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Development of New China’s International Law Theory

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Abstract

For China, the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” initiated in 1953 and jointly advocated by China along with India and Myanmar in 1954, was successively embodied the Bandung spirit of seeking common ground while reserving differences in 1955 when it participated in the Asia-Africa Conference.

The Bandung Conference and the Development of the Diplomatic Idea of “Seeking Common Ground While Reserving Differences”.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For foreign scholars’ analysis of the process and impact of the meeting, see: The New Encyclopædia Britannica (Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2010), vol. 1, p. 863; George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956); Kweku Ampiah, The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: the Reactions of the US, UK and Japan (Folkestone, UK: Global Oriental, 2007); Christopher J. Lee (ed.), Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010); Jamie Mackie, Bandung 1955: Non-alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005); Antonia Finnane and Derek McDougall (eds.), Bandung 1955: Little Histories (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 2010).

  2. 2.

    See: Contemporary China Institute: Manuscript of the History of the People's Republic of China (Volume One) (People’s Publishing House, Contemporary China Press, 2012), pp. 316–317.

  3. 3.

    This kind of order is neither an ideal international order nor a revolutionary order. It is just a proper and “sub-optima” order that China considers acceptable.

  4. 4.

    At the beginning, the United States once looked the Bandung Conference with a cold eye and even impeded China. Now, U.S. officials also regard this meeting as a great milestone. For details, please refer to the website of the US State Department for the introduction to the Bandung Conference: “Milestones: 1953–1960, Bandung Conference (Asian-African Conference), 1955”, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960/bandung-conf.

  5. 5.

    Regarding the international environment of the Bandung Conference, and the general situation of the United States obstructing the meeting and exerting public opinion pressure on China, see Qi Pengfei and Yang Fengcheng: The Chronicle of Contemporary China (1949.10–2004.10) (People’s Publishing House, 2007), pp. 129–131.

  6. 6.

    For the discussion of the significance of the Bandung Conference on international law, see He Zhipeng and Sun Lu, “The Dimension of Justice of the International Rule of Law,” Jilin University Journal of Social Sciences, 2014 (6).

  7. 7.

    For relevant discussion, see Yang Fuchang, “Developing Countries and Their Relationship with China—To Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Bandung Conference”, West Asia and Africa, 2005 (4); Liu Lei, “The Bandung Conference and the Economic and Trade Relations of China with Asian-African Countries”, Research on the History of the Communist Party of China, 2010 (7); Lu Tingen, “On the Bandung Conference and its Impact”, West Asia and Africa, 2005 (3).

  8. 8.

    For a limited number of discussions, please refer to Xiong Huayuan, “Viewing the Spread and Influence of Zhou Enlai's Diplomatic Thought of Peace from the Bandung Conference”, Study of Contemporary China’s History, 2005 (6).

  9. 9.

    For relevant background, see Liu Wusheng, Zhou Enlai and the Major Historical Incidents of Republic (People’s Publishing House, 2005), p. 66; Zhang Wei: “Reading Decryption Archives for the Preparation of New China to Participate in the Bandung Conference”, One-hundred-year Trends, 2005 (5).

  10. 10.

    See: Zhou Enlai, “Supplementary Speech at the Bandung Conference”, Document Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Selected Important Documents since the Founding of the People's Republic of China (Volume 6) (Central Literature Press, 1993), pp. 178–181.

  11. 11.

    See: Xinhua Monthly News, edited: Major Events of the People’s Republic of China (1949–2004), (People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 117.

  12. 12.

    See: [Canada] Ronald C. Keith: Zhou Enlai's Great Diplomacy, translated by Feng Changhong, (International Cultural Publishing Company, 2013), p. 93.

  13. 13.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Literature Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), p. 223, 315, 319.

  14. 14.

    See: Deng Xiaoping’s Anthology (1949–1974) (the Last Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 2014), pp. 172–173.

  15. 15.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Literature Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), pp. 214, 247–249.

  16. 16.

    See: Deng Xiaoping’s Anthology (1949–1974) (the 3rd Volume) (People's Publishing House, 2014), pp. 197–198.

