Abstract
Rouhani’s election in 2013 was a pivotal point in the history of the Islamic Republic and allowed Iran to present a new image on the global stage, one significantly different from the preceding eight years. This chapter assesses the Rouhani Administration’s foreign policy approach by analysing the nuclear negotiations and the impact of the deal on Iran’s global engagement efforts. In addition, this chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the nuclear deal by analysing its impact on the foreign and economic policies of Iran. The chapter concludes that the nuclear deal did not have a practical impact on the prospects of restoring official diplomatic relations with Washington, nor was it sustainably effective in revitalizing Iran’s economy. Thus, the continuation of US primary sanctions inhibited a reform in Iran’s strategic decision-making calculus towards the United States in particular, and foreign policy in general.
Keywords
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Introduction: Rouhani’s Election and Global Engagement Agenda
Rouhani’s election in 2013 was a pivotal point in the history of the Islamic Republic and allowed Iran to present a new image on the global stage, one significantly different from the preceding eight years. The revitalization of the nuclear negotiations by the Rouhani Administration that led to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on July 14, 2015, illustrated Iran’s restored commitment to global engagement and returning to a state of normalcy with the international community.
This chapter assesses the Rouhani Administration’s foreign policy approach by analysing the nuclear negotiations and the impact of the JCPOA on Iran’s relations with the United States. In addition, this chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the JCPOA by analysing its impact on the foreign and economic policies of Iran. This survey assists in understanding the ways in which the nuclear deal, and the negotiations with the United States, continues to shape the domestic discourse on internal and external policies, be used for political infightings, and become subjects of debate in the subsequent legislative and presidential elections.
The chapter concludes that even though Iran benefited from the deal in terms of presenting an enhanced image of Iran on the world stage, as well as the semi-normalization of its relations with the United States and dozens of other countries, the JCPOA and the negotiations with the United States did not have a practical impact on the prospects of restoring official diplomatic relations with Washington, nor was it sustainably effective in revitalizing Iran’s economy. Furthermore, even though Iran benefited economically by reaping the rewards from the lifting of some sanctions, the threats towards the agreement by the Trump Administration a year following the implementation of the agreement as well as the continuation of US primary sanctions have not allowed for meaningful changes on the day-to-day lives of ordinary Iranians. Thus, the continuation of US primary sanctions inhibited a reform in Iran’s strategic decision-making calculus towards the United States in particular, and foreign policy in general.
Hassan Rouhani’s victory in the 2013 presidential elections was a pivotal juncture in Iran’s contemporary history and was an important turning point in the 34-year lifetime of the Islamic Republic. As a staunch supporter of the Islamic revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini, a former member of parliament (Majles) for 20 years, member of the Expediency Council since 1991, the Supreme Leader’s representative on the Supreme National Security Council as well as the President’s National Security Adviser for 16 and 13 years respectively, Rouhani has been a key figure in the Islamic Republic. Rouhani, however, has at various times distanced himself from the conservative and reformist labels and has forged his political path in line with an approach based on pragmatic moderation on internal and external issues which shaped his campaign slogan of prudence and hope. Nevertheless, it has been clear that Rouhani enjoys more support from the reformist groups, evidenced by the strong backing of former presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami who were instrumental in his success during the 2013 elections.
Rouhani’s narrow victory on June 14, 2013, with 50.73 percent of the votes in an election that was participated by 72 percent of the more than 50 million eligible voters, however, was in contrast to the overwhelming victories of his predecessors in past elections, which in essence meant that he needed to rely more on the establishment and the religious leadership’s support rather than the popular support.Footnote 1 In spite of this fact, Rouhani was able to satisfy both, Iranian people and the establishment on one hand, as well as foreign governments that had very high expectations on a future president that would fix what Ahmadinejad had damaged at the international level. The support Rouhani managed to garner was crucial in permitting the advancement of his global engagement agenda, and in tandem, the revitalization of the nuclear negotiations.
Rouhani made it clear during the 2013 presidential campaigns that he aimed for the complete overhaul of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy approach and gradually implemented policies that would allow Iran to represent itself as a responsible and rational actor on the global stage, and, at the same time, to “restore Iran’s relations with the world to a state of normalcy.”Footnote 2 It can be inferred that the Iranian public decided to punish the policy choices of the previous president and voted for the candidate that represented the absolute opposite approach, mainly in the foreign policy arena. Furthermore, the 2013 presidential elections were an important litmus test for the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic and the executive office following the chaos that ensued in 2009. Rouhani campaigned on his promise to resolve the nuclear issue and remove the sanctions on Iran, and by doing so, he deliberately and officially tied a foreign policy issue with domestic politics and recognized a problem that was having serious negative impacts on the Iranian economy and the daily lives of Iranians by extension.
While various sanctions on Iran have been imposed unilaterally by the United States since 1979 as well as multilaterally by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the European Union since 2006, the most impactful sanctions were imposed in 2010 which were expanded and reinforced in 2012 in response to Ahmadinejad’s failure to come to an agreement with the European countries on the nuclear issue. As analysts argue, President Obama put into force “the nuclear option in Washington’s financial war against Tehran,” which became possible after garnering the support of European countries as well as other permanent members of the UNSC—Russia and China.Footnote 3 These sanctions targeted Iran’s central bank, access to the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), and Iran’s oil and gas exports, as well as various other restrictions related to transportation, trade of goods and services, in addition to the freezing of Iranian assets and limiting foreign direct investments in the Islamic Republic.Footnote 4 As a result, Iran’s economy was impaired dramatically, but not just because of sanctions alone, but also due to the Ahmadinejad Administration’s rampant mismanagement which were prompted by unwise government spending, low interest rates and ill-advised lending.Footnote 5 In comparison to the year prior, the national currency devalued more than 100 percent in early 2013, inflation rose more than 40 percent, and the country went to recession with an annual GDP growth rate of negative 7.4 percent.Footnote 6 As an Iranian official admitted shortly after the imposition of the 2012 round of sanctions, “Between Mahmoud Bahmani [the governor of Iran’s Central Bank] and David Cohen [U.S. Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence], I have a hard time deciding which one has been more harmful to Iran’s economy.”Footnote 7 Such negative views against Ahmadinejad’s Administration by the public and some government officials in the last year of his presidency opened the door further for reformist and moderate candidates like Hassan Rouhani to join the presidential elections as candidates and rally on these sentiments during the campaign.
With Rouhani’s victory in the 2013 elections, the world was faced with an option: to embrace the new president or continue the old path of conflict and hostility. Rouhani’s repeated promise to the Iranian people to remove sanctions as well as his calls for negotiations with the world powers on the nuclear issue, allowed Western countries, particularly the United States, to take advantage of this new opening and institute a new approach towards the Islamic Republic. Following Rouhani’s victory, for example, Barack Obama issued a statement congratulating the elected president and the Iranian people, expressing the United States’ readiness to “engage the Iranian government directly in order to reach a diplomatic solution that will fully address the international community’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.”Footnote 8 Obama’s remarks were in sharp contrast to his statements following the 2009 elections and were seen as an important turning point in Iran–US relations.
