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Myanmar on the Road Towards the 2020 Elections: A Pre-electoral Assessment

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Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis
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Abstract

The Myanmar general elections, which have been organized under the auspices of the Union Election Commission (UEC), take place in five-year terms. The 2015 elections had been regarded similar to a referendum against military rule, which led to a government with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as State Counsellor. The 2020 polls were expected to be more competitive, and the entire electoral system to become more tested than before. However, half a year prior to the 8 November 2020 general elections, neither the election date nor the further course of the COVID-19 pandemic were clear. The outbreak of the pandemic compounded already existing weaknesses and risks in the electoral process. This chapter reviews the pre-electoral situation, the legal framework for elections, the election administration, voter registration, the political party landscape, the campaign and campaign finance framework, as well as the local cancellation of elections and their impact in Rakhine State in particular. Furthermore, it also discusses social media and election observation, taking COVID-19 into account.

This chapter presents an updated version of a study with the same title published by the Heinrich Böll Stiftung (HBS) in Yangon, Myanmar, with a creative commons license (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) in July 2020. HBS supported the production of the pre-electoral assessment, which drew on the language and findings of past election observation missions in Myanmar as well as on 25 online interviews with a variety of stakeholders. These included representatives of the election administration, political parties, the media, civil society organisations, technical assistance providers, national and international election observers, and independent experts. The pre-electoral assessment ends with the beginning of the electoral campaign period two months before election day.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Myanmar has not acceded to the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the most important international treaty providing prerequisites for the conduct of democratic elections.

  2. 2.

    ICG (2020a).

  3. 3.

    Hein Thar (2020).

  4. 4.

    ICG (2020c).

  5. 5.

    Spinelli (2020).

  6. 6.

    See the websites of IFES and International IDEA for international comparison. Many international assistance providers left Myanmar before international travel restrictions took effect, but some stayed and worked with the UEC throughout.

  7. 7.

    Compare Lidauer and Saphy (2014), compare Renshaw and Lidauer (2021).

  8. 8.

    Lidauer and Saphy (2014), compare Renshaw and Lidauer (2021).

  9. 9.

    Ibid.

  10. 10.

    EU EOM (2016).

  11. 11.

    Ibid.

  12. 12.

    New ethnic political parties were the Chin National League for Democracy (CNLD), the Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP), the Karen National Development Party (KNDP), the Kayah State Democracy Party (KySDP), the Mon Union Party (MUP), and also included the Wa National Party (WNP).

  13. 13.

    Su Mon Thant (2020).

  14. 14.

    Ye Mon (2020).

  15. 15.

    For comparison, in 2015, the 75 candidate rejections resulted predominantly from a stricter interpretation of the citizenship criteria than had been applied in previous elections conducted under identical rules, and had a particularly high impact on Muslim candidates. This, in turn, had significant consequences for Rohingya candidates. Only 28 of over 6000 candidates approved to contest the elections professed the Muslim faith, with none elected, leaving the national parliament without a single Muslim representative for the first time since independence. In 2020, a number of Muslim candidates prepared again to run for election (Ei Ei Toe Lwin 2020b).

  16. 16.

    Other legal grounds were applied as well, such as the timeframe spent abroad prior to the candidacy, or ongoing service in the military.

  17. 17.

    Min Aung Khine (2020).

  18. 18.

    EU EOM (2016).

  19. 19.

    Compare Lidauer and Saphy (2021).

  20. 20.

    Ei Ei Toe Lwin (2020a).

  21. 21.

    EU EOM (2016), TCC EOM (2016).

  22. 22.

    EU EFM Report (2019).

  23. 23.

    Compare Callahan and Myo Zaw Oo (2019).

  24. 24.

    The exact figure is difficult to ascertain as the 2014 population census was also not carried out in full in many of the areas concerned. Compare Lidauer (2016).

  25. 25.

    Lidauer (2021b). For comparison with 2015 see Lidauer (2021a).

  26. 26.