  17. 17.

    See: Xie Yixian, edited: History of China’s Contemporary Diplomacy (1949–2009) (China Youth Press, 2011), pp. 280–286; Institute of Contemporary China: The History Manuscript of the People’s Republic of China (Volume III) (People’s Publishing House, Contemporary China Press, 2012), pp. 182–185.

  18. 18.

    See Mao Zedong’s speech in 1957, Selected Works of Mao Zedong Diplomacy (Central Literature Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), p. 280.

  19. 19.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Literature Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), pp. 316–317, 322–333.

  20. 20.

    See: Deng Xiaoping’s Anthology (1949–1974) (the 3rd Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 2014), p. 227.

  21. 21.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Literature Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), pp. 178–179, 233, 237, 269 (China is a weak country, not a strong country), 313 (a very poor country, and has nothing); Deng Xiaoping's Anthology (1949–1974) (the 3rd Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 2014), p. 30.

  22. 22.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Literature Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), p. 234; See: Deng Xiaoping's Anthology (1949–1974) (the 3rd Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 2014), pp. 38–39, 116.

  23. 23.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Literature Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), pp. 191–192, 256, 301 (China will not expand externally); Chen Yi's Chronicle (People's Publishing House, 1995), p. 1179.; See: Deng Xiaoping’s Anthology (1949–1974) (the 3rd Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 2014), pp. 197–198, 309, 362.

  24. 24.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Literature Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), p. 167.

  25. 25.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Literature Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), p. 160.

  26. 26.

    See: Deng Xiaoping’s Anthology (1949–1974) (the 3rd Volume) (People's Publishing House, 2014), p. 48.

  27. 27.

    See: Mao Zedong's Diplomatic Essays (Central Literature Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), pp. 228–232, 242–244, 288.

  28. 28.

    About the Ma Guan Negotiating Peace and the three countries' intervene on the return of Liao after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, see Qi Qizhang: History of the Sino-Japanese War (2nd ed.) (Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2014), pp. 385–442.

  29. 29.

    See Guo Tingyi: The Changes of Modern China (Kyushu Press, 2012), pp. 150–151.

  30. 30.

    See: Deng Xiaoping's Anthology (1949–1974) (the 3rd Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 2014), pp. 169–170.

  31. 31.

    See: Mao Zedong: “On the Ten Major Relations”, Mao Zedong's Anthology (Volume 7) (People’s Publishing House, 1999), p. 26. See also: Zhang Wentian's Chronicle (CPC History Press, 2010), p. 993; Zhang Wentian's Anthology (vol. 4) (CPC History Press, 2012), p. 225.

  32. 32.

    See: Deng Xiaoping’s Anthology (1949–1974) (the 3rd Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 2014), p. 312.

  33. 33.

    See: Zhang Wentian’s Anthology (vol. 4) (CPC History Press, 2012), pp. 270, 476.

  34. 34.

    See: Deng Xiaoping’s Anthology (1949–1974) (the 3rd Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 2014), pp. 310–311.

  35. 35.

    See: Zhang Wentian’s Anthology (vol. 4) (CPC History Press, 2012), pp. 280, 300.

  36. 36.

    For the historical significance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, see Liu Wenzong, “The Epoch-making Significance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in Modern International Law”, Journal of the Chinese College of Foreign Affairs, 1984 (2); Wei Min, “The Significance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in Modern International Law”, Chinese Journal of International Law 1985 (China External Translation Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 237–252; QiuRiqing, “On the Two Pillars of the New International Order”, Politics and Law, 1994 (1); Xie Yixian, “The New China has made a major contribution to the principlization and conceptualization of the concept of peaceful coexistence—commemorating the 50th anniversary of the birth of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, Journal of the Chinese College of Foreign Affairs, 2004 (2); Liu Huawen, The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and China’s Proposition of the International Order,” Group Statements, 2014(8); He Zhipeng and Sun Lu, “The Foundation of International Law for the Road to Great Power”, Law and Business Research, 2014 (4); He Zhipeng and Sun Lu, “The Realism Dimension of International Relations: An Exploration of the Position of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”, Journal of Social Sciences of Jilin University, 2014 (6).