Rouhani, the Nuclear Negotiations, and Engagement with the United States
In the spring of 2013, months before the presidential elections in Iran, secret backchannel talks were held in Muscat between officials from the Islamic Republic and the United States. President Obama directed senior American officials, including Deputy Secretary of State William Burns and Vice President Joe Biden’s national security adviser Jake Sullivan, to take part with their Iranian counterparts (not officially clear who was representing Iran).Footnote 9 Both Javad Zarif and John Kerry, however, were presumably briefed on these discussions before they assumed their positions as Iran’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State respectively.Footnote 10 The fact must not be lost that the Iranians started taking part in these talks during the presidency of Ahmadinejad who was responsible for expanding Iran’s nuclear program, the increased level of tensions between Iran and major players in the international community, and the decline of Iran’s economy. What this point illustrates is that the Supreme Leader sidestepped Ahmadinejad to engage in these backchannel talks with the United States.Footnote 11 The secret talks were carried out five additional times in Muscat following Rouhani’s election in June 2013 and led to the revitalization of the nuclear negotiations that started in 2002 between Iran and European countries which repeatedly failed to arrive at a comprehensive resolution for more than a decade.Footnote 12
Rouhani’s first appearance at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2013 was the most important illustration of this new approach in Iran’s foreign policy and the new administration’s global engagement efforts. Days before his trip, President Rouhani published an article in the Washington Post to reach his intended American audience, and stated that “the world has changed. International politics is no longer a zero-sum game but a multi-dimensional arena where cooperation and competition often occur simultaneously,” and that “World leaders are expected to lead in turning threats into opportunities.”Footnote 13 In the same vein, Rouhani also spoke directly to the American people (and leaders) through an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour by stating in English that “I bring peace and friendship from Iranians to Americans.”Footnote 14
Rouhani held bilateral meetings with dozens of world leaders on the sidelines of UNGA, expressed Iran’s interest in resolving the nuclear issue, proposed a resolution at UNGA for a “World Against Violence and Extremism,” and allowed for the first official meeting between Iran’s foreign minister and the US Secretary of State.Footnote 15 While there was much international suspense for a meeting between Rouhani and Obama, the two leaders, however, agreed that a phone conversation will suffice which in and of itself was the first time the leaders of the two countries spoke in more than 34 years.Footnote 16 In addition, during a lengthy meeting that was held between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries—China, France, United Kingdom, United States, Russia, plus Germany and the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy—Zarif and Kerry officialized the months of backchannel talks that were held in Muscat and initiated a 22-month negotiation process with the goal of putting an end to Iran’s nuclear dossier at the UNSC.
The mediation efforts by Oman, Rouhani’s determined efforts at resolving the nuclear issue, and the developments at UNGA, set aside more than 30 years of hostilities and allowed for Iranian and American government officials to be in the same room and engage each other in a cordial and constructive manner. These interactions led to a series of talks that took place in Muscat, Vienna, and Geneva in the subsequent months, which resulted in the Joint Plan of Action on November 24, 2013, the interim agreement that was the framework for the comprehensive deal signed later in 2015. The interim agreement guaranteed Iran’s right to develop a full cycle of nuclear energy and promised the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions that were imposed unilaterally by the United States and the European Union as well as the multilateral sanctions that were enshrined in a number of United Nations Security Council resolutions. In exchange, Iran agreed to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities above five percent, reduce the number of centrifuges, export the already-enriched uranium and decrease its stockpile, as well as guarantee the complete transparency and supervision of the entire nuclear program by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
On the American side, a significant factor was that for the first time since the Islamic Revolution, an American administration recognised a political–religious statement issued by the Supreme Leader as binding for Iranian foreign policy. Following significant progress in the negotiations, President Obama stated on April 2, 2015, that “Since Iran’s Supreme Leader has issued a fatwa against the development of nuclear weapons, this framework gives Iran the opportunity to verify that its program is, in fact, peaceful.”Footnote 17 The statement referred to as a fatwa was unofficially issued by Khomeini in 1987, orally by Khamenei in the mid-1990s and 2003, and officially publicized by the second Supreme Leader in April 2010 during a speech to the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament that was held in Tehran, in which he considered weapons of mass destruction as un-Islamic (haraam) and forbade the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons.Footnote 18 This fatwa, a source of a deep debate among scholars and diplomats, had never before been considered a legally binding statement by the United States. Furthermore, President Obama stated shortly after the Geneva Joint Plan of Action was signed, that “If Iran seizes this opportunity, the Iranian people will benefit from re-joining the international community, and we can begin to chip away at the mistrust between our two nations,” and further argued using keywords often desired by Iranian officials that “this would provide Iran with a dignified path to forge a new beginning with the wider world based on mutual respect”.Footnote 19
The intricacy of Rouhani’s engagement in these negotiations was demonstrated by the fact that the Supreme Leader tacitly supported the negotiations even though he allowed the critical factions, including elements within the Revolutionary Guards, to express their concerns and opposition to the agreement. Many of those who were critical of the negotiations, dubbed themselves as “those who worry” (delvapasan), constantly expressed their opposition to Rouhani and Zarif’s engagement with the West and particularly the negotiations over the nuclear issue. The infightings were evident from the first days following Rouhani’s inauguration and were intensified after Rouhani’s trip to New York in September 2013. The opposition factions mainly consisted of those loyal to Ahmadinejad, the (neo-) conservatives, and revolutionary figures who view any sort of engagement with the West, and particularly the United States, as a threat to their survival and the durability of the regime. An influential opposition was voiced through the hardline newspaper Kayhan which at one point caused Zarif to be hospitalized and later attend the negotiations in a wheelchair due to severe back pain.Footnote 20
The fact must not be lost that Rouhani, as explained earlier, is a key figure in the Islamic Republic and naturally has the same concerns for the survival of the regime. Rouhani’s pragmatism with regard to trust-building measures with the United States and constructive engagement with the European countries was arguably aimed at solidifying and strengthening the Islamic Republic at home and abroad. More importantly, any action that deals with major security and foreign policy issues of the Islamic Republic has the official, or often unofficial, approval of the Supreme Leader. As such, and in the face of growing opposition, the Supreme Leader defended and praised the negotiating team, and positively characterized their actions by stating that they are “working, making efforts, breaking sweat … to obtain what is in the interests of the country and the regime.”Footnote 21 Thus, the assumption that Rouhani’s presidency and global engagement efforts were about to bring a Gorbachev moment in Iran that would lead to the downfall of the Islamic Republic, as some analyst argued, proved to be totally inaccurate.Footnote 22
The close-to two years of intense negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program witnessed many peaks and valleys. Aside from domestic opposition, Rouhani and Obama also faced serious challenges by countries not party to the negotiations—namely Saudi Arabia and Israel. Since the start of the official negotiations in September 2013, both Saudi and Israeli officials voiced their disapproval of any future deal with Iran. Stated reasons for opposing the agreement were that the negotiations did not address Iran’s missile program or regional activities.Footnote 23 However, it was clear that the unstated objective of obstructing the progress of the negotiations was the fear that a rapprochement between Iran and the United States will alter the latter country’s relationships with its traditional allies and partners as well as change the regional balance of power in Iran’s favor. As Aras and Yorulmazlar argue, the Iranian-American détente was “perceived by most of the region’s leaders as a major threat to the existing regional power equations,”Footnote 24 and according to Mazhar and Goraya, “they don’t want Iran as a player in the region. They want Iran isolated and out of the picture.”Footnote 25
