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Time Zone Differences Induced Trade, Factor Prices and Skill Formation

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Abstract

Time Zone difference induced changes in trade and factor prices are relatively new concerns in trade literature as we repeatedly mentioned before. Here in this chapter we formulate yet another trade model capturing the issue of Time Zone difference and communication technology revolution together to show that due to these developments skilled workers benefit. Though wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers is widened under reasonable and, of course, sensible condition. Return to capital goes down while educational capital gets relatively high return. These changes also attract educational capital from abroad and eventually alter the sectoral composition of the economy in favor of more skill based one.

A different version of this chapter was published as Mandal et al. [41].

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The story that we develop in this chapter and the underlying issues that are going to be taken care of are discussed quite nicely in recent literature. This comprises of Deardorf [13], Marjit [44], Long et al. [37], Do and Long [16], Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg [23], Kikuchi and Marjit [32], Matsuoka and Fukushima [48], Kikuchi [31], Kikuchi et al. [33], Findlay [20], Dixit and Grossman [15], Sanyal [52], Sarkar [54], Marjit [43], Kohler [34], Jones and Kierzkowski [27], Jones and Marjit [28, 29], Deardorff [12], Kohler [34, 35]. This work is also closely related with Antras et al. [5], Costinot et al. [11], Harms et al. [24], Dettmer [14], Anderson [2] Christen [10] etc.

  2. 2.

    India is a major trading partner of USA in this regard due to: (a) exactly non-overlapping time zone; and (b) huge supply of educated and computer-savvy youth.

  3. 3.

    Movement of educational capital towards India can be best corroborated by the following facts. India has: (a) 26,500 higher education institutes, greater than USA (7000) China (4000); (b) around 1,50,000 students go abroad in a year; (c) India needs Rs. 20 lakh crores [19] in education sector by 2020 to match the demand.

  4. 4.

    See Marjit [44] and Kikuchi [31] for related issues and analysis. We deliberately relegate the mathematical notations associated with these three options in footnote 6 of this chapter in order to pin point on the option which is relevant for our analysis.

  5. 5.

    Kikuchi, Marjit and Mandal [33] is an important reference in this connection. There it is discussed how and why utilization of time zone difference can induce an increase in productivity and hence skilled wage across the globe.

  6. 6.

    Option-wise (i) \(P_{x} = W_{s} \left( {2 + \delta } \right)\), where \(\delta\) represents time preferences (See [44]; (ii) \(P_{x} = W_{s} \left( {2 + \omega } \right)\), where \(\omega\) reflects extra cost for night-shift work; (iii) \(P_{x} = W_{s} \left( {2 + \rho } \right)\), where \(\rho\) indicates cost of communication technology. Under the condition \(\delta > \omega > \rho\), (iii) is obviously the best option. Another point is the consistency of (iii) with the idea of non-overlapping time zones.

  7. 7.

    If we think of outsourcing to a country where labor cost is less our story would be further strengthened. But we are not doing so to maintain symmetry in skilled wage across the globe. And hence the story can also be replicated for two developed or two developing economies if they are located in different TZ.

  8. 8.

    Communication cost can also play crucial role for countries located in (non-)overlapping time zones even if there exist difference in skilled wages across countries.

  9. 9.

    For further details see Marjit [44] and Kikuchi et al. [33]. Different forms and types of cost are already indicated in footnote 6. In what follows here \(\rho\) implies only communication cost. Readers are cautioned not to confuse if \(\rho\) is also a part of technology of production in X. \(\rho\) essentially measures how much extra cost in terms of \(W_{s}\) is required for communication purpose.

  10. 10.

    Alternatively, production function for \(S_{1}\) can be defined as \(S_{1} = H\left( {E, L_{1} } \right)\). H satisfies standard neoclassical properties. From the production function \(L_{1}\) maximizes the surplus to determine the demand for E. The surplus function looks like: \(W_{s} S_{1} - WL_{1} - \tau E\). Using standard first order condition for surplus maximization we get \(W_{s} \frac{{\partial \left( {E, L_{1} } \right)}}{\partial E} = \tau\). Eventually this helps to calculate the demand for E by \(L_{1}\). Therefore, the unit cost function for the production function is \(C_{H} \left( {W, \tau } \right) = W_{s}\). Following this, the cost-price equality for skilled labor in a competitive set up is described like Eq. (11.9) in the main text.