  37. 37.

    For Hu Jintao's speech at the Asia-Africa Summit in April 22, 2005, see: Documentary Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Selected Important Documents since the 16th National Congress (Central Documentary Press, 2006), p. 848.

  38. 38.

    B. V. A. Rölling, International Law in an Expanded World (Amsterdam: Djambatan N. V., 1960), p. 15.

  39. 39.

    Peter Malanczuk, Akhurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th ed., Routledge, 1997), p. 33.

  40. 40.

    At that time, in order to disrupt the participation of the Chinese delegation in the conference, the Taiwan authorities created an incident by placing bombs that caused the crash of the “Kashmir Princess” aircraft in which some Chinese representatives took. The 11 staff members were killed. Regarding the facts of the incident, the negotiations between the Chinese government and the British government, and the holding of a memorial service conference in China, see Institute of Contemporary China, The History Manuscript of the People's Republic of China (Volume I) (People’s Publishing House, Contemporary China Press, 2012), p. 314; Institute of Contemporary China (ed.), The Chronicle of the History of the People's Republic of China Volume 1955 (Contemporary China Press, 2009), pp. 243, 246, 265–266.

  41. 41.

    For the basic process of China’s participation in the Bandung Conference and Zhou Enlai’s speech at the Conference, see: Institute of Contemporary China (ed.), The Chronicle of the History of the People's Republic of China Volume 1955 (Contemporary China Press, 2009), pp. 267–274; Documentary Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Selected Important Documents since the Foundation of the People's Republic of China (Central Documentary Press, 2006), pp. 170–182.

  42. 42.

    See: The CPC Central Committee Party History Research Office, History of the Chinese Communist Party Volume II (1949–1978) (Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2011), pp. 633–639.

  43. 43.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Documentary Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), pp. 182, 204.

  44. 44.

    See: The CPC Central Committee Party History Research Office: History of the Chinese Communist Party Volume II (1949–1978) (Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2011), pp. 645–652.

  45. 45.

    See: Yang Kuisong: Research on the History of the Founding of the People's Republic of China (Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 2009), pp. 177–215.

  46. 46.

    See: Yang Kuisong: Research on the History of the Founding of the People's Republic of China (Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 2009); R. McFarquhar and John King Fairbank (eds.), Yu Jinyao, et al. (translated), The Cambridge History of the People’s Republic of China (the Last Volume): Revolution within the Chinese Revolution (1966–1982) (Chinese Social Science Press, 1992); R. McFarquall and John King Fairbank (eds.), XieLiangsheng, et al. (translated), The Cambridge History of the People's Republic of China (the First Volume): The Rise of a Revolutionary China (1949–1965) (Chinese Social Science Press, 1990); Xie Yixian (ed.), History of China’s Contemporary Diplomacy (1949–2009) (3rd ed.) (China Youth Press, 2009).

  47. 47.

    Wang Yizhou and Tan Xiuying: 60 Years of China’s Diplomacy (Chinese Social Science Press, 2009), pp. 12–14.

  48. 48.

    See: Contemporary China Institute: Manuscript of the History of the People's Republic of China (Volume One) (People's Publishing House, Contemporary China Press, 2012), p. 306.

  49. 49.

    For the basic process of the controversy, see: The CPC Central Committee Party History Research Office: History of the Chinese Communist Party Volume II (1949–1978) (Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2011), pp. 653–659.

  50. 50.

    See: Yang Kuisong: Research on the History of the Founding of the People's Republic of China (Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 2009), p. 223, note. 2.

  51. 51.

    For the related historical facts, see Huang Anyu: The History of New China’s Diplomacy (People's Publishing House, 2005), pp. 40-42; Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Documentary Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), pp. 316–317, 322–333.

  52. 52.

    See: Deng Xiaoping's Anthology (the 3rd Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 1993), pp. 294–295.

  53. 53.