The Obama Administration was mindful of the concerns put forward by some member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and attempted to reassure these rulers during a Camp David summit months before the JCPOA was finalized. The United States proposed increased military cooperation which was hailed by all GCC countries, and in turn, all six member states welcomed and recognized the JCPOA.Footnote 26 At the Summit, President Obama also aspired for dialogue and negotiations between the GCC states and Iran, and stated that the “purpose of security cooperation is not to perpetuate any long-term confrontation with Iran or even to marginalize Iran,” arguing that “a key purpose of bolstering the capacity of our GCC partners is to ensure that our partners can deal with Iran politically, diplomatically, from a position of confidence and strength.”Footnote 27
In parallel to Obama’s efforts, the Rouhani Administration was eager to reinvigorate the Islamic Republic’s relationships with the GCC countries. Rouhani repeatedly expressed his desire for better relations with the GCC countries and acted on his administration’s proposals by travelling to Kuwait and Oman to ease tensions and open the doors for dialogue.Footnote 28 Additionally, Foreign Minister Zarif actively pursued this approach and, for example, published numerous articles, including one in Asharq Al-Awsat titled “Our neighbours are our priority” soon after the interim agreement was reached on the nuclear issue, stating that “In our interconnected world, the fate of one nation is tied to the destinies of its neighbours.”Footnote 29 Such overtures by both Iran and the United States allowed for the easing of some tensions in the Persian Gulf region and the gradual, yet short-lived, acceptance of the nuclear deal by Iran’s southern neighbours.
When the JCPOA was signed in Vienna on July 14, 2015, it was clear that a new era in Iran’s international relations was officially initiated, while at the same time, Iran’s right to nuclear enrichment was recognized under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and established the Islamic Republic as one of the few countries in the region with a peaceful nuclear energy program that is under strict supervision by the IAEA. The 159-page final document, including the core text and five technical annexes, put in place a series of limitations on Iran and at the same time provide a timeline for the relief from sanctions, restrictions, and embargoes that have been imposed on Iran by the United States, European Union, and the United Nations Security Council. While some of the nuclear restrictions will be indefinitely lifted on Iran within the 25-year period, the IAEA’s transparency regulations and supervision of Iran’s nuclear program are also indefinite.
The implementation of the JCPOA consisted of a series of steps with clearly defined deadlines, which included ratification by both the Iranian and American legislatures, despite reservations on the part of conservatives in both countries.Footnote 30 Following the finalization of the agreement on July 14, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2231 that endorsed the JCPOA in its entirety, terminated the provisions of the past six UNSC resolutions on Iran, and obliges all UN member states under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and follow the Security Council’s decision. The JCPOA was adopted on October 18, 2015, 90 days following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2231. Meanwhile, the IAEA expressed its satisfaction with the progress and the responses it received from the questions it posed to Iran with regard to unresolved concerns over past activities on August 15 and officially ended the investigation over possible military dimensions on December 15, 2015. Finally, the JCPOA was officially implemented on January 16, 2016, after the IAEA’s announcement that Iran has fully met its commitments outlined in the deal, which allowed for the termination of the application of all nuclear-related sanctions by the United States, EU, and the UNSC.
Most importantly, the JCPOA managed to resolve a long-term controversy using multilateral diplomatic tools as opposed to military means. Both Iran and the United States recognized that the nuclear agreement was necessary to reduce tensions and move past the more than three decades of hostilities, even though neither party was fully satisfied with the terms of the agreement. President Obama recognised that this was “a deal between states that are not friends,” and that the deal was “not built on trust” but on “verification.”Footnote 31 Rouhani also said that the deal “was not perfect but it was necessary to compromise,” adding that “it was really difficult to preserve some of our red lines,” but “no one can say Iran surrendered.”Footnote 32 Simply put, all sides had to make concessions to reach an all-accepting comprehensive agreement.
As the implementation of the JCPOA was being announced on January 16, 2016, Iran and the United States agreed to a prisoner exchange which included Iranian-Americans detained in Tehran on charges related to national security and espionage, in exchange for seven Iranians that were detained in the United States on charges related to violation of sanctions. Both sides insisted that the swapping of prisoners was not part of the nuclear negotiations and was a gesture of goodwill to end a source of irritation and open new horizons in bilateral ties. The good mood helped to resolve some non-related issues such as the quick liberation of US Navy vessels and ten sailors, on January 13. After a purported mechanical error that caused the vessels to drift into Iranian territorial waters, they were detained by Iranian forces. Foreign Ministry spokesman Hossein Jaberi Ansari stated that this was an involuntary and non-hostile act which was solved rapidly through discussions by Kerry and Zarif, thanks to the newly established direct diplomatic channels.Footnote 33 In addition, Iran exported 32 tons of heavy water to the United States at an estimated cost of 8.6 million dollars as part of the agreements pertaining to the JCPOA, a clear illustration of cooperation between Iran and the United States on the nuclear program.Footnote 34
While there was hope for the betterment of Iran–US relations on other fronts following the implementation of the JCPOA, such hopes, however, did not fully materialize on the ground. Months after the finalization of the JCPOA and just before its full implementation, Iran’s Supreme Leader signaled that diplomatic relations with the United States will not be established anytime soon when he ruled out any further negotiations with the United States and warned that such talks would “open gates to their economic, cultural, political, and security influence” in Tehran.Footnote 35 Analysts argue that these remarks were primarily prompted by the report that Zarif and Obama shook hands on the sidelines of the 2015 UNGA which triggered protests by the delvapasan and those who oppose the JCPOA and re-establishing relations with the United States.Footnote 36
Furthermore, Iran and the United States once again traded barbs following the announcement by the United States that it imposed new sanctions on individuals and entities tied to the Iranian ballistic missiles program, and in response, Iran tested ballistic missiles on March 9, 2016, which further soured relations. Moreover, as the implementation of the JCPOA was occurring at a sensitive time in American domestic politics and during the heated presidential elections, Iran, and relations with it, was amongst the top foreign-policy talking points of all Democratic and Republican candidates. On March 21, 2016, then-candidate Donald Trump officially announced his intention to terminate the US participation in the JCPOA, by stating that the “number one priority is to dismantle the disastrous deal with Iran.”Footnote 37
The Nuclear Deal’s Impact on Rouhani’s Foreign and Domestic Economic Policies
In response to the 2012 round of sanctions, Iran adopted the notion of “Economy of Resistance,” a decree by the Supreme Leader to promote economic self-reliance and limit or circumvent the effects of international sanctions. The decree expands on Iran’s already high degree of protectionism and increases its support and advocacy for domestic production, with the objective of lowering dependency on revenues from the export of oil and gas. Moreover, it includes maintaining a positive balance of trade through foreign exchange reserves and export controls and the redistribution of the GDP by reducing the importance of oil revenues in the national budget, while generating growing revenues from taxes and privatization. Additionally, the economy of resistance, which became a hallmark of the Supreme Leader’s domestic economic policies, also aimed to increase the domestic refining capacity to allow Iran to refine petroleum for domestic use and, at the same time, become an exporter of refined crude and condensates and free up gas for exports. These measures continued to dominate the Rouhani Administration’s domestic economic policies all throughout the nuclear negotiations, and most aspects stayed intact following the implementation of the JCPOA in 2016.