    ICG (2020b).

  27. 27.

    ICG (2020b).

  28. 28.

    Interview with an expert on Rakhine State politics on 7 July 2020.

  29. 29.

    On 14 October, three NLD candidates were abducted by armed men in Toungup township in southern Rakhine State. The AA claimed ownership of the incident several days afterwards (The Irrawaddy, 14 October 2020).

  30. 30.

    For developments in Rakhine State in the immediate aftermath of the elections see e.g. (Kean 2021).

  31. 31.

    Rio (2020).

  32. 32.

    Lidauer (2012).

  33. 33.

    EU EFM (2019).

  34. 34.

    For comparison, the UEC accredited 11,445 citizen election observers from 52 organisations, some of them coming from very small grassroot organisations, as well as 468 international observers from six organisations in 2015 (EU EOM 2016).

  35. 35.

    Lidauer and Saphy (2021).

  36. 36.

    Joint Statement by Domestic Election Observer Organisations, 29 January 2021.

  37. 37.

    Tatmadaw Information Team, 31 January 2021, no longer available online.

Abbreviations

AA:

Arakan Army

ANFREL:

Asian Network for Free Elections

ANP:

Arakan National Party

CoC:

Code of Conduct

GAD:

General Administration Department

DG:

Director General

DNP:

Democratic Party of National Politics

EEOP:

Election Education and Observation Partners

EFM:

Election Follow-up Mission

EOM:

Election Observation Mission

EU:

European Union

MoHS:

Ministry of Health and Sports

MoIP:

Ministry of Immigration and Population

NLD:

National League for Democracy

PACE:

People’s Alliance for Credible Elections

PP:

People’s Party

SNDP:

Shan Nationalities Development Party

SNLD:

Shan National League for Democracy

TCC:

The Carter Center

UBP:

Union Betterment Party

UEC:

Union Election Commission

USDP:

Union Solidarity and Development Party

Selected Sources and Further Readings

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  • Ei Ei Toe Lwin: An Old Controversy Returns as Govt Gets the Green Light to Campaign Early. The Frontier, 7 July 2020a.

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  • Ei Ei Toe Lwin: ‘We Won’t Retreat’: Muslim Candidates Prepare for Election Battle. The Frontier, 27 July 2020b.

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  • EU Election Observation Mission (EOM) Myanmar General Elections: Final Report. Yangon, January 2016.

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Post-Scriptum

Post-Scriptum

The 2020 election results clearly confirmed the NLD in office. Despite initial acceptance of the election results, the armed forces increasingly contested the electoral outcomes. On 1 February 2021, hours before the new legislature was scheduled to convene and proceed with the election of a new President, the Tatmadaw staged a coup d’état based on a narrative of electoral fraud, referring in particular to faulty voter lists. It is important to state, however, that any intentional tempering with the election results was not apparent. As tensions mounted prior to the coup, a broad coalition of national election observers clearly stated that “the elections were credible and reflected the will of the majority voters”.Footnote 36

Nevertheless, the military argued “It is not the outcome itself of the elections that the Tatmadaw is objecting to in its interaction with the UEC and the NLD-led government (…) rather, the Tatmadaw finds the process of the 2020 election unacceptable”Footnote 37 and re-iterated historical positions of the armed forces as the guardian of the nation. Alongside other state institutions and dignitaries, the military quickly replaced and detained the leadership of the UEC, announced probing into the electoral proceedings of 2020 as well as revisions of voter registration and the electoral system, and fresh elections within a certain timeframe. Against the unfolding drama in the aftermath of the military takeover, these statements appeared implausible. However, it is possible that the Tatmadaw will again employ narratives of electoral fraud and approaches to change the electoral framework to their benefit in the future.

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Lidauer, M. (2022). Myanmar on the Road Towards the 2020 Elections: A Pre-electoral Assessment. In: Yamahata, C., Anderson, B. (eds) Demystifying Myanmar’s Transition and Political Crisis. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6675-9_8

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