    See: The Manuscripts of Mao Zedong Since the Founding of the PRC (Volume 12) (Central Documental Press, 1998), pp. 276, 431.

  54. 54.

    See: Yang Kuisong, Research on the History of the Founding of the People’s Republic of China (Jiangxi People’s Publishing House, 2009), pp. 210–220.

  55. 55.

    The state of affairs at this stage can be reflected in the words of the People’s Daily and related media. “On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat”, People’s Daily, April 5, 1956; The article “Again on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletarian” first proposed the concepts of the contradiction between the enemy and myself and the internal contradiction among the people, pointing out that the contradiction between the enemy and myself is a fundamental contradiction, and its basis is the conflict of interests between rival classes; the internal contradiction among the people is non-fundamental contradiction, and the solution of it must first be subordinated to the total interests of hostile struggle, and it should proceed from the desire for solidarity, be resolved through criticism or struggle, and gain new solidarity under new conditions. Correcting Stalin's mistakes is an internal contradiction among the people. Stalin's merit is greater than his mistake. The total negation of Stalin will encourage revisionist ideological trends. Internal contradiction among the people can be transformed into confrontational contradiction under certain conditions, and become part of the contradiction between the enemy and myself. Bosnia and Herzegovina developed into anti-socialism from the opposition against the great-nation chauvinism. “Again on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletarian”, People’s Daily, December 29, 1956.

  56. 56.

    See: Yang Jiemian, etc., The Chinese Communist Party and the Diplomatic Theory and Practice with Chinese Characteristics (Oriental Publishing Center, 2011), pp. 79–80.

  57. 57.

    For an analysis of this issue, please refer to Zhu Dandan, “The Revolutionary Ideals and the 'New Principle' of the Relationships among Socialist Countries—the Historical Link between the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the Guidelines for Socialist Countries’ Relations”, Diplomatic Review, 2013 (3); Yue Bo, “The Contradiction between the Theory and Practice of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in Mao Zedong's Time”, Journal of Xiaogan College, 2003 (4).

  58. 58.

    See: Deng Xiaoping's Anthology (1949–1974) (the Middle Volume) (People's Press, 2014), pp. 381–383.

  59. 59.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Anthology (Volume 6) (People’s Publishing House, 1999), pp. 333–334.

  60. 60.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Anthology (Volume 7) (People’s Publishing House, 1999), p. 139.

  61. 61.

    See: Wu Lengxi, The Ten Years’ Controversy (Central Documental Press, 1999), p. 152; International Strategic Research Foundation, edited: Enduring the Same Hot and Cold around the Globe—The International Strategic Ideas of a Generation of Leaders (Central Documental Press, 1993), p. 267.

  62. 62.

    See: Wang Taiping (ed.), The History of the Diplomacy of the People's Republic of China (Volume II 1957–1969) (World Knowledge Press, 1998), pp. 282–322.

  63. 63.

    See: Wang Taiping (ed.), The History of the Diplomacy of the People's Republic of China (Volume II 1957–1969) (World Knowledge Press, 1998), pp. 334–335, 335–348.

  64. 64.

    See: Contemporary China Institute, Manuscript of the History of the People’s Republic of China (Volume Third) (1966–1976) (People's Publishing House, Contemporary China Press, 2012), pp. 171–172; Chen Yi’s Chronicle (People's Publishing House, 1995), pp. 1181–1182, 1189, 1194–1195.

  65. 65.

    See: The CPC Central Committee Party History Research Office, History of the Chinese Communist Party Volume II (1949–1978) (Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2011), pp. 879–881.

  66. 66.

    See: Xie Yixian (ed.), History of China’s Contemporary Diplomacy (1949–2009) (China Youth Press, 2011), pp. 204–209.

  67. 67.

    See: Xue Hanqin, Chinese Contemporary Perspectives on International Law: History, Culture and International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012), pp. 25–28.

  68. 68.

    See: Xiao Yang, Zhang Wentian and China’s Diplomacy (Xuelin Press, 2012), pp. 11–12.

  69. 69.