With the nuclear deal’s implementation and the subsequent removal of nuclear-related sanctions, Iran’s economy underwent some positive changes in 2016 and witnessed a brief era of revival. According to official Iranian and international statistics, Iran’s inflation rate dropped in 2016 to single digits for the first time in 25 years, remaining below 9.6 percent throughout the year. This was a major achievement for Rouhani who inherited an inflation rate of 45 percent.Footnote 38 Furthermore, Iran’s annual GDP growth rate, which reached negative 7.4 percent in 2012, turned around to positive 13.4 percent in 2016, the highest rate since 1990.Footnote 39 Without a doubt, the prospects of Iran (re)joining the global markets after the implementation of the JCPOA was a major factor in allowing these shifts in key economic indicators.
The long-awaited agreement with Airbus that materialized with the landing of the first A-321 in Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport on January 12, 2017, was another important accomplishment for Rouhani as a result of the 2013 interim agreement that lifted the sanctions on Iran’s civil aviation which were in place for decades, barring Iran from purchasing new aircrafts, spare parts, and even refuelling at various international airports.Footnote 40 In January 2016, during a visit to Paris by President Rouhani, a major contract was signed with Airbus to buy 118 planes worth approximately 27 billion dollars. Negotiations accelerated in October 2016 following the US decision to remove a final impediment for Western aircraft manufacturers to sell planes to Iran under contracts signed after the enforcement of the JCPOA. Iran sealed another deal with Boeing in June for the purchase of 80 passenger planes worth approximately 25 billion dollars, marking the largest US–Iran trade contract since the revolution. In December, the deal with Boeing was finalized and the first plane was expected to be delivered in 2018.Footnote 41
Another indication of a shift in Iran’s global economic engagement post-JCPOA was the vast number of foreign businesses and tourists that visited the country. In 2016, all high-end hotels in Tehran were sold out due to the massive inflow of foreign companies and investors, and according to official statistics, there was a 200 percent increase in the number of visitors traveling to the country for business and leisure.Footnote 42 A large number of companies signed preliminary agreements and Memorandums of Understandings with dozens of their Iranian counterparts with the hopes of taking advantage of Iran’s mostly untapped markets. A prime example of these large-scale contracts was in the automobile industry. In June 2013, the French manufacturer Peugeot-Citroen signed a joint venture with Iran’s largest automobile manufacturer, Iran Khodro, worth 400 million Euros.Footnote 43 In parallel, Kia, Hyundai, Renault, Volkswagen, Daimler, and other companies also entered the Iranian market full force. Additionally, pharmaceuticals such as Roche and Sanofi, manufacturing corporations like Danielli, food and drink companies such as Nestle, are amongst the dozens of well-recognized multinational corporations that entered the Iranian market. Joint ventures were not just limited to established traditional organizations, but also expanded to investments in Iran’s booming e-commerce platforms, such as the Snapp Group, Iran’s equivalent of Uber.
The most important positive impact of the JCPOA on the Iranian economy was the removal of limitations on Iran’s oil and gas exports and the rise in potential international buyers. Furthermore, Iran managed to convince OPEC and non-OPEC member states to free up space for increased Iranian exports in tandem with agreeing to reduce overall production to raise the price of oil in global markets. As a result, Iran managed to produce more than 4.2 million barrels per day (bpd) in December 2016, in comparison to 3.3 million bpd earlier in January, on an average price of 53 dollars per barrel.Footnote 44 Royal Dutch Shell, for example, restarted its purchases of Iranian crude oil in June 2017, becoming the second major oil company after France’s Total to resume oil imports from Iran post-JCPOA.Footnote 45 Additionally, various contracts were signed with Total, China’s national oil company CNPC, and Italy’s Eni, amongst others, to expand and develop Iran’s petrochemical infrastructure.
While the intent to enter the Iranian market was clear, the vast majority of the aforementioned contracts were not fully materialized due to the ongoing US primary sanctions and the repeated threats to the durability of the agreement stemming from the campaign rhetoric during the US presidential elections by the Republican nominee, Donald Trump, and his supporters in the US Congress. In addition, the vague and unclear nature of directives by the Office of Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) during the Obama presidency made decision-making a daunting task for international and multinational corporations wanting to enter the Iranian market. Additionally, while sanctions on Iran’s banking and the limits to its access to SWIFT were lifted following the implementation of the JCPOA and access was reactivated for some 286 Iranian banks and branches; only 25 foreign banks, mainly Asian and smaller international ones, established brokerage links with Iranian entities.Footnote 46 As such, these short-lived ventures and economic engagements were based more on hopes than tangible outcomes.
