of this book.
- 51.
See Annex VII of this book.
- 52.
See Annex VIII of this book.
- 53.
The Legislature Parliament consisted of a total of 330 members. Among them, 209 were from the mainstream political parties , 73 were Maoists, and the remaining 48 seats were allocated for people from marginalized groups and eminent personalities. However, ultimately, the political parties nominated their own cadre for all of the 48 seats.
- 54.
See Dixit , Kanak Mani (2011). Peace Politics of Nepal. Kathmandu: Himal Kitab Pvt. Ltd. Kindle Location 68.
- 55.
See generally Lijphart , Arend (1977). Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. Yale University Press; see also Lijphart, Arend (2012). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press; Lijphart, Arend (2008). Thinking About Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in the Theory and Practice. Routledge.
- 56.
See Steiner, Jurg (1981). The Consociational Theory and Beyond. Comparative Politics. 13, p. 33.
- 57.
See Choudhry, Sujit (2010). Bridging Comparative Politics and Comparative Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, In Sujit Choudhry (Ed.), Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation? Oxford University Press, pp. 4–5.
- 58.
Id., p. 9.
- 59.
See Lijphart , Democracy in Plural Societies, supra note, p. 4. Lijphart observes, “Segmental cleavages may be of a religious, ideological , linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, or ethnic nature. A further characteristic, already implied by Eckstein’s definition, is that political parties , interest groups, media of communication, schools, and voluntary associations tend to be organized along the lines of segmental cleavages. The groups of the population bounded by such cleavages will be referred to as the segments of a plural society.”
- 60.
Id., at 11.
- 61.
See Ghai , Yash (2011). Ethnic Identity , Participation and Social Justice: A Constitution for New Nepal? International Journal on Minority & Group Rights. 18, 309–334. Ghai offers an ethnicity-based state as the consociational model to solve the problems of the Nepalese society. He claims that “In the ethnic-based state, ethnic groups are fundamental building blocks of the political system and many rights of citizenship can only be exercised through membership of an ethnic group. Citizenship rights are differentiated. Representation and participation are based on ethnic distinctions. Therefore group rights are frequently more important than individual rights.”
- 62.
See European Commission for Democracy through Law (March 11, 2005). Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative, paras. 44 & 59, CDL-AD (2005) 004.
- 63.
Id., para. 69, which reads, “If the members of the Presidency elected from an Entity represent all citizens residing this Entity and not a specific people, it is difficult to justify that they must identify themselves as belonging to a specific people. Such a rule seems to assume that only members of a particular ethnicity can be regarded as fully loyal citizens of the Entity capable of defending its interests. The members of the Presidency have a veto right whenever there is a violation of vital interests of the Entity from which they were elected. It cannot be maintained that only Serbs are able and willing to defend the interests of the RS and only Croats and Bosniacs the interests of the Federation. The identity of interests in this ethnically-dominated manner impedes the development of a wider sense of nationhood.”
- 64.
Id., para. 101.
- 65.
Lijphart offers four characteristics of political stability: system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and effectiveness. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, supra note, p. 4.
- 66.
See Bhandari, Surendra (2005). Future of the Nepalese Constitution and Democracy. In Surendra Bhandari & Budhi Karki (Ed.), The Future of the Nepalese Constitution. Kathmandu: Law Associates Nepal.
- 67.
See Shakya , Sujeev (2009). Unleashing Nepal. Penguin Books, p. 3.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2014 Springer Science+Business Media Singapore
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bhandari, S. (2014). The Landscape of Constitution Making in Nepal. In: Self-Determination & Constitution Making in Nepal. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-005-6_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-005-6_1
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Singapore
Print ISBN: 978-981-287-004-9
Online ISBN: 978-981-287-005-6
eBook Packages: Humanities, Social Sciences and LawPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)