    See: Jin Chongji, The Outline of Chinese History in the Twentieth Century (the 2nd Volume), (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2009), pp. 720–743. In fact, the historic process and specific issues of the Korean War are far more complicated than those described in the book.

  70. 70.

    See: Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong’s Anthology (Vol. 6) (People’s Publishing House, 1999), pp. 97, 103. Like the legal institute, New China’s diplomacy adopts an attitude of completely abandoning the old diplomatic institute. For the process of the development of old China’s diplomacy, see Xiong Zhiyong et al., The History of Modern and Contemporary Diplomacy of China (2nd ed.) (Peking University Press, 2014).

  71. 71.

    See: Zhou Enlai: “Striving for the Consolidation and Development of the People’s Victory”, Selected Works of Zhou Enlai (the Last Volume) (People's Publishing House, 1984), p. 35; Xiao Xian: Studies on Liu Shaoqi's Diplomatic Thought and Practice (1949–1966) (China Social Sciences Press, 2013), pp. 52–55.

  72. 72.

    In July 1949, when Stalin and Liu Shaoqi talked, they expressed their intention to carry out an international revolutionary movement with the division of labor between the Soviet Union and China: The Soviet Union was responsible for providing assistance to the Western countries’ revolution; while China was responsible for providing help to the nationalist and democratic revolution of colonial, semi-colonial and affiliated countries. Liu Shaoqi Chronicle (the 2nd Volume), p. 245. Xiao Yang, Zhang Wentian and China’s Diplomacy (Xuelin Press, 2012), pp. 12–13. Therefore, Liu Shaoqi stated at a meeting of Asian and Australian trade union representatives from November 16 to December 1, 1949 that China assumes responsibility and supports the armed struggle of colonies and semi-colonies. China’s support for the Vietnamese people’s struggle against the French colonial rule is a vivid illustration. The Manuscript of Liu Shaoqi since the founding of the People's Republic of China (Vol. 1) (People's Publishing House, 2005), pp. 165–168.

  73. 73.

    Many scholars have proposed various interpretations of China’s military deployment. Although afterwards the archives confirmed that the US military had no intention of invading China through the border of arbitration, the author believes that even if the U.S.-led army with the UN flag did not intend to directly collide with the Chinese military, the fact that the U.S. military cannot stop at the 38th parallel had meant this battle had already exceeded the limit of “self-defense” in international law. Therefore, Chinese leaders and the military had reason to consider the issue of territorial security; as for Kim Il Sung’s plea and Stalin’s proposal, especially China’s ideological position as a communist country, all these of course are factors that must be considered. Therefore, under the current situation and information conditions, especially given the key fact that the United States-led military did not stop at the 38th parallel and undermined China’s anticipation of a relatively stable international situation, hence China’s military deployment is a rational choice that needs no doubt. For related analysis, see Shen Zhihua, Mao Zedong, Stalin and the Korean War (3rd ed.) (Guangdong People's Publishing House, 2013); Shen Zhihua, The Cold War in Asia: The Korean War and China’s Deploying Troops to North Korea (Kyushu Press, 2013); Yang Kuisong, Mao Zedong's Gratitude and Complaint with Moscow (4th ed.), Jiangxi People's Publishing House, 2008.

  74. 74.

    See: Xiao Xian: Study on Liu Shaoqi’s Diplomatic Thought and Practice (1949–1966) (China Social Sciences Press, 2013), pp. 57–62.

  75. 75.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Anthology (Volume 6) (People’s Publishing House, 1999), pp. 332–335.

  76. 76.

    See: Pang Xianzhi and Jin Chongji, Mao Zedong (1949–1976) (the First Volume) (Central Documental Press, 2003), p. 562.

  77. 77.

    For documents and proceedings in the process of exchange of chargeback between China and the United Kingdom and China and the Netherlands, see the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, People's Pictorial, Decryption of Diplomatic Documents—Archives of the People’s Republic of China for Establishment of Diplomatic Relations (China Pictorial Press, 2006), pp. 460–497, 534–567.