Furthermore, the Dollar-Rial exchange rate, one of the indicators that directly affects the Iranian population, did not improve drastically in 2016. According to Iranian Central Bank information, 2016 started with an official exchange rate of 30,178 IR/1 US dollar (USD), and the year ended with 32,399 IR.Footnote 47 However, in the first week of January 2017, the free market exchange rate spiked to 39,000 IR/USD, presumably in response to the inauguration of Donald Trump. The other challenging indicator, unemployment, seems to resist policies by the different Iranian governments, and accordingly, it was not significantly impacted by the JCPOA or the prospects of foreign investments following the lifting of sanctions. While in August 2013, when Rouhani’s tenure started, unemployment was at 10.5 percent, in 2016 the rate increased to 12.4 percent, according to non-official data.Footnote 48 Unemployment has been a key issue in Iranian domestic politics and resolving it has been a priority demand by the Iranian populous. In polls conducted in February and March 2016, just over 50 percent of the Iranian respondents declared that reducing unemployment is the most important issue they care about. As such, the failure to reduce the unemployment numbers and the inability to establish the required number of jobs also damaged Rouhani’s domestic approval ratings as well as increased negative perceptions towards the United States.Footnote 49
In sum, the Iranian economy did experience a brief era of a somewhat revival thanks to the JCPOA which illustrated an immeasurable potential for development and growth; however, all that was achieved started to fade away following Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential elections.
Trump’s U-Turn and the Reestablishment of Hostile Relations
Since the start of his presidential campaign, and particularly following his address to the Tea Party’s Washington rally in September 2015 titled “End the Iran Deal,” Donald Trump was a fierce critic of the JCPOA and vowed to withdraw the United States from the agreement.Footnote 50 However, despite the heavy anti-Iranian discourse, which characterised Trump’s presidential campaign, most of the interviewed scholars in Tehran showed relative optimism the first months after he assumed office.Footnote 51 Some argued that regardless of Trump’s personal approach, the JCPOA involves numerous countries and organizations, and that the United States alone cannot abrogate the deal without triggering a general backlash within the international community. Others argued that the common interests that were always present in both American and Iranian positions regarding Al-Qaida, Daesh, and other terrorist groups should help to reinforce, rather than weaken, bilateral Iran–US relations.
Trump gave credit to Iran for its role against terrorists in Syria during the presidential debates by stating “I don’t like Assad at all, but Assad is killing ISIS. Russia is killing ISIS and Iran is killing ISIS.”Footnote 52 In the same debate, however, Trump also illustrated his disapproval with the JCPOA by bashing Hillary Clinton, arguing that “she made [Iran] strong and Kerry and Obama made into a powerful nation and a rich nation, very quickly, very, very quickly.”Footnote 53 As soon as Trump took office, his administration was quick to alter President Obama’s post-JCPOA approach towards the Islamic Republic: they included Iran in the list of countries that were banned from travelling to the United States (the so-called Muslim Ban) and implemented a policy of “maximum pressure,” by first putting Iran “on notice,” and imposing new sanctions related to the Iranian ballistic missiles program.Footnote 54
With countering Iran positioned high on the Trump Administration’s foreign policy, Trump’s victory in the 2016 US presidential elections was largely welcomed by some Arab states and Israel, and once again challenged the regional balance of power.Footnote 55 On the other hand, it can also be inferred that that the United States views Saudi Arabia and Israel, Iran’s primary regional adversaries, as important partners in guaranteeing the success of the maximum pressure campaign against the Islamic Republic. Trump’s decision to travel to Saudi Arabia and then to Israel as two legs of his first foreign trip that started on May 20, 2017, the day after Iran’s presidential elections, signalled exactly what many Israeli and Arab leaders hoped for and most analysts predicted: that the United States is no longer interested in peace with Iran and is back at supporting its traditional regional allies and partners to counter Iran’s growing influence around the Middle East and beyond. In turn, the new US led region-encompassing policy had a weighty impact on Iran’s regional posturing, actions, and policy planning, and was the primary reason for the heightening of regional tensions to levels unseen in the past decade.
As a result of Trump’s U-turn, Iran once again readopted its anti-American posture, evidenced by the harshening of tone by Iranian officials as well as the full-force return of the “Death to America” chants at Friday Prayers.Footnote 56 Rouhani, for example, stated during a speech marking the 38th anniversary of the Iranian revolution that “Some inexperienced figures in the region and America are threatening Iran,” adding that “Our nation is vigilant and will make those threatening Iran regret it … They should learn to respect Iran and Iranians.”Footnote 57 In the same vein, Zarif also argued during an interview that “the US policy, at least the declared policy, was that they respected the Iranian people and had differences with the Iranian government. Now the current administration unfortunately decided to insult the entire Iranian nation.”Footnote 58 He also argued that, “Iran is hardly moved by threats. We do not respond well to threats.”Footnote 59
Trump’s election also had a major impact on Iran’s economy and drastically limited Rouhani’s global economic engagement efforts. While Iran witnessed a peak in its annual GDP growth in November 2016 with rate of 16.5 percent, for example, a decline started a month later following Trump’s inauguration, which reduced the GDP growth rate to 13 percent by May 2017.Footnote 60 More importantly, the rhetoric from Washington forced hundreds of international companies, investors, and even tourists to abandon their plans to conduct business or travel to Iran, halting dozens of important development and mega-sized projects inside the country.Footnote 61
Despite the rhetoric and the consequential impact of the new Iran policies, however, the Trump Administration upheld the United States’ JCPOA commitments by renewing sanctions waivers on May 17, 2017, two days before the presidential elections in Iran. This move marked the first time President Trump took a proactive step to implement the deal in the first four months of his presidency, despite the fact that new sanctions were also imposed on Iran’s ballistic missile program on the same day.Footnote 62 Furthermore, the continuation of US adherence to the JCPOA renewed hopes that President Trump might not live up to its campaign promise to “rip up the Iran Deal.”Footnote 63 As such, and due to the fact that the wavers occurred so close to the election day in Iran, Rouhani’s campaign on expanding the nuclear deal got a boost and helped secure the required votes to remain as the president of the Islamic Republic for a second term.
Conclusion
Iran and the United States started to genuinely and tangibly reach a détente through the renewed nuclear negotiations that started after Rouhani’s election in 2013 and were on the path to initiate the development of a new type of relationship based on mutual respect and diplomatic brinksmanship. The negotiations leading to the JCPOA proved sceptics wrong and put aside close to four decades of animosity that inhibited an agreement between Iran and the United States. With the agreement in place, new horizons for Iran–US relations were opened and, for a brief period, prospects for reforming the severed relationship seemed within reach. The fact that Iran and the United States moved past their differences and reformatted the more-than-a-decade-long negotiation process over the Iranian nuclear program, set in motion a sequential agreement that ensures the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for the removal of sanctions and restrictions that had been imposed on Iran because of the nuclear issue.
