Comparing Chomsky, Skinner and Harris: What Counts as ‘New’?

Abstract

In this comparison concerning the second topic ‘what counts as “new” ’, an interesting discovery emerging from our discussion is that the authors’ differences in conceptualizing the ‘new’ are fundamentally influenced by what is considered ‘constant’. Chomsky believes in an innate organ of grammar which can be captured through scientific linguistic research. This linguistic organ generates all and only grammatical sentences in a specific language. The creativity exemplified by speakers and hearers in producing and understanding new sentences can be directly derived from the functioning of this organ. Skinner, on the other hand, believes that human behaviour is actually continuous and undifferentiated though, as observed in adults, it features a diversified repertoire resulting from emergence of new forms of behaviours. Not only that, he also explains how the shaping of new behaviour depends upon the recognition that human behaviour is in nature continuous. While Harris emphasizes the ever-newness of meaning generated in the flow of contexts, he also implies the sameness of all integration process only that this process is guided by the principle of cotemporality and is time-bound. Moreover, the three authors’ accounts reflect three different views of ‘temporality’. To put in general terms, Chomsky’s theory abstracts away ‘time’ by not looking into language use; so what is new is virtually already there. Skinner does not recognize the time-boundedness of human behaviour; instead, he believes in the existence of general laws of behaviour which could be applied repetitively to produce and control behaviours. In contrast, Harris strongly underlines the situatedness of human communication and sign-making; his understanding of ‘new’ meaning recognizes the fundamental shiftiness of time and contexts.