  78. 78.

    See: Qi Pengfei and Li Baozhen, A Summary History of the Diplomacy of the New China (People’s Publishing House, 2014), pp. 11–17.

  79. 79.

    See: Wang Taiping (ed.), The History of the Diplomacy of the People's Republic of China (Volume II 1957–1969) (World Knowledge Press, 1998), pp. 94–105.

  80. 80.

    See: Xiao Xian, Study on Liu Shaoqi’s Diplomatic Thought and Practice (1949–1966) (China Social Sciences Press, 2013), pp. 62–67.

  81. 81.

    See: Contemporary China Institute, Manuscript of the History of the People’s Republic of China (Volume One) (People’s Publishing House, Contemporary China Press, 2012), pp. 303–304.

  82. 82.

    See: Mao Zedong’s Diplomatic Essays (Central Documental Press, World Knowledge Press, 1994), p. 291.

  83. 83.

    See: Xiao Yang, Zhang Wentian and China’s Diplomacy (Xuelin Press, 2012), p. 11.

  84. 84.

    See: Han Yaguang, Research on the Development of New China (Intellectual Property Press, 2009), p. 25.

  85. 85.

    See: Wang Chengzhi, Handshaking across Minefields: A Study of the Mitigation Process between China and the United States from 1969 to 1972 (Shanghai Sanlian Bookstore, 2010), p. 1.

  86. 86.

    See: The CPC Central Committee Party History Research Office, History of the Chinese Communist Party Volume II (1949–1978) (Chinese Communist Party History Press, 2011), pp. 1053–1061, 1064.

  87. 87.

    In 1952, the French economist and demographer Alfred Sauvy used the word “the three worlds” for the first time in an article published in the magazine The Observer. Alfred Sauvy, “Trois Mondes, Une Planète”, L’Observateur, 14 août 1952, No. 118, p. 14. In the late 1950s, the theory of three worlds was used to describe the countries that had qualitative difference with those of the countries in North America and European old Continent. Among them, the capitalist camp headed by the United States was the first world, and the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union was the second world. A large number of new countries that had just gained independence were the third world.

  88. 88.

    See: The Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping’s Thoughts (Central Documental Press, 1998), p. 334.

  89. 89.

    See: Deng Xiaoping, “Speech at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly”, The Works of Deng Xiaoping (the 3rd Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 2014), pp. 354–355.

  90. 90.

    For example, on September 16, 1978 Deng Xiaoping’s talk when he heard the work report of the Standing Committee of the CPC Jilin Provincial Committee, (The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (the 2nd Volume) (People's Publishing House, 1994), p. 127); On March 30, 1979 the speech at the seeking-vacant meeting of the Party's theoretical work; On April 7, 1981 the talk with the responsible comrades of the drafting group of the Resolution on the Party's Several Historical Issues Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China; On August 21, 1982 the talk when meeting with UN Secretary-General Dekui Liard; On September 14, 1985 the talk with Austrian President Kirchschlig; On May 12, 1987 the talk with Dutch Prime Minister Lubbers; On March 3, 1990 the talk with several central responsible comrades; and so on were all elaborated. See: The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (the Second Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 1994), pp. 160, 415–416; The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (the Third Volume) (People’s Publishing House, 1993), pp. 233, 353.

  91. 91.

    See: Documentary Research Office of the Central Committee of the CPC: Deng Xiaoping’s Chronicle 1975–1997 (Volume 1) (Central Documental Press, 2004), p. 40.

  92. 92.

    See: “Realizing the Four Modernizations and Never Dominating”, of Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume 2) (People's Publishing House, 1994), pp. 111–112.

  93. 93.

    See: “China’s Foreign Policy”, of Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume 2) (People’s Publishing House, 1994), p. 415.

  94. 94.

    See: “Maintaining world peace and doing a good job of domestic construction”, of Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume 3) (People's Publishing House, 1993), p. 56–57.

  95. 95.

    See: Documentary Research Office of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Selected Important Documents since the 12th National Congress (the Middle Volume) (Central Documentary Press, 2001), pp. 127–129.