The various phases of the nuclear negotiations allowed for the change in posture and perception of the establishment in both Iran and the United States towards one another. On one hand, it was no longer a taboo in Iran to negotiate with the United States, particularly on accepting limitations on the nuclear program. On the other hand, the US acceptance of Iran’s right to the enrichment of uranium as well as the recognition of the fatwas by Iran’s Supreme Leader(s) against the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons as legally binding, changed the course of close-to four decades of US–Iran diplomatic relations. Most importantly, the agreement solved a long-term controversy using diplomatic tools as opposed to military means, an ever-possible scenario. As such, the JCPOA was, and continues to be, considered a diplomatic success, both bilaterally with respect to Iran and the United States, as well as multilaterally considering Iran and the other P5+1 member states. Moreover, at the international level, the mere fact that the agreement was reached in July 2015 also had a lasting impact on the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the wider Middle East. The agreement also allowed for the surfacing of Iran on the international stage for businesses and corporations as an untapped market.
Rouhani’s pragmatic, foreign policy approach and dedication to ending the nuclear issue, in tandem with Obama’s commitment to solving the issue with Iran, established a new modus operandi for both countries towards one another. Rouhani and Obama did not, however, succeed in further advancing the positive steps that were taken during the nuclear negotiations, and the new horizon that was put in motion thanks to the JCPOA was destined to fail when Donald Trump’s anti-Iran rhetoric and threats towards the nuclear agreement started to be amplified from the White House in January 2017. While Obama was no longer in charge and only his legacy was tied to the JCPOA, Rouhani’s fixation on reaching a deal on the nuclear issue to remove sanctions and his visible optimism with regard to the potential positive impacts of the JCPOA, both internally and externally, continued to drive the policy making of his administration and was the cornerstone of his campaign’s preparation for the May 2017 presidential elections in Iran. During the presidential debates, Rouhani also promised that he will remove all the remaining sanctions on Iran and vowed to negotiate with the Trump Administration.Footnote 64 Interestingly, Trump’s antagonism towards Iran did not have a significantly negative impact on Rouhani’s re-election campaign, and ironically, boosted his bid following Trump’s adherence to the JCPOA just days before the Iranian presidential elections.
Despite the U-turn following Trump’s inauguration and the scarce visible long-term economic impact for Iran, the JCPOA was, and continues to be, considered as an advantage for Iran for the following reasons: (a) The normalization of Iran’s status at the international stage as a rational and “normal” country, (b) The recognition of Iran’s right to enrich uranium in accordance with the regulations set forth in the NPT, (c) The removal of sanctions on Iran’s oil and gas exports and the re-entry of Iran into the international energy markets, and (d) Pushing the entire Iranian establishment to implement gradual reforms in economic, political, and social realms. Thus, it is expected that Rouhani will continue to insist on Iranian compliance of the nuclear issue in tandem with pursuing a path to comprehensively end the spat with the United States, including the removal of all primary US sanctions. Rouhani will only be able to pursue this path as long the Trump Administration does not implement non-reversible policies that can suffocate the Iranian economy or once again isolate it from the international community. More importantly, a comprehensive and lasting rapprochement can only be possible if Rouhani and his government do not face a serious challenge from hardliners inside the country that can potentially lead to his removal from office.
Notes
- 1.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad got 61% and 63% of votes in his two elections in 2005 and 2009, with 53% and 83% turnout; Mohammad Khatami obtained 70% and 77% with the 80% and 67% turnout in his two terms, 1997 and 2001; Hashemi Rafsanjani got 95% and 62%, but with low turnout, 55% and 50% in 1989 and 1993; Ali Khamenei obtained 95% and 85% with 74% and 53% turnout in the 1981 and 1985 elections; Ali Rajai got 95% of votes in 1981, with 65% turnout; and finally Abol Hassan Bani Sadr obtained 75% of votes with 67% turnout in 1980.
- 2.
Mohammad Javad Zarif, “What Iran Really Wants: Iranian Foreign Policy in the Rouhani Era,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2014, p. 7. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2014-04-17/what-iran-really-wants.
- 3.
Bijan Khajehpour, Reza Marashi, and Trita Parsi, “The Problem with Sanctions,” Cairo Review, October 2013, https://www.thecairoreview.com/issues/summer-2013/.
- 4.
Restrictions on trade in several goods: prohibition to export to Iran arms, dual-use goods and goods which could be used in enrichment-related activities; prohibition to import crude oil, natural gas, petrochemical and petroleum products; prohibition to sell or supply key equipment used in the energy sector, gold, other precious metals and diamonds, certain naval equipment, certain software, etc. Restrictions in the financial sector: freezing the assets of the Central Bank of Iran and major Iranian commercial banks, laying down notification and authorization mechanisms for transfers of funds above certain amounts to Iranian financial institutions. Measures in the transport sector: preventing access to EU airports of Iranian cargo flights, prohibition of maintenance and service of Iranian cargo aircraft or vessels carrying prohibited materials or goods. Travel restrictions and asset freeze imposed against other listed persons and entities “EU restrictive measures against Iran,” Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/iran/.
“Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions,” International Crisis Group, February 25, 2013, p. 12 https://www.crisisgroup.org/file/1943/download?token=fxrcs1uZ.
- 5.
“Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions,” International Crisis Group, February 25, 2013, p. 24.
- 6.
“Iran Indicators.” Trading Economics Online Database, https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/indicators.
- 7.
“Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions,” International Crisis Group, February 25, 2013, p. 25.
- 8.
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Election in Iran. June 15, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/15/statement-press-secretary-election-iran.
- 9.
Michael Crowley, “Obama’s Iran Gamble,” Time, September 12, 2013, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2158653,00.html.
- 10.
Javad Zarif, as Iran’s former Representative to the United Nations, was involved with the nuclear negotiations since its start in 2002 and it can be inferred that President Rouhani was aware of these developments when he nominated Zarif as his foreign minister. John Kerry, as Senator and the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was involved in the decision-making process with President Obama and Secretary Clinton to hold the secret talks in Oman.
Additionally, it was only reported after the interim deal was signed in Geneva that John Kerry’s absence in Washington in December 2011 and again in May 2013 were due to the fact that he travelled secretly to Muscat on the request of President Obama to test the waters of Oman’s mediating capacity with regards to Iran. Bryan Bender, “How John Kerry Opened A Secret Channel to Iran,” Boston Globe, November 26, 2013, https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2013/11/26/john-kerry-developed-secret-dialogue-with-iran-through-oman/rRBZZ8aeDrsP2Q2HdoWJEJ/story.html.
- 11.
Ayatollah Rafsanjani mentions during a speech that the Supreme Leader was the primary architect of the new approach towards the nuclear issue before Rouhani’s election as he wanted to resolve the issue diplomatically, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SwwutJkMyI.
- 12.
In 2003, during Mohammad Khatami’s presidency, and after a negotiation with the EU-3 group (United Kingdom, France, and Germany) Iran agrees to meet IAEA demands to suspend its uranium-enrichment activities, ratify the additional protocols, and grant the IAEA broader rights of access to declared nuclear sites. Iran implemented the protocols unilaterally without the Majlis ratification as a good will gesture towards the international community. Once Ahmadinejad assumed office in August 2005, Iran reinitiated the uranium-enrichment activities and brought the agreement to a suspension.
