Abstract
The idea of self-so had always been important for the Daoists. As a philosophical concept, it is different from the contemporary sense of “nature.” It means instead, so of itself, originally so, the nature of what is so originally, and without artificial action. It also contains the sense of necessarily so, what is determined by mandate (命). Sometimes it also refers to being without intention and without purpose. As a philosophical concept, it is first seen in the Daodejing. It was later inherited by the Zhuangzi and was developed by Wang Chong, Wang Bi and Guo Xiang till it reached its acme.
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Wang, Y., Bao, Q., Guan, G. (2020). Self-so (ziran, 自然). In: History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2572-8_19
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