  96. 96.

    See: Li Kaisheng, Understanding Chinese Diplomacy (1949–2009): The Pursuance of the National Identity in the Process of National Revival (Chinese Social Sciences Press, 2011), pp. 193–200.

  97. 97.

    See: Xi Jinping’s Theory on Ruling the State and Administrating the Politics (Foreign Languages Press, 2014), pp. 296–299.

  98. 98.

    Niu Jun believes that China’s foreign policy in the 1950s faced a transition from revolution to the founding of the country. Niu Jun, Cold War and the Origin of New China’s Diplomacy: 1949–1955 (Social Sciences Literature Press, 2013), pp. 471–472. The author believes that this reference of “transition” is very revealing, but whether all the transition goals of the diplomatic acts can fall on the concept of “the founding of the country” is worth considering.

  99. 99.

    In September 1972, when Zhou Enlai was negotiating with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei, he put forward a proposal of “shelving controversy” against the Diaoyu Islands. For the related details, see Zhang Xiangshan, “Review of the Negotiations for Sino-Japanese Resumption of Diplomatic Relationship”, Japan Journal, 1998 (1), p. 47; in October 1978, Deng Xiaoping reiterated the view of shelving the Diaoyu Island dispute at a press conference during his visit in Japan. See Deng Xiaoping’s Chronicle (Central Documental Press, 2004), pp. 411–412. In 1984, Deng Xiaoping explained at the plenary meeting of the Central Advisory Commission that the means of shelving controversies was aimed at joint development. See The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (Volume 3) (People’s Publishing House, 1993), p. 87. On June 17, 1986 when Deng Xiaoping met with the Vice President Laurel of the Philippines, he put forward a proposal to put aside disputes and jointly develop for the Nansha Islands; On April 16, 1988, when Deng Xiaoping met with the President of the Philippines, Mrs. Aquino, he put forward a proposal for the Nansha Islands of joint development based on the recognition of China’s sovereignty. See Chronicle of Deng Xiaoping (Central Documental Press, 2004), pp. 1122, 1227. Many scholars believe that China’s point of view is that “Sovereignty is on me, put aside disputes, and jointly develop”. This argument is logically contradictory: If “Sovereignty is on me”, it means that there is no recognition of “controversy”, then how to talk about to “put aside”? If sovereignty is on me, why must we “jointly develop” in the condition that there are no financial and technological defects? If the dispute is shelved, it proves that there is a different understanding of the issue of sovereignty, then there can be no precondition that “sovereignty is on me”. Moreover, this formulation is not in line with the proposer of this mode Deng Xiaoping's notion of seeking common ground while reserving differences.

  100. 100.

    See: Deng Xiaoping’s Anthology (Volume 3) (People’s Publishing House, 1993), pp. 58–60, 87, 96–97.

  101. 101.

    Tao Te Ching, in Chinese 道德经, the most important classics of Taoism, is attributed to Lao Tzu (Laozi).

  102. 102.

    The 60th chapter of the Tao Te Ching. See Lou Yulie, Notes, Proofreads and Explanations of Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Classic (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 2008), p. 157. The differences in this sentence between various versions (Silk-Book the First Version, the Second Version, Wang Bi-Notes Version) are very small (such as “cooking” in the Second Version is “Heng”, the ancient synonymous word; “fresh” in Dun Huang the Eighth Version is “Xing”). For the explanations of the predecessors, see Gao Ming, Proofreads and Notes of Silk-book Lao Tzu (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 1996), p. 119.

  103. 103.

    The 61st chapter of the Tao Te Ching, See Lou Yulie, Notes, Proofreads and Explanations of Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Classic (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 2008), p. 159. For the notes and explanations of the meaning of article, see: Zhu Qianzhi, Proofreaders and Explanations of Lao Tzu (Zhonghua Book Bureau, 1984), p. 248.

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He, Z., Sun, L. (2020). Development of New China’s International Law Theory. In: A Chinese Theory of International Law. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2882-8_5

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