- 13.
Hassan Rouhani, “Time to Engage,” The Washington Post, September 20, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/president-of-iran-hassan-rouhani-time-to-engage/2013/09/19/4d2da564-213e-11e3-966c-9c4293c47ebe_story.html.
- 14.
“Full transcript of Amanpour’s interview with Iran’s President, Hasan Rouhani,” CNN, September 27, 2014, http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2014/09/26/full-transcript-hassan-rouhani/.
- 15.
“United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/68/L.31,” Adopted December 18, 2013, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/68/127.
- 16.
Obama and Rouhani both decided on the manner in which they publicized the phone call by agreeing to state that while Rouhani was about to depart his hotel to leave New York, the White House called Iran’s UN ambassador and the two leaders spoke for 15 minutes. See details in Jeff Mason and Louis Charbonneau, “Obama, Iran’s Rouhani hold historic phone call,” Reuters, September 28, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-iran/obama-irans-rouhani-hold-historic-phone-call-idUSBRE98Q16S20130928; The White House Office of the Press Secretary. Statement by the President. September 27, 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/27/statement-president;متن کامل سخنان رییس جمهور در جمع خبرنگاران, October 2, 2013 http://www.president.ir/fa/72111; and Rouhani on Twitter: “In phone convo, President #Rouhani and President @BarackObama expressed their mutual political #will to rapidly solve the #nuclear issue.” This tweet replaced an earlier statement in which Rouhani claimed that the phone conversation also ended with Obama saying Khodahafez (Goodbye in Farsi), https://twitter.com/HassanRouhani/status/383680262539722752?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E383680262539722752&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theguardian.com%2Fworld%2F2013%2Fsep%2F27%2Fobama-phone-call-iranian-president-rouhani.
- 17.
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on the Framework to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a Nuclear Weapon. April 2, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/02/statement-president-framework-prevent-iran-obtaining-nuclear-weapon.
- 18.
Supreme Leader’s Message to International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament, April 17, 2010, http://english.khamenei.ir/news/1287/Leader-s-Message-to-International-Conference-on-Nuclear-Disarmament. Porter, Gareth, “When the Ayatollah Said No to Nukes,” Foreign Policy, October 16, 2014, https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/10/16/when-the-ayatollah-said-no-to-nukes/. President Obama also mentioned the Fatwa during his speech at UNGA in 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly.
- 19.
Special Correspondent, “The Struggle for Iran’s Soul,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2015,
- 20.
Golnaz Esfandiari, “Back Pain Breaks Ice During Iran Nuclear Talks,” Radio Free Europe, October 17, 2013, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-nuclear-zarif-back/25139716.html.
- 21.
نظر رهبری درباره تیم مذاکرهکنندهی هستهای و منتقدین آنها, دیدار رهبری مسئولان و کارگزاران نظام, June 23, 2015, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/video-content?id=30061 تیم مذاکره کننده ایران امین، غیور، شجاع و متدین هستند/ گلهای از دولت ندارم, ISNA News Agency, June 23, 2015, https://www.isna.ir/news/94040201442/تیم-مذاکره-کننده-ایران-امین-غیور-شجاع-و-متدین-هستند-گله-ای .
- 22.
See, for instance, Jochen Bittner, “Is Rouhani an Iranian Gorbachev?” New York Times, December 3, 2013; Natan Sharansky, “Is Rouhani the New Gorbachev?” The Wall Street Journal, November 18, 2013; and Stephen Kotkin, “Rouhani’s Gorbachev Moment. What Makes a Genuine Reformer?”, Foreign Affairs, November 24, 2013.
- 23.
David Kenner, “Why Saudi Arabia Hates the Iran Deal,” Foreign Policy, November 14, 2013, https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/14/why-saudi-arabia-hates-the-iran-deal/.
- 24.
Bulent Aras and Emirhan Yorulmazlar, “Turkey and Iran after the Arab Spring,” Middle East Policy 21, no. 4 (2014), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14754967/21/4.
- 25.
Muhammad Saleem Mazhar and Naheed Goraya, “Geneva Deal: Beginning of a New Era Between Iran-US Relations,” South Asian Studies 29, no. 1 (2014). http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/5.%20Naheed%20S.%20Goraya_29_1.pdf.
- 26.
Remarks by President Barack Obama at A Press Conference after Meeting with GCC Leaders, Camp David, United States, May 14, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/remarks-president-obama-press-conference-after-gcc-summit.
- 27.
Ibid.
- 28.
Babak Dehghanpisheh, and Sami Aboudi, “Iran president eyes better ties with Gulf Arabs during trip,” Reuters, February 15, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-gulf-oman-kuwait-idUSKBN15U0US.
- 29.
Mohammad Javad Zarif, “Our Neighbors Are Our Priority,” Ashraq Al-Awsat, November 21, 2013, https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/m-zarif/opinion/opinion-our-neighbors-are-our-priority.
- 30.
The JCPOA was approved by Iran’s Majles famously in 20 minutes, after two months of intense debate in various fractions within the Majles as well as Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. President Obama also managed to secure the support of a Republican-majority US Congress without a single Republican voting in favour of the agreement. The US Senate did not arrive at the required 60 votes to block the implementation of the agreement.
“Larijani Explains’s the JCPOA’s Approval Process in the Majles (توضیح لاریجانی درباره تصویب ۲۰ دقیقهای برجام در مجلس)” Tasnim News, May 6, 2017, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1397/02/16/1718218/توضیح-لاریجانی-درباره-تصویب-20-دقیقه-ای-برجام-در-مجلس.
Jennifer Steinhauer, “Democrats Hand Victory to Obama on Iran Nuclear Deal,” The New York Times, September 10, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/us/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-senate.html.
- 31.
Gordon, Michael R. and Sanger, David E., “Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen with Time,” The New York Times, July 14, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html.
- 32.
“Rouhani Says Nuclear Deal Political Victory for Iran,” Al Jazeera, July 15, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/07/rouhani-nuclear-deal-political-victory-iran-150715100849846.html.
- 33.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Spokesman: US marines entry to Iranian territorial water was not hostile,” Press release, January 13, 2016, https://ifpnews.com/news/politics/security/spokesman-us-marines-entry-to-iranian-territorial-water-was-not-hostile/
‘تصمیمگیری درمورد تفنگداران آمریکایی بادستور سلسه مراتب خواهد بود’ (‘The decision about the US marines will be taken by the hierarchy’), Mehr News, January 13, 2016, https://www.mehrnews.com/news/3023790/تصمیم-گیری-درمورد-تفنگداران-آمریکایی-بادستور-سلسه-مراتب-خواهد.
- 34.