  11. 11.

    One can easily call it transformation or upgradation function.

  12. 12.

    A careful observation of Eq. (11.7) entails, in turn, that how many L can be upgraded to S depends on E. Simultaneously, E also determines the quantity of E requires for training and upgradation purposes as transformation of \(L_{1}\) into \(S_{1}\) crucially depends on educational infrastructure which is again a product of E. Hence E determines how much L can be upgraded to S, and L also determines how much E is demanded. Furthermore, here we do not distinguish between high and low-quality S as otherwise technological requirement in X and Y would have to be different.

  13. 13.

    This equation helps us to know the fortune of \(\tau\) when \(W_{s}\) and W change due to any change in \(\rho\). But it cannot capture the effect of E on \(\mu_{ES}\) and hence on \(\tau\). We will come to this issue in a moment.

  14. 14.

    \(\theta_{ij}\) represents the value share of ith factor in jth good, and ‘^’ over a variable implies proportional change.

  15. 15.

    If \(\varphi \left( E \right)L_{1} \left( E \right)\) rises at a rate identical with or higher than that of E, change in \(\frac{{\varphi \left( E \right)L_{1} \left( E \right)}}{E} \ge 0\) indicating change in \(\frac{1}{{\mu_{ES} }} = {\text{change in}}\frac{1}{\alpha \left( E \right)} \ge 0\) due to an increase in E. This will either raise \(\tau\) further or \(\tau\) will remain fixed at a higher level as \(\tau = \frac{{W_{s} - W}}{{\mu_{ES} }}\). Therefore, E will continue to come in—implying instability in the international market for E.

  16. 16.

    See Appendix 1 for an alternative explanation for such phenomenon.

  17. 17.

    Here, \(\theta_{sx} = \frac{{W_{s} \left( {2 + \rho } \right)}}{{P_{x} }} = 1\) implies productive skilled share in X, \(\theta_{dx} = \frac{{W_{s} \rho }}{{P_{x} }}\) indicates (disutility wage) or communication cost share in X, and \(\theta_{ky} ,\theta_{sy} ,\theta_{kz} ,\theta_{lz}\) have usual interpretation following Jones [25, 26].

  18. 18.

    Readers are referred to Appendix 1 for explanation.

  19. 19.

    More detailed explanations are provided in Appendix 2.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Adjustments in \({\varvec{\uptau}}\) and E

Following arguments in the main text we understand that \(\tau\) influences E which in turn changes \(\mu_{ES}\), productivity of educational capital in upgrading L. An increase in the supply of E owing to higher \(\tau\) initially raises average productivity. Such phenomenon is quite sensible as the supply of complementing factor, L, is traditionally huge in supply. Therefore, \(\frac{1}{{\mu_{ES} }}\) goes up or \(\mu_{ES}\) goes down. But in the long run, productivity of E must fall gradually because of the similar reason iterated before. So, E demonstrates a positive relation with \(\tau\), before reaching a certain level. But beyond that level E drags down \(\tau\) through changes in the productivity of educational capital. Hence, \(\tau\) decreases and gets equalized with international level where inflow or outflow of E comes to a halt. These arguments are described in the following diagrams. Figure 11.3a shows the relationship between \(\mu_{ES}\) and τ, whereas Fig. 11.3b defines the desired shape of the curve showing different combinations of E and \(\tau\). Both the points G and H denote equilibrium, but H is a stable one.

Fig. 11.3
figure 3

a Relationship between \(\mu_{ES}\) and \(\tau\). b Shape of curve for E and \(\tau\)

Appendix 2: Change in \({\varvec{\uptau}}\)

From Eq. (11.9) of the main text we easily derive that \(\hat{W}_{s} - \hat{W}\theta_{ls} = \theta_{Es} \left( {\hat{\tau } + \hat{\alpha }} \right)\) as \(\mu_{ES}\) and \(\alpha \left( E \right)\) both are identical and essentially imply inverse of average productivity of E. However, when there is no endowment change in E, productivity of E will not change. This is what we need to look at as change in \(\tau\) would be due to change in \(\rho\) only to start with. Substituting the values of \(\hat{W}\) and \(\hat{W}_{s}\)

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\tau }\theta_{Es} & = - \hat{\rho }\theta_{dx} + \hat{\rho }\theta_{dx} \frac{{\theta_{sy} }}{{\theta_{ky} }}\frac{{\theta_{kz} }}{{\theta_{lz} }}\theta_{ls} \\ \hat{\tau }\theta_{Es} & = - \hat{\rho } \theta_{dx} \left( {1 - \frac{{\theta_{sy} }}{{\theta_{ky} }}\frac{{\theta_{kz} }}{{\theta_{lz} }}\theta_{ls} } \right) \\ \hat{\tau } & = - \hat{\rho }\frac{{ \theta_{dx} }}{{\theta_{Es} }}\left( {\frac{{\theta_{ky} \theta_{lz} - \theta_{sy} \theta_{kz} \theta_{ls} }}{{\theta_{ky} \theta_{lz} }}} \right) \\ \end{aligned}$$

This is the preferred relationship between \(\tau\) and \(\rho\) when only different input prices change and calls for an international movement of educational capital.

Appendix 3: Output Change Due to \({\varvec{\uprho}}\) and E

For the time being let us abstain from the issue of an inflow of E though it will take place eventually as \(\tau\) has already gone up. So, here both \(L_{1}\) and \(S_{1}\) are zero. Change in output will be due to factor substitution only owing to change in factor prices triggered by change in \(\rho\). From the zero-profit condition and Envelope condition

$$\hat{a}_{lz} = \sigma_{z} \left( {\hat{W} - \hat{r}} \right)\theta_{lz} \quad{\text{and}}\quad \hat{a}_{kz} = - \sigma_{z} \left( {\hat{W} - \hat{r}} \right)\theta_{kz}$$

Using full employment condition for L and plugging the values of \(\hat{W}\) and \(\hat{r}\) one arrives at

$$\hat{Z} = - \hat{\rho }\sigma_{z} \theta_{dx} \frac{{\theta_{sy} }}{{\theta_{ky} }}$$

Again, K constraint gives the value

$$\hat{Y} = \hat{\rho }\sigma_{z} \theta_{dx} \frac{{\theta_{sy} }}{{\theta_{ky} }}\frac{{\lambda_{kz} }}{{\lambda_{ky} }}$$

If one substitutes the value of \(\hat{Y}\) in the full employment condition of skilled labor, we have

$$\hat{X} = - \hat{\rho }\sigma_{z} \theta_{dx} \frac{{\theta_{sy} }}{{\theta_{ky} }}\frac{{\lambda_{kz} }}{{\lambda_{ky} }}\frac{{\lambda_{sy} }}{{\lambda_{sx} }}$$

Now let us quickly move to the endowment effect. Equation (11.7) entails \(\hat{S}_{1} \left( E \right) = \hat{L}_{1} \left( E \right)\) for non-changing quality parameter of E. Note that Eq. (11.9) can also be written as \(W + \tau \frac{E}{{S_{1} \left( E \right)}} = W_{s}\). This argument ensures that \(\hat{S}_{1} \left( E \right) = \hat{L}_{1} \left( E \right) = \hat{E}\) for any given \(W_{s} ,W\) and \(\tau\) (remember that \(\tau\) is now higher than the international level). Once E flows in, however, there must be further modifications in \(\tau\). It must go down to restore the world-wide balance. But right now we are not interested in that. Consequent upon inflow of E we will have slightly modified full employment conditions where both \(L_{1}\) and \(S_{1}\) are non-zero and positive. Using the standard Cramer’s rule and substitution of \(\hat{S}_{1} \left( E \right) = \hat{L}_{1} \left( E \right) = \hat{E}\) we have

$$\hat{Z} = - \hat{E}\frac{{\lambda_{l1l} }}{{\lambda_{lz} }};\ \hat{Y} = \hat{E}\frac{{\lambda_{l1l} }}{{\lambda_{lz} }}\frac{{\lambda_{kz} }}{{\lambda_{ky} }};\ {\text{ and }}\ \hat{X} = \hat{E}\frac{{\lambda_{S1S} \lambda_{lz} - \lambda_{l1l} \lambda_{kz} \lambda_{sy} }}{{\lambda_{lz} \lambda_{sx} }}.$$

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Marjit, S., Mandal, B., Nakanishi, N. (2020). Time Zone Differences Induced Trade, Factor Prices and Skill Formation. In: Virtual Trade and Comparative Advantage. Kobe University Monograph Series in Social Science Research. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3906-0_11

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