“Deputy FM Cautions US to Remain Loyal to N. Deal,” Fars News, March 8, 2016, http://en.farsnews.com/13941218001208.
- 35.
Special Correspondent, “The Struggle for Iran’s Soul,” Foreign Policy, October 12, 2015.
- 36.
Parisa Hafezi, “Obama, Iran’s Zarif shake hands in New York, Iranian official says,” Reuters, September 29, 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-obama-zarif/obama-irans-zarif-shake-hands-in-new-york-iranian-official-says-idUSKCN0RT0WG20150929.
- 37.
Carol Morello, “Iran nuclear deal could collapse under Trump,” The Washington Post, November 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-nuclear-deal-could-collapse-under-trump/2016/11/09/f2d2bd02-a68c-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4_story.html.
- 38.
“Consumer Price Index,” Central Bank of Iran, http://www.cbi.ir/category/1624.aspx; “Iran Inflation Rates,” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/inflation-cpi.
- 39.
“Iran GDP Annual Growth Rate” Trading Economics Online Database, https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/gdp-growth-annual.
- 40.
Luciano Zaccara, “Iran 2016: From the Saudi Embassy Attack to the Demise of Rafsanjani,” Asia Maior, vol. 27. (2016) p. 368 (357–378), https://www.asiamaior.org/the-journal/asia-maior-vol-xxvii-2016/iran-2016.html.
- 41.
“Iran to Get First Purchased Airbus Aircraft Thursday,” Tasnim News, January 8, 2017, https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2017/01/08/1291261/iran-to-get-first-purchased-airbus-aircraft-thursday.
- 42.
تمام هتلهای درجه یک تهران تا پایان سال ۲۰۱۸ رزرو شد (All high-end hotels in Tehran are sold out until the end of 2018), Tasnim News Agency, March 8, 2017, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1395/12/18/1349557/تمام-هتل-های-درجه-یک-تهران-تا-پایان-سال-2018-رزرو-ش.
- 43.
“PSA signs JV deal with Iran Khodro,” Press TV, June 21, 2016, https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2016/06/21/471458/PSA-signs-JV-deal-with-Iran-Khodro.
- 44.
“Iran crude oil Production,” Trading Economic, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/crude-oil-production; ‘OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report’, OPEC, December 14, 2016, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/static_files_project/media/downloads/publications/MOMR%20December%202016.pdf.
- 45.
Rupert Rowling, Angelina Rascouet, and Julian Lee, “Shell Follows Total in Buying Iranian Crude After Sanctions End,” Bloomberg, June 8, 2016, http://businessweekme.com/7921/.
- 46.
See the Iranian Banks’ SWIFT Code list, http://www.swift-code.com/iran.
- 47.
“Foreign Exchange Rate,” Central Bank of Iran, http://www.cbi.ir/exrates/rates_en.aspx.
- 48.
“Iran Unemployment Rates,” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/iran/unemployment-rate.
- 49.
From May 2015 to April 2018, the proportion of Iranians who think the economic situation is bad increased from 44% to 72%. For the same periods, the Iranians who believe the economic situation is getting worse grew up from 37% to 64%. Moreover, in April 2018, 43% strongly agreed and 30% somewhat agreed with the statement “the government is not doing enough to help the poor”. On the other hand, the distrust on the United States notably increased, from 45% of Iranians that believed in 2015 that the United States would comply with the JCPOA dropped to just 11% three years later. Finally, the Iranians who considered the US presidential policies were “completely hostile” towards Iran increased from the 42% in December 2016 (Obama) to the 69% in January 2018 (Trump). “Iranian Attitudes Before & After Parliamentary Elections,” Center for International and Security Studies at University of Maryland (March 2016), http://www.cissm.umd.edu/sites/default/files/CISSM-IranPoll%20-%20Feb%20%20March%202016%20%28Pre%20and%20Post%20election%20results%20and%20trends%29%20-%20Final.pdf.
- 50.
Nick Corasaniti, “Donald Trump Brings Theatrics to Iran Nuclear Deal Protest,” The New York Times, September 9, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/09/09/donald-trump-brings-theatrics-to-iran-nuclear-deal-protest/.
- 51.
Interviews conducted with ten Iranian scholars from Tehran University, Azad University, and Allameh Tabatabaei University in January 2017.
- 52.
“Full transcript: Second 2016 presidential debate,” Politico, October 10, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/10/2016-presidential-debate-transcript-229519.
- 53.
Ibid.
- 54.
Nahal Toosi, and Louis Nelson, “Trump slaps new sanctions on Iran after missile test,” Politico, February 3, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/iran-sanctions-234604.
- 55.
Robin Wright, “President Trump’s surprisingly warm welcome in the Middle East,” The New Yorker, November 10, 2016, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/president-trumps-surprisingly-warm-welcome-in-the-middle-east.
- 56.
Parisa Hafezi, “Iranian People Chant Death to America in Rally Against President Trump.” Reuters, February 10, 2017, https://www.aol.com/article/news/2017/02/10/iranian-people-chant-death-to-america-in-rally-against-preside/21711346/.
- 57.
Ibid.
- 58.
“Full transcript of Amanpour’s interview with Iran’s foreign minister,” CNN, February 17, 2017, https://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/17/world/amanpour-zarif-full-transcript/index.html.
- 59.
Ibid.
- 60.
“Iran GDP Annual Growth Rate” Trading Economics Online Database, https://tradingeconomics.com/iran/gdp-growth-annual.
- 61.
In January 2016, the Obama Administration changed the Visa Waiver Program for Europeans and some Asian nationals that had been to Iran, Iraq, Sudan, or Syria in the previous five years or if they possess dual citizenship that includes one of those four countries. This regulation was further reinforced in the beginning of the Trump Administration causing many to choose between going to Iran or the United States, aside from having serious repercussions on the daily lives of thousands of Iranian dual nationals.
“Been on holiday to Iran? It will make US trips more expensive and stressful,” The Telegraph, January 22, 2016. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/middle-east/iran/articles/Been-on-holiday-to-Iran-It-will-make-US-trips-more-expensive-and-stressful/.
- 62.
Kelsey Davenport, “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran,” Arms Control Association, Updated April 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran.
- 63.
Torbati Yeganeh, “Trump election puts Iran nuclear deal on shaky ground,” Reuters, November 9, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-iran/trump-election-puts-iran-nuclear-deal-on-shaky-ground-idUSKBN13427E.
- 64.
“Rouhani vows to target all US sanctions if re-elected,” Al Jazeera, May 13, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/rouhani-vows-target-sanctions-elected-170512174313852.html.
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Zaccara, L., Haghirian, M. (2020). Rouhani, the Nuclear Deal, and New Horizons for Iran–US Relations. In: Zaccara, L. (eds) Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani's First Term (2013–2017). Contemporary Gulf Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3924-4_4
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